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How do editors of a Sunday newspaper magazine, a section first developed in the 
late 19th century to increase circulation, manage the interplay between editorial values 
and business values in producing a weekly publication for a daily newspaper? How did 
these editors’ values change when other newspapers began eliminating their own Sunday 
magazines due to high costs and low advertising revenues? This project answers these 
questions through a 50-year case study of The Washington Post’s Sunday magazine, from 
1961-2011. In particular, this study examines the attitudes, perceptions and motivations 
of Sunday newspaper magazine editors in producing a section that is unlike any other.  
Sunday newspaper magazines “challenge classification,” writes magazine 
historian William Howard Taft (1982), because they blend the aesthetics and editorial 
packaging of a magazine, but are produced in newspaper newsrooms that are rooted in 
traditional journalistic values such as objectivity and public service to society.   
This study accomplishes three things. First, it provides a broad history of Sunday 
newspaper magazine sections, including their technological, economic and cultural 
influences on the newspaper industry. Second, the case study of The Washington Post’s 
Sunday magazine, starting with the founding of Potomac in 1961, illuminates for the first 
time the various business strategies, editorial opportunities, challenges and personalities 
that defined the publication over a 50-year period. Finally, this qualitative study reveals 
that Post magazine editors’ pursuit of positive recognition and professional acceptance by 
the daily newspaper’s most respected reporters and editors largely informed their 
professional values, which often included a strong distaste for the business of publishing. 
Moreover, Post magazine editors often sought to protect or bolster their internal status by 
copying the editorial approach of the most highly regarded Sunday magazine in the 
industry, The New York Times Magazine. Through the lens of institutional theory, such 
actions can be seen as highly irrational given that the Times serves a distinctly different 
audience (namely, national) and enjoys a much broader advertising base.  
Newspapers across the country have been eliminating their locally produced 
Sunday magazines over the past 30-plus years due to economic reasons, as opposed to a 
lack of reader interest. High costs and weak advertising revenues often receive the blame 
from publishers who announce the shuttering of their magazines. For the once venerable 
Sunday magazine to survive, and perhaps even enjoy a resurgence of sorts, this study 
shows that editors will need to reevaluate their professional motivations and find a better 
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 As I write this, on Sunday, February 17, 2013, a copy of The New York Times sits 
nearby on the floor of my home office. Inserted within the massive Sunday edition is the 
Times’ high-end monthly style magazine, titled simply T. It is physically substantive and 
elegant; its pages are perfectly bound by glue, in the same way most thick magazines are.  
 The first hint of editorial copy can be found on page 70. Between the cover and 
70 is nothing but full-page advertisements. Giorgio Armani. Ralph Lauren. Chanel. 
Gucci. Prada. It goes on and on and on. Eventually, there are a handful of feature stories 
and many more short items; this month’s Sunday magazine is dedicated to women’s 
fashion and totals 226 pages in all. This is in addition to the Times’ separate weekly 
general-interest Sunday magazine, which comes in at “only” 56 pages. 
Page 70 of T is the Editor’s Letter, which is titled “Welcome to Change.” It’s 
mildly clever because this is the first issue produced by new editor Deborah Needleman, 
who left The Wall Street Journal’s luxury and style magazine WSJ to join the Times, and 
also because the issue is introducing the spring season’s new fashions. But to media 
observers and scholars alike, the title could represent something else. In looking out 
across the thinning national landscape of Sunday newspaper magazines, “Welcome to 
Change” could be read as a sign of things to come for the entire newspaper industry. 
With fewer than 10 locally produced weekly Sunday magazines still in publication—
down from approximately 225 in 1979, due to a variety of reasons that are almost entirely 
economic—it is quite possible that the secret to the section’s survival lies in the 
willingness of editors and publishers to change how they view and approach their jobs.  
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 Since the beginning of my doctoral studies at the Philip Merrill College of 
Journalism at the University of Maryland, I knew I wanted my dissertation to be directly 
relevant to the newspaper industry. I entered academia from the journalism profession, 
most recently as managing editor of Presstime magazine, a trade journal that covered the 
business operations of newspapers. 
During my time at Merrill, I wrote a research paper on how the journalism trade 
press portrayed the founding and early development of USA Today, which premiered in 
1982 and married colorful magazine-like page designs with relatively short, often upbeat 
stories (Lemberg, 2009). The trade press was downright hostile toward the self-
proclaimed “nation’s newspaper,” dubbing it McPaper, or fast-food journalism that was 
big on style and short on substance.  
While researching that paper in the stacks of the Levin Library, I came upon a 
Columbia Journalism Review article from 1986 that questioned whether locally produced 
Sunday magazines deserved to survive. The author, Michael Shields, argued that Sunday 
magazines were expensive to produce and often served little editorial or business value to 
the newspapers that published them. Shields seemed to ask more questions than he 
provided answers, and so I moved on because I had a research paper to finish.   
 A few months later, I was teaching an undergraduate magazine writing course at 
Merrill and invited The Washington Post’s Sunday magazine editor, Tom Shroder, to 
speak to my class. He was witty, insightful and self-deprecating; the students loved him. 
Tom and I talked for a while after that class, and I told him about the CJR article from 
1986 that I had found. Sunday magazines were still in grave trouble, he explained. Since 
the mid-’80s, numerous newspaper publishers had eliminated their Sunday magazines for 
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financial reasons, despite the sections’ popularity with readers. Tom was the last editor of 
Tropic, the award-winning Sunday magazine of the Miami Herald. The magazine was 
eliminated in 1998 because of high production costs and low advertising revenues. 
Moreover, Tom told me, he was about to accept a buyout from The Washington Post. The 
newspaper had a new publisher and a new editor, and it was clear to Tom that the Post 
wanted to take the magazine in a new direction: shorter articles, and more special editions 
about such topics as home design and travel. He wasn’t interested in helping the 
Washington Post make more money; he was an editor who wanted to tell interesting 
stories.   
It was then that I decided to study Sunday newspaper magazines, specifically the 
interplay between their editors’ journalistic values and business values. This dissertation 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Lindsay Ess had a passion for clothing. As a high school student, she would often 
spend up to an hour choosing the right outfit for an evening out with friends. Ess went on 
to study fashion merchandising at Virginia Commonwealth University, earning her 
bachelor’s degree in 2007, and lined up a job following graduation to teach fashion 
marketing at an area high school.  
But on the first day of school, Ess was not in a classroom sharing her thoughts on 
clothing. Instead, she was lying in an intensive care unit following the amputation of both 
her arms and both her legs. 
Weeks before the start of the school year, Ess underwent surgery to remove part 
of her intestines. In 2006, she was diagnosed with Crohn’s disease, a chronic disorder 
that causes severe inflammation of the digestive track. The surgery was a somewhat 
common procedure for Crohn’s patients. However, Ess quickly became severely ill and 
immediately had to undergo a second surgery to remove more of her intestines. In 
addition, she developed a bacterial infection that caused sepsis, a life-threatening blood 
disorder, and doctors were left with little choice but to amputate all four of her limbs in 
an effort to save her life (Lohmann, 2008). 
At the age of 24, Ess was a quadruple amputee living at home with her single 
mother. Ess could not bathe, brush her hair or get dressed without assistance. Going to 
the bathroom was a major undertaking. Yet, one year later, Ess was not only walking 
again, with the help of prosthetics, but also teaching an undergraduate fashion course at 
her alma mater.  
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Freelance writer and photographer Matt Mendelsohn had spent months in mid-
2008 documenting the life and challenges of Ess, and successfully pitched it as a cover 
story to editors of The Washington Post Magazine. Despite their initial interest in and 
commitment to the feature, however, editors of the Post magazine opted not to run it. In 
September 2009, Mendelsohn speculated as to why, saying his piece was killed because 
new Washington Post Publisher Katharine Weymouth believed that advertisers didn’t like 
“depressing” stories (Kurtz, 2009, C3). Mendelsohn said he did not think Weymouth 
actively sought to have his feature squashed. Rather, he believed that by voicing her 
opinion about wanting to see more stories with a happy tone in the magazine, it “set the 
stage for the piece to get killed” (Kurtz, 2009, C3).  
 “Whatever Katharine may have felt about the piece was immaterial to the editorial 
process,” said the Post’s executive editor, Marcus Brauchli, in the 2009 news story. 
Disputing Mendelsohn’s account, Brauchli explained that the Ess article was killed 
because of the magazine’s shifting editorial strategies. “We are not driven by what one of 
our business-side colleagues, or even our publisher, thinks about a piece. We follow a 
journalistic compass” (Kurtz, 2009, C3). Brauchli explained that the Sunday magazine 
was in the midst of a shift in editorial emphasis, away from long, narrowly focused 
stories. To suggest he was trying to please advertisers was simply “nonsense,” Brauchli 
said (Kurtz, 2009, C3).  
Based on this rationale, the primary point of conflict in the Post not publishing 
Mendelsohn’s story was the notion that business interests somehow trumped journalistic 
interests. But whether the decision was based on creating a more inviting content 
environment for advertisers or improving Sunday circulation, I believe business 
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considerations were central to the shift away from stories like Mendelsohn’s. After all, 
newspapers make almost all of their money through two revenue sources: advertising and 
circulation. For nearly two hundred years, newspapers have earned the lion’s share of 
their revenue through advertising, with circulation revenue typically accounting for less 
than 20% of earnings (Pew Research Center, 2011). Yet, the two revenue streams are 
directly connected; advertising rates are based largely on the number of newspapers sold. 
This is the very foundation of the “penny press” business model, starting in the 1830s, 
whereby newspapers were sold for one cent—as opposed to the then-typical six or eight 
cents—to generate a wider audience and enable publishers to charge advertisers more to 
reach that audience. In the Post article, Weymouth even explained that her paper’s 
Sunday magazine was created some 50 years earlier “to drive readership, to draw people 
into the Sunday paper” (Kurtz, 3C). In short, the magazine section’s very existence was 
and remains a business determination. 
 
Purpose of Study  
This study is an examination of the attitudes and perceptions of former and 
current magazine editors at The Washington Post to better understand how and why they 
navigated the gray areas between news values and business values. I define “business 
values” broadly as the pursuit of revenue and profit, either through circulation or 
advertising. Ultimately, I sought to answer the following research questions: 
* How did editors of the Post magazine perceive the primary purpose of the 
publication?  
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 * What were magazine editors’ motivating factors in determining editorial 
content?  
 * How did the magazine editors navigate the internal politics and culture of The 
Washington Post in producing a Sunday section that was both a part of and distinct from 
the rest of the newspaper? 
Sunday newspaper magazines are interesting subjects of study because they 
“challenge classification” (Taft, 1982, 223) and must attempt to straddle the line between 
the two media. They typically package and produce content in the manner of a magazine, 
but operate in a newspaper newsroom environment where professional journalistic values 
reign supreme. Among other things, these values have historically included a willing and 
often gleeful ignorance of the advertising and business operations of their own newspaper 
(Schudson, 1981; Meyer, 2004). To maintain their credibility with readers and their 
editorial independence from commercial pressures, journalists have long purposely 
shielded themselves from their paper’s financial workings. The problem is that the 
financial positions of locally produced Sunday magazines are in a long downward spiral.  
In 1977, the Louisville Courier-Journal and the rotogravure printing company 
Standard Gravure, which printed many of the country’s Sunday magazines at the time, 
commissioned a study to explore the future of the Sunday supplement. Conducted by the 
Institute for the Future, the study found that Sunday newspaper magazines were facing 
something of an identity crisis, with general-interest editorial content that wrongly 
attempted to appeal to all Sunday newspaper readers, as opposed to a distinct audience 
like most sections of the newspaper. Advertisers were not necessarily interested in 
reaching every type of newspaper reader, and the study’s authors correctly envisioned a 
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time in the near future when advertisers would have more media options to target their 
messages to distinct audiences. In the late 1970s, advertisers were buying space in 
Sunday magazines because these were often the only sections that could publish in four 
color. The authors noted that advances in printing technologies would soon enable 
newspapers to print color in other sections, thereby greatly minimizing Sunday 
magazines’ draw.  
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 looks at news values in the journalism 
industry, and the evolution of editorial decision making due to technological and 
economic changes in publishing. The chapter explores the advent of professionalism in 
the news media industry and the various market forces that have influenced content 
creation over the years. Chapter 3 examines the history of Sunday newspaper magazine 
sections, from their conception in the late 1800s, to the rotogravure photo sections of the 
early to mid-1900s, to the modern Sunday magazine. The chapter will also examine the 
various factors that have led to the decline and near elimination of locally produced 
Sunday magazines in U.S. daily newspapers. Chapter 4 is a history of The Washington 
Post and its Sunday magazine, as well as the business behind the newspaper. In addition, 
this chapter examines magazine-style storytelling at the Post and its influence on the 
Sunday magazine. Chapter 5 explores two theories, institutional theory and social identity 
theory, and their application in furthering understanding of individual and organizational 
behavior within a news media company. Institutional theory serves to explain the pursuit 
of social and economic legitimacy through conformity to established practices, even 
when the adoption of such practices is inefficient or irrational, and how this drive for 
sameness leads to a codification of norms and practices that become difficult to change 
	  
	   6	  
over time. Social identity theory attempts to explain the pursuit of positive 
distinctiveness, and how individuals measure and continuously self-evaluate their identity 
through their perceptions of different social groups. It is a self-evaluative process, as 
identity is measured in comparison between the perceived social standing of one’s own 
group and that of other groups. These are highly relevant theories for a study that seeks to 
examine professional attitudes within a competitive newspaper newsroom environment. 
Chapter 6 outlines the methodology of this study. In triangulating the data, I 
blended the case study method, which I used to examine a 50-year history of the Post’s 
Sunday magazine—starting with the launch of Potomac in 1961—with the grounded 
theory method, which I used to analyze in-depth interviews with 13 editors who have led 
the Post’s Sunday magazine. In addition, I analyzed news accounts, internal company 
documents and interviews with various Post business-side executives, largely for the case 
study portion of this study. The final two chapters, 7 and 8, contain Findings and 
Discussion. The Findings of this study suggest that Post magazine editors’ attitudes 
toward content creation were largely rooted in a desire to earn greater professional 
respect from colleagues throughout the Post newsroom. Almost all magazine editors 
came to the job from other sections at the Post and they routinely maintained traditional 
newspaper newsroom values, including distaste for the consideration of business values 
in editorial decision-making. In addition, because magazine editors were afforded a high 
degree of editorial autonomy over their section and matters of editorial decision-
making—such autonomy was the norm for all Post section editors—the magazine 
struggled to maintain a consistent and coherent editorial identity. In the pursuit of status 
within the newsroom, editors often attempted to mimic The New York Times Magazine, 
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despite the fact that the Times served a very different readership and advertising base than 
the Post. 
 In the final chapter, I discuss an extension of institutional theory through the use 
of social identity theory to explain how and why Washington Post magazine editors were 
able to pursue editorial strategies that were often misaligned with their two main 
audiences: local readers and local advertisers. In addition, Chapter 8 discusses why 
editors were allowed to operate a magazine that routinely lost money, and the possible 
implications for the future of Sunday magazine publishing as newspapers’ print 
advertising revenues continue to shrink due to heightened digital competition.  
 
Background and Context 
During my 13-year career as a journalist at newspapers and magazines, and 
having seen a number of differences in the working relationships between the editorial 
and business departments at each type of media—it was largely nonexistent at the 
newspapers and routine at the magazines—I was always fascinated by the organizational 
and cultural norms that shape the behavior of different newsroom professionals. By 
examining a locally produced Sunday magazine, I hoped to shed some light on how its 
editors attempted to balance the editorial values that define most newspaper newsrooms 
with the commercialism that is inherent in editorial decision-making at many magazines. 
I selected the Post magazine for a number of reasons, including the fact that it was among 
the few locally produced Sunday magazines still in publication. In addition, the Post 
newspaper is among the industry leaders in content innovation; it was among the first 
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U.S. newspapers to publish a “style” section, in 1968, and among the first U.S. 
newspapers to launch a website, in 1996.  
Newspaper magazine sections were developed in the late 1800s to boost Sunday 
readership. They featured fiction, poetry and reader contests. There were stories about 
mysterious medical maladies, personality profiles and an assortment of articles about 
food, fashion and travel. Above all, these special Sunday sections featured color printing 
and pages upon pages of photographs. Newspapers soon began using a new printing 
process for their Sunday magazines called rotogravure, which provided enhanced color 
reproductions. The sections became a huge draw for readers and advertisers alike.  
But as the Institute for the Future predicted in 1977, Sunday magazines would 
lose much of their commercial value when color-printing capabilities expanded to others 
sections of the newspaper. This included newspapers offering targeted distribution of 
preprinted advertising inserts that were printed on similarly glossy paper. In addition, less 
expensive alternatives existed in the form of nationally syndicated Sunday magazines. 
William Randolph Hearst’s American Weekly was the first syndicated Sunday magazine, 
in the late 1890s. Today, Parade and USA Weekend are the two largest nationally 
syndicated newspaper magazines, serving approximately 1,450 newspapers combined. 
Newspaper companies are all too happy to carry one—and on rare occasion both—of the 
nationally syndicated magazines because it bolsters the Sunday edition at a relatively 
modest cost (Machalaba, 1982; Reilly, 1991). Sunday editions are almost always the 
highest circulation edition of the week and generate the most advertising revenue. In 
addition to Parade and USA Weekend, there are a handful of other syndicated magazines, 
including the monthly food title Relish and the middle-America, small-market weekly 
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magazine American Profile, both owned by Publishing Group of America in Franklin, 
Tennessee. (The history and evolution of syndicated magazines will be expanded upon in 
Chapter 3.)  
From more than 120 locally produced Sunday newspapers magazines in the late 
1950s (Danilov, 1957), the number ballooned to approximately 225 in 1979 (Kurtz, 
1982).1 But this declined to 60 in the late 1980s (Turbett, 1999) and to 22 in 1997 (Jones, 
1997). “Part temple, part playground, [the Sunday magazine is] where writers stretch and 
readers curl up,” reported the American Society of Newspaper Editors shortly thereafter. 
“It’s a diminished, even endangered, world full of spirit and short on cash. It probably 
won’t be around forever” (Woodward, 1999, 15).  
By the end of 2011, only six newspapers published their own weekly Sunday 
magazine. In addition to low advertising revenues, high printing and distribution costs are 
most often cited as the reason newspapers shutter their Sunday magazines (Garneau, 
1991; Editor & Publisher, 1995; Fitzgerald, 1998). Newspapers that still publish their 
own Sunday magazines are The Boston Globe, The Kansas City Star, The New York 
Times, The Seattle Times, The Washington Post and the Albuquerque Journal. The 
Journal actually publishes four different magazines, with each subject-specific magazine 
appearing on a different Sunday every month. (Of the six magazines, the Albuquerque 
Journal, The Boston Globe, The Seattle Times and The Washington Post also carry 
Parade. The Kansas City Star also carries USA Weekend. The New York Times, which 
has a national circulation and draw largely from a national advertising base, does not 
carry a syndicated magazine.) With the exception of the Journal’s magazines, the locally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  number	  included general feature sections, so it is not entirely clear how many 
were traditional magazine sections.	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produced magazines largely remain general-interest publications; all are published on a 
higher quality paper stock than the rest of the newspaper and maintain printing 
dimensions similar to most consumer magazines. At least three other newspapers, the 
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and the Toledo Blade, publish 
Sunday sections titled “Magazine”—the Blade’s is just a single page, consisting mostly 
of photography—but the sections are printed on newsprint in a broadsheet format. They 
are essentially feature sections with stories about outdoor activities, food and local 
events.  
 
Newspapers, Magazines and Journalistic Culture 
But many newspapers have not given up on the value of magazines. The Christian 
Science Monitor, for example, ceased publication of its 100-year-old five-day-a-week 
print newspaper in 2008, opting instead to focus its editorial efforts online. The Monitor’s 
only print presence is now a glossy Sunday magazine (Edmonds, 2009); the news 
organization is partially subsidized by the First Church of Christ, Scientist (Edmonds, 
2012). In San Francisco, The Chronicle newspaper—owned by Hearst Corp., which also 
publishes Cosmopolitan, Esquire and Seventeen magazines, among many others—began 
printing its front page, section fronts and various other pages on magazine-like high-
quality paper in November 2009, to be a “better newspaper for both its readers and 
advertisers” (Vega and Bushee, 2009). By adopting the paper stock and some of the 
production capabilities that have traditionally defined magazines, The Chronicle sought 
to highlight the aesthetic value of print. And in September 2010, The Sun in Baltimore 
reintroduced its Sunday newspaper magazine, formerly a weekly that was killed off in 
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1996, as a quarterly high-end lifestyle publication (Serpick, 2010). It has since been 
increased to six times a year. Other newspapers have similarly launched new magazines, 
often published monthly, that are distributed only to affluent readers and target high-end 
luxury goods advertisers. These include the Houston Chronicle (Gloss), the Dallas 
Morning News (FD Luxe) and the San Francisco Chronicle (San Francisco Chronicle 
Magazine). 
Since at least 1997, newspaper magazines have been working to modify their 
editorial content to “attract the right readers and advertisers,” specifically affluent and 
educated readers and luxury-goods advertisers (Jones, 1997, 10). Among the many 
challenges, according to Ann Gordon, former editor of the now-defunct Cleveland Plain 
Dealer’s Sunday magazine, is that “some [Sunday magazine] editors find it hard to shake 
their newspaper pasts and think like a magazine editor” (Jones, 1997, 40). That idea is 
among this study’s central areas of examination. Because newspapers remain general-
interest publications, albeit with subject-specific sections that feature much of the same 
content that their Sunday magazines have historically pursued—such as sports, home 
design and food, for example—identifying and focusing on a “right reader” remains a 
challenge for most Sunday magazine editors. 
McQuilken differentiates newspapers from magazines by explaining that 
newspapers “thrive on conflict” in bringing editorial value to readers, while magazines 
“thrive on aesthetics” (1992, 45). That is obviously a general statement, but it does speak 
to some of the cultural and operational differences between most newspapers and 
consumer magazines. Newspaper journalists have long defended the value of the 
proverbial “church-state” divide, whereby news operations are kept separate from 
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business departments to protect reporters and editors from potential economic pressures. 
The ability to plead ignorance about their publication’s commercial interests also enables 
journalists to better maintain credibility with readers and to appear objective in the 
gathering and reporting of news (Tuchman, 1978; Schudson, 1981; Mindich, 1998; 
Downie Jr. and Kaiser, 2003). In contrast, editorial independence from advertising 
considerations isn’t necessarily the norm at many consumer magazines, particularly those 
with narrow, category-specific editorial missions and high levels of competition 
(Peterson, 1964; Tebbel, 1969; Taft, 1982; Abrahamson, 1996). From their very 
conception, these consumer magazines work to build a targeted base of readers with 
specific shared interests who are of value to certain categories of advertisers (Johnson 
and Prijatel, 2006). As Bagdikian writes, “The role of most magazines, as seen by their 
owners, was to act as a broker in bringing together the buyers and sellers of goods. There 
was, and still is, a significant difference among magazines in how far they go to sell their 
readers to advertisers. But the influence of advertising on magazine content continues” 
(2004, 243-4). Steinem similarly decried the influence of advertisers on editorial content, 
specifically in women’s magazines, noting that food, clothing and beauty product 
companies often required women’s magazines to publish favorable, non-controversial 
editorial content in return for an ad buy. “That’s why women’s magazines look the way 
they do….The myth that advertisers simply follow readers is very strong” (Steinem, 
1990). In actuality, she contended, advertisers followed editorial content in magazines 
that dutifully affirmed the commercialism and consumerism that such advertisements 
promoted.  
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As Brauchli’s comments show in discussing why the Post magazine chose not to 
publish the Lindsay Ess feature, newspaper journalists are deeply protective of their 
editorial independence from advertising-related pressures, whether real or perceived. The 
notion that a story is published, or not published, out of deference to a newspaper’s 
pursuit of advertising revenue runs counter to the professional norms and practices that 
have long defined newspaper journalism (Schudson, 1981; Squires, 1993; Auletta, 1998; 
Bagdikian, 2004). Another reason for such autonomy is rooted in the journalistic purpose 
of truth-telling, as newspapers “need to draw a fortification around work meant to inform 
people of the facts and arguments they need to understand to function effectively as 
citizens of a self-governing community” (Fuller, 1996, 202). Studies have shown that 
broadcast and magazine reporters maintain similar professional values (Weaver and 
Wilhoit, 1986). And yet, there are numerous examples of print publications’ commercial 
interests trumping journalistic ones, most notably the failure of many newspapers and 
magazines in the 1970s and ’80s to publish stories about the health risks associated with 
tobacco products, out of fear of losing lucrative tobacco-related advertising (Smith, 1978; 
Soley and Craig, 1992; Bagdikian, 2004). Cigarette makers were major print advertisers, 
particularly following a 1971 law that banned tobacco advertising from television. And a 
2000 study by the Pew Research Center and the Columbia Journalism Review found that 
more than one-third of nearly 300 journalists surveyed said that stories often or 
sometimes go unreported because the stories might hurt the financial interests of their 
news organization (Pew Research Center, 2000). The study did not detail who within the 
news organizations made the decision to ignore certain stories, only that, according to 
journalists, stories went unreported for the good of the news organization’s bottom line.  
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Research has shown that weekly supplements and lifestyle sections are almost 
always launched or redesigned for the primary purposes of generating adverting revenue 
and they are discontinued primarily due to a lack of advertising support (Kenney and 
Lacy, 1987; Chalaby, 1989; Attaway-Fink, 2004). In January 2009, nine months before 
Kurtz’s article about Mendelsohn’s dropped feature, The Washington Post announced 
that it was discontinuing Book World as a stand-alone Sunday section and would simply 
publish fewer book reviews through its existing Style and Outlook sections. In the article 
that reported the elimination of Book World, Brauchli explained that the primary reason 
for the decision was cutting expenses at a time of declining advertising and circulation 
revenues (Kurtz, 2009). Days earlier, in an online Q&A with readers to explain other 
changes to the Post’s Sunday newspaper, Brauchli was even more pointed in his 
explanation: 
“Alas, we are in a business, and the business requires us to produce a product 
that our advertisers will support. It is true that we publish nearly as many book 
reviews and as much book news as we did in the stand-alone Book World section. 
But those reviews are now in sections that, on the whole, are advertising 
supported” (Brauchli, 2009). 
This apparent lack of consistency in explaining how and why different editorial 
decisions are made at the Post highlights the difficulties journalists at newspaper 
companies face in maintaining and defending longstanding professional standards of 
practice. In describing the differences between what journalists routinely say about their 
professional practices and what they typically do, Zelizer (1993) writes that the culture of 
journalism is defined by the symbols, narratives and myths that journalists use to make 
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sense of themselves. As an interpretive community, journalists negotiate among 
themselves and collectively determine the legitimacy of professional practices. Part of the 
challenge is that many newspaper journalists define organizational values and journalistic 
culture based on the professional standards that inform the production of hard-news 
sections, mainly the front news section, rather than the lifestyle- and entertainment-
themed sections that follow (Boczkowski, 2009). Soft news carries lower status in the 
news industry because such stories don’t often convey public affairs content (Hughes, 
1981; Patterson, 2000; Baum, 2003). Temporality is another key factor that differentiates 
hard and soft news, with hard news receiving immediate attention and swift publication; 
in contrast, soft news is far less reliant on the news value of timeliness and can therefore 
make the scheduling of publishing more manageable (Tuchman, 1978; Hughes, 1981; 
Schudson, 1986). Because magazines typically publish weekly, monthly or even less 
frequently, they are far more reliant on soft news content than daily newspaper sections 
are. Although a number of magazines publish public affairs content, one of the key 
differentiators between hard and soft news, most magazines make ample use of lifestyle 
stories and service journalism pieces that can be assigned and published over long 
periods of time without becoming dated. 
Further complicating matters is the fact that The Washington Post is unique 
compared to most U.S. dailies. For example, the Post has long considered itself a local 
newspaper, but because it is based in the nation’s capital much of its news coverage over 
the years has focused on national politics and policy as well as international news. In 
addition, the newspaper has largely maintained a newspaper advertising monopoly in the 
Greater Washington, D.C. area since the 1950s, when it cornered the morning newspaper 
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market after buying the rival Washington Times-Herald. The Post’s last true newspaper 
competitor, the afternoon Washington Star, went out of business in 1981. The 
Washington Times was launched the following year, but it has provided little competition 
for advertising or circulation revenue (Ellison, 2012). In 1991, the Post had a weekday 
circulation of approximately 800,000, compared to about 100,000 for the Times, and two-
thirds of Times subscribers also purchased the Post (Jones, 1992). According to recent 
audit numbers, the percentage difference between the two papers’ weekday circulation—
the Times does not published a Sunday edition—remains about the same. This earning 
power has enabled the Post to absorb a certain amount of financial losses when it comes 
to experimenting with new editorial sections or revamping existing ones. Lastly, because 
The Washington Post is family owned—the Post Co. is publicly traded, but the Graham 
family and close associates maintain all voting shares of its dual-class stock—the 
newspaper hasn’t faced the same short-term financial pressures that have plagued other 
public newspaper companies. Taken together, these factors make the Post a distinct U.S. 
daily newspaper. But in many ways, as this study uncovered, these same factors have also 
restricted Sunday magazine editors’ willingness to re-evaluate the proper balance 
between editorial and commercial values in producing their weekly section.  
Gade (2004) found three types of newspaper editors: those who resist changes in 
the profession of newspaper journalism because changes are perceived to be market, or 
commercially, driven; those who accept the need to change because they accept the 
connection between market considerations and editorial goals; and those who feel 
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conflicted and frozen by the connection between journalism and business imperatives.2 
“Obviously, habits are hard to break. Change is as much social as it is mechanical; it 
threatens specific social work arrangements that newspaper employees have crafted” 
(Sylvie and Witherspoon, 2002, 194). 
The newspaper industry is currently facing hard times. Print advertising revenues 
have plummeted due to increased competition from digital media, and circulation has 
been in decline since 1990, as people have turned to other sources of information, namely 
cable television and the Internet (Beckett, 2010). In 2011, print advertising revenues for 
the U.S. daily newspaper industry were half of what they were just five years earlier, a 
loss of some $20 billion (Pew Research Center, 2012). Hundred-plus-year-old daily 
newspapers have gone out of business (Perez-Pena, 2009), while others have reduced 
print publication to three or four days a week (Beaujon, 2012). As newspaper companies 
continue to battle for their survival, the once venerable locally published Sunday 
newspaper magazine could reemerge as a key weapon to showcase the relevancy and 
power of print—to readers and advertisers alike—in an increasingly digitized world. That 
is, if the editors charged with creating these sections are able to effectively navigate their 
organization’s internal culture and the interplay between journalistic and business values. 
To be sure, it will not be easy. Around six months before the Lindsay Ess feature 
was spiked, allegedly for being too depressing and a potential turnoff to advertisers, the 
Post magazine published a cover story by staff writer and columnist Gene Weingarten 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Gade	  used	  two	  surveys	  to	  conduct	  his	  study.	  The	  first	  went	  to	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  
journalists	  at	  17	  newspapers	  that	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  change	  initiatives.	  The	  
second	  survey	  went	  to	  top	  newsroom	  managers	  at	  the	  same	  newspapers.	  The	  
surveys	  sought	  to	  assess	  respondents’	  attitudes	  about	  the	  change	  processes	  and	  
how	  well	  the	  changes	  aligned	  with	  organizational	  values	  and	  goals.	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about parents who accidentally killed their own children by leaving them strapped into 
the backseats of hot, park cars for hours on end (Weingarten, 2009). One year later, 
“Fatal Distraction” won the 2010 Pulitzer Prize in feature writing. There’s no question a 
place must exist in newspapers for great stories that examine tragedy, sorrow and the 
ability of ordinary people to cope and persevere in the face of immense pain, advertising 
be damned. The question that remains unanswered, however, is where in the newspaper 
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Chapter 2 
News Values and the Business Imperative 
 As editor of the Miami Herald’s Sunday magazine, Tropic, in the mid-1990s, 
Tom Shroder said he routinely had to fight top editors and business-side leaders for “the 
[magazine’s] right to be different” from the rest of the newspaper (McQuilken, 1992, 
150). Shroder, who would later serve as editor of The Washington Post’s Sunday 
magazine, said Tropic’s value to readers was that it was unlike every other section of the 
Herald. Unlike the daily newspaper, the Sunday magazine carried very few stories rooted 
in the news value of timeliness. In addition, Shroder proudly avoided potential stories 
that contained what he called “useful information” (McQuiklen, 1992, 151), what’s 
known in the news media industry as service journalism. Service journalism is defined as 
consumer-oriented, action-oriented or instructional stories—also known as “how-to” 
articles—that help people make choices in their lives (Scott, 1989). Examples run the 
gambit, from a story about how to select a ripe cantaloupe to a story about how to file for 
disability benefits. Tropic typically featured opinion columns, first-person accounts and 
other point-of-view articles; these are now sometimes known as “alternative journalism,” 
whereby “credibility and trustworthiness can be derived from accounts of lived 
experience, not only from objectively detached reporting; and that there need be no 
imperative to separate facts from values” (Atton, 2009, 284). Shroder said he was largely 
uninterested in editorial objectivity, a hallmark of the majority of journalism published in 
most other sections of the newspaper, and instead pursued stories and columns through 
which the writer could express opinions and attitude. That did not always sit well with 
newsroom colleagues, business-side executives and advertisers, Shroder admitted. In the 
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case of advertisers, some did not want to be associated with a point of view that they 
believed reflected poorly on their brands.   
In late 1998, the Herald shuttered its magazine; it was reported that the weekly 
publication was losing $2 million annually due to high production costs and a lack of 
advertising (Robertson, 1998). Interestingly, Shroder wanted the final issue to feature 
retrospective opinion pieces by many of the then-famous journalists who had written for 
Tropic over its 31-year history: David Barry, Madeleine Blais and Gene Weingarten, to 
name just a few. But Herald editor Doug Clifton vetoed the idea, instead wanting the 
final issue to be the magazine’s annual end-of-year gift guide because it was extremely 
popular among advertisers (Bernstein, 1998). The dueling visions—Clifton got his way—
spoke to the very point of conflict Shroder previously addressed. Shroder and his 
predecessors at Tropic sought to produce a Sunday magazine that appealed solely to 
readers—advertisers and revenue be damned. In contrast, top Herald leaders generally 
disliked editorial uniqueness when advertisers shied away from it (Bernstein, 1998). This 
point will be expanded upon later in the chapter, but many advertisers prefer to associate 
their products and messages with editorial content that positively reflects their brands.  
Since the days of Joseph Pulitzer in the late 1800s, newspapers have worked to 
keep their editorial operations separate from their business operations. This “church-
state” divide was devised to protect the independence of journalists’ editorial decision-
making processes. Keeping advertising sales representatives away from reporters and 
editors meant fewer opportunities for business interests to influence journalistic interests, 
which have long been rooted in accuracy, truth-telling, and serving as a watchdog of 
government (Schudson, 1981; McChesney, 1999; Baker, 2002). 
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That divide is not absolute, however. As this chapter will illustrate, the line that 
separates editorial and business values varies greatly based on the organization, the 
medium, and the economic considerations of the times. As Witshge and Nygren (2009) 
note, journalistic news criteria are evolutionary, changing due to shifts in social and 
cultural interests, market demands and institutional considerations. Moreover, it is nearly 
impossible to detangle the relationship between editorial content, audiences and 
advertisers; by and large, they are interwoven within the organizational fabric of most 
news companies.  
Professional journalists have long claimed a monopoly over the ability to 
determine which events and issues merit coverage, and how that coverage should be 
structured. However, determining news criteria involves a complex mix of professional 
norms and values, social structures, and market forces. These processes have been 
thoroughly examined over the second half of the 20th century (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; 
Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979; Schudson, 1989) and they have gained renewed interest in 
recent years as millions of people with no formal training in journalism have taken to the 
Internet to publish on their own (Singer, 2003; Donsbach, 2004; Allan, 2006; and Goode, 
2009).  
The study of editorial decision-making processes at a locally produced Sunday 
newspaper magazine is significant because editors of such publications operate in a 
distinct environment. Although they perform many of their professional responsibilities 
alongside their daily newspaper colleagues, the editorial product they produce is different 
from every other section of the paper. Sunday magazines are typically printed on glossy 
paper, use color inks, and mirror many of the production sensibilities of commercial 
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magazines, such as the mechanical binding and full-bleed trimming of pages. And 
because locally produced Sunday magazines are printed by third-party vendors, as 
opposed to in-house, editors work on production schedules that range from three weeks to 
multiple months ahead of time. In addition, Sunday magazines have long featured far 
more distinctive page design and photography than other newspaper sections; for most of 
the 20th century, Sunday magazines and the comics were the only sections printed with 
color inks, and editors sought to highlight their color-printing capabilities with graphic 
design elements not seen in black-and-white sections. All of these factors influence 
editorial decision-making. “Not quite newspapers but not exactly real magazines either, 
[Sunday magazines] have floundered in search of an identity that would justify their 
place in the Sunday package” (Shields, 1986, 35).  
Locally produced newspaper magazines were created in the late 1800s to bolster 
Sunday circulation. For the past 50 years, however, newspaper companies have 
increasingly measured their magazines’ success based on advertising revenue and profits 
alone. Since at least the 1980s, newspapers have consistently cited weak advertising 
revenues and high productions costs—rather than readers’ lack of interest in the 
sections—to publicly explain the discontinuation of their magazines (Editor & Publisher, 
1995; Editor & Publisher, 2001; Associated Press, 2003; Rosenthal, 2009). In this regard, 
the editorial values that inform the work of Sunday magazine journalists are clearly 
secondary to the business values of the newspaper as a whole. 
No matter the news media industry, organizational economic considerations have 
crept into journalists’ decision-making processes about which events and issues merit 
news coverage and how that coverage should be presented, a phenomenon known as 
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“market-oriented journalism.” Critics have decried the trend of treating readers like 
“consumers,” as opposed to citizens (Underwood, 1993; Squires, 1993; Bagdikian, 2004), 
yet there has also been widespread recognition throughout the news media industry that 
journalism and revenues cannot exist independent of one another. Wrote Neil Shister, a 
longtime journalist who served as the rapporteur of an Aspen Institute conference titled 
“Journalism and Commercial Success: “There is…a need to inculcate throughout the 
organization, from the members of the board to the rank-and-file, heighted commitment 
to the notion that the profession serves as a steward of public trust as well as a source of 
financial profit” (2002, vii)  
In examining the attitudes of Washington Post Sunday magazine editors and the 
factors that influence their editorial decision-making processes, this chapter will explore 
the history and evolution of journalistic news values, the role of professionalism in 
shaping how journalists do their jobs, and how external market considerations have 
influenced editorial decision-making.  
 
Journalistic News Values 
A tremendous amount of research literature exists on news production within 
media organizations large and small, foreign and domestic (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; 
Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1979; Schudson, 1989). However, very few studies exist that 
specifically examine how weekly news magazine editors determine which events and 
issues merit coverage. There have been even fewer studies of Sunday newspaper 
magazine editors (Ranly, 1981; Kurtz, 1982; McQuilken, 1992; Turbett, 1999). Instead, 
Sunday magazines have mostly been defined through anecdotal evaluations in the trade 
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press: “Sunday magazine readers were thought to be mainly female, mainly housewives, 
and, as newspaper people’s reasoning ran, mainly uninterested in anything other than 
bright profiles and looks at the annual flower show” (Shields, 1986, 35).   
Gans’ (1979) study of news values at general interest weekly newsmagazines, 
specifically Time and Newsweek, stands as the seminal work in news construction. 
Referring to journalists as “commercial employees” (229), Gans wrote that he entered the 
study assuming editors and reporters at the newsweeklies—his study also examined 
journalists at national television evening news programs—would take great pains to 
understand what their audiences wanted to read and view. However, to his surprise, 
journalists had little knowledge of who their readers or viewers were or what they were 
interested in, and regularly rejected feedback from them. “Instead, they filmed and wrote 
for their superiors and for themselves, assuming…that what interested them would 
interest the audience” (230).3 In defense of how journalists construct the news, Gans 
explained that audiences for national news magazines and TV news broadcasts were too 
large and diverse to be fully understood, and that readers and viewers don’t necessarily 
even know what they want.  
On a far smaller scale, Min (2004) studied a biweekly alternative news magazine 
in Texas and also found that editors largely perceived their audiences as similar to 
themselves demographically (older, white and educated) and politically (progressive). 
Because that particular publication operated as a nonprofit and was not focused on 
maximizing revenue, editors and writers said they wrote about whatever they believed 
was socially, culturally or politically important, rather than what readers and/or potential 
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  Gans	  defined	  “superiors”	  as	  direct	  and	  indirect	  editorial	  supervisors.	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advertisers might actually want. As one editor said, “We don’t worry so much about 
pleasing everybody all the time” (Min, 2004, 454). But such an approach is the exception 
rather than the norm in the publishing world today, particularly given the vast 
competition online for readers’ time and money as well as for advertisers’ business. 
Because The Texas Observer’s editorial mission is rooted in a politically liberal 
perspective, its advertisers know exactly what they’re aligning their brands with. 
However, the nonprofit that publishes the newspaper is still losing significant money; 
revenues are generated through donations, fund-raising, grants, subscriptions and 
advertising. Revenues in 2011 were down approximately 30% from the previous year, the 
organization lost nearly $190,000, and the print edition publishes only monthly today. At 
some point in the near future, the Observer will either run out of money and go out of 
business, or editors will need to start worrying a bit more about trying to please readers 
and advertisers.  
Scholars and practitioners alike have long developed lists of news values 
journalists employ to determine when, where and how resources should be allocated to 
cover certain events and issues. Most studies have focused on “hard” news values at daily 
newspapers (Donahew, 1967; Clyde and Buckalew, 1969; Weaver and Wilhoit, 1986) 
and/or television news stations (Harmon, 1989; Berkowitz, 1990). At both newspapers 
and broadcast TV stations, conflict, timeliness and proximity were the most prominent 
values. Others have examined the news values at weekly community newspapers, where 
proximity reigns supreme. Stories are often focused on a narrowly defined geographic 
area and the publication is emotionally connected to its readers (Byerly, 1981). 
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News values and the values for feature pieces that inform much magazine writing 
are not all that dissimilar (Ricketson, 2004). Impact, relevance, prominence and conflict 
are among the shared values, while timeliness is more relevant to news writing than it is 
to feature writing; features typically are not wedded to a daily news agenda. The true 
differences exist in focus. Feature writers focus more on subjects’ personal issues, as 
opposed to the professional issues often covered by news reporters. Feature writers focus 
more on story subjects’ emotions than on their opinions (Steenson, 2009). Lastly, there is 
an ever-increasing amount of literature about story development at online publications 
and the differing standards of news criteria between print newspapers and online 
publications (Singer, 2001; Singer, 2003; Boczkowski, 2004; Robinson, 2006). For 
example, online editorial content—whether professional journalists or amateur writers 
produce it—is more rooted in immediacy, novelty and the prominence of story subjects 
than is print content. However, newspaper journalists who also produce content for the 
Internet have largely maintained their traditional gate-keeping role online by applying 
normative news values to information gleaned from and for the Internet (Cassidy, 2006; 
Farhi, 2009; Hermida, 2010).  
Despite the many factors journalists consider when determining which issues and 
events merit news coverage, there is “no single or simple explanation of the news” (Gans, 
1979, 281). News decision-making is a complex, often hierarchical, process that involves 
such factors as institutional objectives, technical and operational factors, the manipulative 
power of news sources, and the subjective beliefs of journalists. These all fall under the 
broad conceptual framework of “gatekeeping,” or the process by which journalists 
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acquire information and decide what of that information should be disseminated to the 
public. 
White (1950) was among the earliest scholars to study editorial decision-making 
and shed some light on the processes journalists used to determine what information is 
and isn’t shared with readers. He made a middle-aged wire editor, whom he dubbed “Mr. 
Gates,” famous by studying how the man performed his “gatekeeping” function in 
selecting and rejecting various wire stories for transmission to newspapers. Mr. Gates’s 
decision-making process was often rooted in technical or operational factors, while some 
story-selection decisions seemed subjective to White, who argued that journalists’ 
personal experiences and attitudes have a sizable affect on their determination of news. 
Later research confirmed this point. Daily newspaper reporters were largely secular, left 
of center politically, and socially progressive, beliefs that informed which events and 
issues received coverage and how that coverage was portrayed (Broder, 1987; Garment, 
1991). 
In examining the gate-keeping function of 16 wire editors in Wisconsin, Gieber 
(1956) found that their personal preferences were rarely cited in determining a story’s 
suitability for transmission. Rather, the editorial values of the newsroom as a whole 
guided decision-making. The editors were “concerned with goals of production, 
bureaucratic routine and interpersonal relations within the newsroom” (1956, 175). As 
was the case with White’s study, Gieber noted that editors often declined stories based 
simply on a lack of available space. To be sure, technological advances—from news 
organizations’ adoption of the telegraph in the 1850s to the Internet in the 1990s—have 
influenced the construction of news, as routines based on the collection and 
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dissemination of editorial content has evolved. The speed by which information can be 
obtained from sources, both local and international, thanks to technological advances is 
perhaps the biggest factor that influences the types of stories news organizations publish 
(Ibold and Wilkins, 2008). At the least, it expands the opportunity for certain stories to be 
published or broadcast. Other gatekeeping studies examined the role of collective 
assessments made during daily editors meetings (Clayman and Reisner, 1989), as well as 
the maintenance of cultural and social values relating to such issues as crime (Cohen and 
Young, 1973), sexuality and health (Watney, 1987), race (Hartmann and Husband, 1974) 
and gender equality (Tuchman, 2000). 
 The definition of news also varies by era, region and medium (Demers and 
Viswanath, 1999). For example, although sensationalism in big-city newspapers took root 
in the late 19th century, such coverage expanded in the 1920s, following the advent of 
radio, and again in the 1960s and ’70s, following increased competition for audience’s 
time and attention from television. Small-town newspapers provided far less 
sensationalistic coverage than their major metropolitan counterparts, focusing instead on 
the day-to-day happens of their communities (Houchin Winfield, 2008). In the 1940s, 
The Commission on Freedom of the Press—a private effort spearheaded by magazine 
publisher Henry Luce and University of Chicago President Robert Hutchins to study and 
clarify the changing social and civic needs of the U.S. citizenry—found that journalists 
often made editorial decisions based on a desire to appeal to the broadest possible 
audience, a central component of an advertising-based business model. “When a 
journalist says that a certain event is news, he does not mean that is important in itself. 
Often it is; but about as often it is not. The journalist means by news something that has 
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happened within the last few hours which will attract the interest of the customers. The 
criteria of interest are recency or firstness, proximity, combat, human interest, and 
novelty….To attract the maximum audience, the press emphasizes the exceptional rather 
than the representative, the sensational rather than the significant” (The Commission on 
Freedom of the Press, 1947, 55). The impact and significance of the Commission’s report 
will be further examined later this chapter.  
Galtung and Ruge (1965) identified several competing and oftentimes 
overlapping news values journalists use to determine which events—in their study’s case, 
foreign-based events—merit coverage and publication: frequency, significance, clarity, 
cultural proximity, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, composition, actions of the 
elite, personification and negativity. But because newspapers are complex organizations 
that generate the preponderance of their revenues through a combination of advertising 
and circulation, it’s not unusual for different employees to interpret audiences differently. 
As DeWerth-Pallmeyer (1997) contends, “Working images of the audience are shaped to 
meet organizational needs” (4). For example, top business-side executives might see 
readers merely as a compilation of demographics that can be sold to advertisers, while 
editors might perceive readers as similar to themselves, possessing many of the same 
subject-matter interests. In addition, reporters can form views of readers from feedback 
obtained through letters, emails or comments on the street, but also via newsroom 
colleagues who bring their own biases to news criteria selection. Lastly, reporters might 
adopt a fluid view of their readers’ content wants and needs in order to convince an editor 
of a potential story’s news value. “None of these people are [sic] necessarily wrong. 
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However, each viewpoint is incomplete when taken alone” (DeWerth-Pallmeyer, 1997, 
102). 
Studies have found that editors often overestimate reader interest in crime, 
religion and sports (Bernt et al, 2000), as well as celebrity news (Atwood, 1970), and 
they underestimate reader interest in national and international news (Bogart, 1981; Atkin 
et al, 1983). It’s worth noting, as stated earlier, that news definitions vary by era and that 
they are based in large part on editors’ opinions of what readers need and desire at a 
certain point in time. At The Washington Post in the 1960s and ’70s, Executive Editor 
Ben Bradlee and Managing Editor Howard Simons were particularly interested in what 
they deemed “SMERSH”: science, medicine, education, religion…and all that shit 
(Graham, 1997), and informed writers and section editors to report on these areas more 
fully. A serious newspaper, their thinking went, covered the pursuit of knowledge and the 
maintenance of spirituality. It’s unclear if these topical interests were born from readers’ 
desires, or if the topics were simply of interest to the editors and their belief in what 
readers should care about. Perhaps it’s neither. Maybe it was just an effort to win 
additional advertising support from area hospitals, colleges, churches and synagogues. As 
previously noted, the application of news values is a complex process that includes 
organizational, cultural and commercial factors.    
Although the notion of objectivity is a cornerstone of 20th century newspaper 
journalism practice (Schudson, 1978; Mindich, 1998), surveys have shown a correlation 
between widely accepted societal values, journalists’ personal beliefs, and their 
determinations of which issues and events merit news coverage (Patterson and Donsbach, 
1996; Donsbach, 2004). Schudson (1989) calls this the “culturological approach” to 
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editorial decision-making, or the “symbolic determinants of news in the relations between 
ideas and symbols” (17). Gans (1979) categorized a number of these cultural values—
including ethnocentrism, responsible capitalism, individualism, and small-town 
pastorialism—to explain how journalists construct the news. Similarly, Tuchman (1972) 
has argued that journalists often rely on their own versions of “common sense,” derived 
from socialized structures and cultural attitudes that are taken for granted as accurate. 
“The news judgment which justifies ‘sense’ seems to be sacred professional knowledge” 
(Tuchman, 1972, 675).  
 
The Professionalization of Journalists 
In surveys dating to the 1970s, journalists saw their roles as neutral, detached 
observers that provide factual information, and also as advocates of solutions to societal 
problems who interpret or explain events (Johnstone, Slawski and Bowman, 1976). Later 
research expanded on journalists’ conceptions of their work, which included acting as 
adversaries of business and government (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1986) and as mobilizers of 
readers (Weaver et al, 2007). Rooted in each of these conceptions is the notion that 
journalism is a professional practice. 
The professionalization of journalism took shape in the late 19th century and early 
20th century, as reporters began receiving college training and, hence, a higher degree of 
respectability within society. Some have claimed that the professionalization of the 
industry was a reaction to the prevalence of yellow journalism, a form of editorial 
sensationalism that emphasized exaggerations, scandals, rumors and crime coverage. 
Yellow journalism was popular starting in the early 1900s as newspapers, particularly in 
	  
	   32	  
major cities, competed for readers’ attention in an effort to bolster circulation (Mott, 
1941; Campbell, 2001). The University of Missouri-Columbia featured the first school 
dedicated to journalism instruction, starting in 1908 (Houchin Winfield, 2008), while 
Columbia’s journalism program in New York City was founded in 1912 (Carey, 2000). 
For the first time, future reporters and editors were learning the “obligations, correct 
practices, and knowledge of historical roots and acceptable principles” (Houchin 
Winfield, 2008), enabling them the opportunity to earn the kind of societal respect 
bestowed upon professionals in the practice of law and medicine.  
Journalism education was rooted in the philosophical goal of public service in the 
support of democracy through the dissemination of information that might help people 
make informed decisions about their lives. Truth and accuracy became a hallmark of the 
profession. Reporters’ bias within news stories were frowned upon by editors and 
occasionally derided by newsroom colleagues. The journalistic purpose of serving the 
public interest held primacy over publishers’ pursuit of profit. Obviously, these standards 
were not adopted and applied consistency throughout the industry. But through formal 
education and the growth of professional journalism associations that enabled reporters 
and editors to discuss best practices, deride deviations, and celebrate through the 
administration of awards the work that best exemplified their industry, standards were 
increasingly accepted and normalized (Schudson, 1981; Sloan and Startt, 1996; Houchin 
Winfield, 2008). 
Professional journalism was to stand on the same intellectual footings as the 
learned professions of medicine and theology, as opposed to the “client-centered, 
industry-based relationships” (Ibold and Wilkins, 2008, 86) that defined accounting and 
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engineering. Other traits of journalism as a profession include members’ willingness to 
put public service ahead of financial gain, and that members produce products that vary 
greatly on a daily basis (Beam, Weaver and Brownlee, 2009). In writing about 
professionalism in general, Freidson (1986) and Scott (1995) similarly noted that 
professional authority is derived from mission-driven work that holds social legitimacy. 
The individual members that make up organized units of professionals possess expert 
knowledge, typically obtained through a common and specialized education, and define 
their own areas of interest. Because of their common educational backgrounds and 
associations with other industry professionals, operational standards and processes are 
codified, diffused and become normative. However, because professional authority is 
linked to organizational identity, changes in an organization’s mission can limit the 
power of certain professionals. Thornton (2002), for instance, tracked the institutional 
shift in the U.S. higher education book publishing industry, from an editorial logic in the 
1960s to a market-oriented logic in the 1980s. In the 1960s, many publishing companies 
were privately owned and relatively small, and their missions were rooted in 
organizational prestige and increasing book sales. Publishing was a profession. Things 
began to change some 10 years later, as higher education book publishing became a big 
business, with corporations consuming independent publishers and missions changing to 
competitive position and profit generation. With top-tier publishing houses leading this 
shift toward market gain, conformity in the pursuit of legitimacy followed. The CEO, 
whose status and authority were derived from the company’s financial success, hence 
became the dominant authority figure, as opposed to the editorial-side professional 
publisher.  
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As the newspaper industry similarly faces technological and economic challenges 
to their bottom lines, many have worried how journalists’ professional identities might be 
impacted. Washington Post political reporter David Broder once contended that the 
professionalization of journalists stood as a bulwark against publishers more interested in 
profit than social purpose. “When journalists were itinerant, hard-drinking, but lightly 
educated and poorly paid wretches, they were easily replaced by others no worse 
equipped to cover a beat or write a headline” (Broder, 1987, 325). The educated, finely 
trained journalist, whose work earns industry-wide accolades and a loyal following 
among readers, is not so easily replaced. In additional, the collective maintenance of 
professional standards throughout a newsroom can oftentimes carry as much weight as 
any commercial or political pressure. Post Publisher Katharine Graham famously used to 
say that her refusal to back down from the Nixon administration during her paper’s 
coverage of the Watergate scandal was less about standing up to the White House and 
more about not wanting to tell the newsroom to stop doing their jobs. To call off the 
Post’s reporters and editors “would have caused a newsroom rebellion that might have 
damaged the Post’s credibility far more than any political or commercial pressures from 
the administration,” according to Broder (1987, 325). In essence, the professional 
standing of workers was more advantageous to them than it was to their employers. 
Independent-minded professionals, typically motivated by public interest, simply would 
not abide by managerial efforts that might undermine their values and social standing 
(Larson, 1977; Aldridge and Evetts, 2003). 
A number of studies have examined changes in the news media industry and their 
effects on journalists’ attitudes about professional values. For example, Neuzil et al 
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(1999) found that team-based models of content creation were unpopular with newspaper 
journalists because individualism, as it pertains to creativity, is a major component of 
professional standards of practice. In noting how the professional standards of traditional 
journalistic practice, specifically original reporting and writing and a commitment to 
truth, were being challenged by online journalists, who often practiced the digital 
aggregation of others’ work and placed a high value on expediency in publishing, Singer 
(2003) argued that it was the traditional journalists who would likely have to reconsider 
existing notions of professionalism. Traditional journalists’ value systems were not 
stronger than market forces, she contended; readers and advertisers were leaving 
newspapers in drones for less expensive and even free digital media alternatives. The 
challenge for journalists is in striking a proper balance between traditional notions of 
professionalism in their print newspaper work and new practices for a relatively new 
medium.  
The professional values that define a newspaper journalist can also be different 
than the professional values of someone who writes for a magazine. Broder, the longtime 
and award-winning political reporter for The Washington Post, called newspaper 
reporters “voyeurs, not participants.” Professional newspaper journalists must be “our 
most disciplined and dispassionate when almost every human instinct impels us to give 
way to joy or pain” (1987, 343). Yet, a professional philosophy such as this runs counter 
to the professional practice of journalism often seen in consumer magazines, including 
such periodicals as The New Yorker, Mother Jones, The Atlantic and Esquire. Among the 
defining characteristics of narrative nonfiction journalism, of the type popularized by the 
likes of Thomas Wolfe, Joan Didion and Hunter S. Thompson starting the 1960s, is the 
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author’s point of view and, often, his or her own inclusion in the article as a character 
who interacts with those under examination (Macdonald, 1965; Douglas, 1991; Harvey, 
1994). In addition, narrative nonfiction often includes the recreation of dialogue that the 
reporter wasn’t present to hear and the recreation of scenes the reporter did not witness. 
But magazine journalists are afforded the opportunity, based on the professional norms 
and values specific to the medium for which they ply their craft, to be both a voyeur and 
a participant. As Abrahamson (1996) and others (Tebbel, 1969; Taft, 1982) have argued, 
magazines typically do not maintain the same public service values that define 
newspapers. That said, literary journalism isn’t the province of magazines alone; Wolfe, 
Didion and many practitioners experimented with narrative nonfiction during their time 
as newspaper reporters. The constant deadline pressures of a daily newspaper are often 
the great impediment in reporters’ ability to write such pieces (Harvey, 2004).  
Veering from any internal norms can be difficult because control of the rules and 
standards by which individual members must adhere to typically lies with managers and 
editors (McLeod and Hawley Jr., 1964), who wield the power to hire and fire, to praise 
and punish. In providing a critical definition of professionalism, Soloski contends it is a 
way for organizations to “control the behavior of reporters and editors” (1989, 207). At 
the root of this concept of professionalism is the relationship between supervisor and 
worker, whose professional future is tied to performing tasks in a proscribed way under 
the rules set by a supervisor. Consequently, “there is little reward in the professions for 
systematically re-examining the intellectual basis of professional practice” (Carey, 1978a, 
851). Although senior managers, or editors in the case of journalism, don’t necessarily 
create internal cultures, they do often enforce them or attempt to adjust them by 
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informing workers of appropriate attitudes, values and behaviors (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; O’Reilly, 1989). Culture is largely defined as socially constructed structures and 
systems through which an organization operates. The beliefs and behaviors of individuals 
feed and solidify an organization’s culture, but those beliefs and behaviors are largely the 
result of an indoctrination of sorts that are perpetuated through norms and routines. For a 
culture to persist, intensity in the adoption of norms and consensus are required 
(O’Reilly, 1989; Kanter et al, 1992).  
In this formalized system of control, individuals come to see that they should act 
and interact in certain ways, both to meet the needs of supervisors but also to potentially 
win such rewards as recognition, promotion, a salary increase, and/or enhanced 
responsibilities (Breed, 1955). “Journalists do not adhere to formal codes of 
newsworthiness that can be identified and promulgated and therefore ‘learnt’ by the 
public. Instead the informal code of what constitutes a good story is part of newsroom 
initiation and socialization. Affirmation for ‘good stories’ is confirmed in the newsroom 
by acknowledgement of superiors and by peer envy and praise” (McGregor, 2002, 2).  
It’s also confirmed and acknowledged through professional associations. 
Associations can influence professional practices through educational trainings and by 
fostering and managing discussions about deviations from established institutional norms, 
a social process that can lead to the legitimization or rejection of those deviations. If 
deviations are legitimized, professional identities can then be reconstituted under a new 
order (Greenwood et al, 2002). The newspaper industry has a number of professional 
groups and associations through which norms, codes of ethical conduct, and values are 
continually reinforced through conferences, interpersonal interactions and marketing 
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materials, such as trade publications. They include, among many others, the Society of 
Professional Journalists, American Copy Editors Association, the American Society of 
Magazine Editors, Associated Press Sports Editor and the Online News Association. 
From 1987 to the early 2000s, the Sunday Magazine Editors Association, or SUNMAG, 
brought together Sunday magazine editors on an annual basis to share best editorial 
practices and provide awards for noteworthy journalism that appeared in locally produced 
Sunday newspaper magazines. The goal of the association, largely underwritten by the 
Standard Gravure Co. of Louisville, Ky., a rotogravure printing company that printed 
many of the nation’s Sunday magazines, was to help professionalize Sunday magazine 
editors and bolster the editorial quality of the publications (Gersh, 1987). From a business 
standpoint, Standard Gravure rationalized that Sunday magazines would thrive and 
survive if they were viewed as editorially indispensible by the newspapers that published 
them. This was partially accomplished by giving out awards for top work; as they tend to 
do, newspapers dutifully boasted within their own pages about the awards their 
journalists won (Washington Post, 1992; Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 1994; Orlando 
Sentinel, 1996). Different Sunday magazine editors would serve as president of the 
association each year. However, SUNMAG disbanded in the early 2000s due to a lack of 
membership, as newspapers were eliminating their locally produced Sunday magazines 
for economic reasons. According to some of the Post magazine editors interviewed for 
this study, little attention was spent at SUNMAG conferences talking about advertising or 
the economics of magazine publishing. Typical discussions revolved around finding good 
freelance writers, the challenges in getting daily reporters to write for the Sunday 
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magazine, best practices in packaging feature stories, and new ideas for column themes 
and short sections.   
But even editorial content changes don’t come easily, particularly when 
professionals perceive that their values are being challenged. When The New York Times 
explored adding new lifestyle-oriented sections in the spring of 1976, many journalists 
throughout the newsroom were concerned about how they, and their newspaper, would be 
perceived by readers and others in the news media industry. Arthur Gelb, an assistant 
managing editor who was tasked with launching the new Weekend section, said his chief 
concern wasn’t whether the section would make money; it turned out to be hugely 
popular among readers and advertisers. Rather, it was “whether his peers and those in the 
literary and cultural community whose opinion he valued would feel the Times had sold 
its soul and cheapened itself” (Tifft and Jones, 1999, 510). 
The success of Weekend, and greater flexibility in production and printing thanks 
to technological advances, prompted the Times to further revamp the “old gray lady” into 
something more contemporary. The paper took many of its inspirations from the world of 
magazines to create design-heavy section fronts unique for each day of the week (Sports 
on Monday, Science on Tuesday, Living on Wednesday, for example). However, not 
everyone at the paper embraced these changes; many reporters and editors worried that 
the journalistic character of the Times—as well as their own professional identity as 
Times journalists—would suffer. The Times was long known for its seriousness of 
purpose. But publisher Arthur “Punch” Sulzberger knew that times had changed, and that 
the popularity of television for both entertainment and breaking news was a threat to his 
company’s bottom line. “The mission of The New York Times, Punch told one 
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interviewer at the time without a hint of shame, was first to be profitable, and then to 
cover the news, explaining that if the paper didn’t make money, ‘we can’t have any other 
mission’ ” (Tifft and Jones, 1999, 512). It’s not entirely clear why Sulzberger should 
have felt shame for admitting that a business must generate revenues in excess of its 
costs. As the newspaper scholar Philip Meyer (2004) later explained, economic ignorance 
on the part of journalists has been institutionalized, ironically at the expense of the very 
bottom lines that determine editorial budgets, staffing and other content-based resources. 
“The old convention that editors should be protected from all knowledge of the business 
side is hopelessly out of date” (Meyer, 2004, 205).  
Interestingly, news organizations have been placing a greater emphasis on 
personality traits, as opposed to professional values, when making hiring determinations 
of entry-level workers. Faced with increased competition from the Internet—for both 
revenue and people’s time—the importance of professional values in hiring decisions has 
seemingly waned. Research has shown that newspaper editors in the mid-1990s, when 
compared to the early ’80s, were increasingly interested in hiring entry-level people with 
specific personality traits and work habits that would mesh well within their 
organization’s evolving culture, specifically the embrace of change and adaptation. 
Editors ranked their interest in the professional values held by prospective employees 
relatively low, beneath technical skills, English language skills and general knowledge. 
Television news directors actually rated “professional values,” such as journalistically 
ethical standards, much higher than newspaper editors did. It is unclear why, although 
station managers may have believed that the immediacy of TV broadcasting required a 
high level of journalistic ethical standards. “Both television and print news executives are 
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more concerned with hiring new employees who can meet the demands of the 
organizational culture than they are with hiring those who can meet the demands of the 
professional culture of journalism” (Hollifield et al, 2001, 110). It is possible that these 
news organizations have come to realize that it is far easier to teach new employees the 
professional values that define the industry, than it is to teach new employees how to 
adapt to change as technological and economic circumstances demand.   
  
Market-Orientation 
To be sure, newspaper journalists are increasingly aware of the financial 
challenges their industry faces, in no small part because of staff and news hole reductions 
at their own publications (Scott and Sieber, 1992; Meyer, 2009; Sonderman, 2012) as 
well as a steady stream of news accounts in the trade press and mainstream media that 
chronicle industry upheaval (Downie and Schudson, 2009; Dorrah, 2009). In a study that 
sought to empirically map perceptions of journalistic culture and the role that economic 
considerations play in newsrooms, Kunelius and Ruusunokso (2008) interviewed a 
number of managing editors of newspapers in Finland. The authors found that most 
actively considered the business interests of their newspapers—largely in terms of 
competition for readers—in editorial decision-making. As one managing editor noted: 
“Newsrooms will have to live in economic frames which get tighter all the time, and all 
this is developing into a content production industry....You have to understand what it is 
all about, and start thinking how journalism can be renewed from within these financial 
frames” (668).  
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Entering 2010, paid weekday circulation for daily newspapers was down 31.5% 
over the previous 25 years, to approximately 43.5 million, while Sunday circulation was 
down 27%, to 45.6 million, according to the Newspaper Association of America (Project 
for Excellence in Journalism, 2010). Worse yet, advertising revenues—which make up 
the bulk of newspapers’ earnings—declined a whopping 28% in the third quarter of 2009, 
compared to the same period a year earlier (Liedtke, 2009). It was the 13th consecutive 
quarter that newspaper advertising revenues have dropped year-over-year. And the trend 
hasn’t improved. U.S. newspapers earned approximately $2 billion less in advertising 
revenues in 2011 compared to the previous year for a total of about $24 billion. Worse 
yet, for every $1 newspapers earned in online advertising, they lost $10 in print 
advertising (Lee, 2012). 
In the early 1990s, a task force consisting of newspaper editors and executives 
issued a report that outlined several strategic options dailies could employ to increase 
readership and, subsequently, advertising revenue. Among the recommendations 
developed by the Competitive Analysis Project Task Force was the individual appeal 
strategy, whereby the newspaper “creates a series of daily features and weekly specialty 
magazines and lifestyle tabs so that the various special interests of changing consumers 
are served by tightly targeted publications” (Editor & Publisher, 1992, 22TC). Perhaps 
more importantly, sectionalization would give specific would-be advertisers a print 
platform to reach a dedicated niche audience of particularly engaged readers. 
“Sectionalization makes the newspaper more accessible to readers by making its content 
more predictable, by packaging content in a convenient and manageable form….It is that 
predictability that develops readers’ emotional ties to the features, that brings readers 
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back to the paper day after day, that makes the paper’s content seem familiar and 
comfortable amidst the endless turmoil and daily turnover in the subject matter of the 
(predominantly unpleasant) hard news” (Bogart, 1989, 106).  
With varying degrees of success, newspapers have pursued niche content 
strategies in the pursuit of category-specific advertising for the past 40 years. When 
national advertising revenues began shifting away from newspapers and toward television 
and direct mail in the 1970s, many metropolitan dailies sought to reinvent themselves to 
win new readers and regain their relevancy in the eyes of advertising media buyers, who 
tended to be young and typically didn’t read newspapers (Maxwell and Wanta, 2001). 
Advertisers were no longer interested in total market coverage, even though many 
metropolitan dailies invested millions in the production and distribution of free 
advertising circulars to nonsubscriber households beginning in the 1970s. “The trend 
toward highly refined target marketing is a result of audience fragmentation” 
(Advertising Age, 1989, 48). Readers were given more feel-good feature stories, while 
new lifestyle sections and entertainment supplements were created. The rise of food 
sections in the late ’80s and early ’90s, for example, was directly related to the fact that 
supermarkets had become large print advertisers. “The outburst of features on running 
shoes and home medical test kits and dead rock stars…lent newspapers a frothy tone 
usually found in consumer magazines. These features and sections signify the adoption of 
marketing by dailies and remind us that advertising influences editorial content through 
symbiosis, not extortion” (Blankenburg, 1992, 116). 
From 1979 to 1983, 25% of daily newspapers added new “lifestyle” sections, 
while 38% of papers with a circulation of more than 100,000 created such sections 
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(Bogart, 1985). Zoned editions were also added to win over readers with specific 
geographic interests, as well as to appeal to small area businesses that couldn’t afford the 
high price of full run ad rates. In an effort to emulate the appeal of television, a number of 
publications added color to their pages—and charged advertisers a premium for the kind 
of color they previously could only purchase through the paper’s Sunday magazine—
increased the usage of photographs and charts, and began requiring reporters to write 
shorter stories (Gladney, 1994). 
Applying a market-based approach to the creation of editorial content is hardly a 
phenomenon of the 1980s and early ’90s, although Gannett Co.’s USA Today, founded in 
1982, is widely credited with taking audience research and marketing to new heights in 
the newspaper industry (Prichard, 1987). Magazines have been using market research to 
understand their readers since at least the early 1900s. Such efforts were largely in 
response to advertisers’ demands for more demographic data about readers, including 
their incomes and product-buying habits. Advertisers wanted to figure out where best to 
spend their money in an increasingly competitive field of newspapers and magazines. 
Curtis Publishing Co., which owned the two highest circulation magazines in the country 
during the 1910s, Ladies Home Journal and the Saturday Evening Post, was a pioneer in 
the use of reader market research. “To Cyrus Curtis and his staff, readers were more than 
just an audience; they were a product in themselves, something that could be defined, 
packaged and sold to advertisers. As in the commercial publishing world today, readers 
were a commodity” (Ward, 1996, 48). However, Curtis and his journalists also used the 
data to better understand their readers’ content preferences. 
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Newspapers began conducting audience studies in the 1930s (Bogart, 1985) and 
have since used them to gain a better understanding of readers’ editorial content desires. 
In addition, newspapers have used these studies to better understand the demographic 
characteristics of their readers, to better “sell” their audience to prospective advertisers. 
Beam (1995) found that 85% of newspapers hired outside consultants to conduct 
readership studies and that most newspapers used the studies to restructure feature 
sections rather than national or international news coverage in the main section. This was 
because feature sections typically contain the type of editorial content that best appeals to 
specific markets of would-be advertisers. Of course, none of this means newspaper 
journalists actually like the practice of considering audience wants. Journalists have been 
generally reluctant to “accept any procedure which casts doubt on their news judgment 
and their professional autonomy” (Gans, 1979, 232).  
However, in the early 2000s, Gade found that U.S. newspaper managers and 
journalists were still reexamining their news values, but were displaying “increased 
market consciousness” (2004, 9) out of necessity. Because of the Internet, competition 
for readers’ time and attention was fierce; moreover, newspaper circulation was on the 
decline. In years past, Stepp (2000) wrote in chronicling the changing culture of the 
newspaper industry, “newsrooms and news people were autocratic, aloof and aggressive. 
They published first and asked questions later. They brazenly built fences between 
themselves and their sources and audiences. They guarded an independence bordering on 
isolation, not only from the outside world but even from other divisions of their own 
papers. They strutted and preened in the security of reader dependence. No more.” But as 
the business of publishing changed, and newspapers in particular began losing tens of 
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millions of dollars in classified and other forms of advertising, the threat of their own 
professional mortality compelled many to approach their work a little differently.  
In 2007, Gannett Co. launched a task force that studied the content wants and 
needs of readers over the age of 40. According to the company, people 40 and older were 
the most loyal and largest age-based segment of print newspaper readers. Among the 
findings, passed along to all Gannett papers to act on, was that these readers prioritized 
local news and hard news, yet they also greatly valued lifestyle-oriented content, such as 
entertainment listings, movie and restaurant reviews, and articles about cooking and day 
trips. “For us to be most effective with the print platform, it is necessary to zero in on the 
primary audience of readers over the age of 40,” read the report (Strupp, 2008, 23). 
The Chicago Tribune took “reader engagement” to new heights in early 2009, 
when the paper sent out questionnaires to some 9,000 readers, asking them which of 10 
prospective stories they would most like to read. Each of the stories was already in the 
works. However, when word of the questionnaire became known throughout the 
Tribune’s newsroom, journalists were largely aghast. Tribune editor Gerould Kern said 
the problem was not whether it is appropriate to ask readers what they think, but rather 
unwise to talk about stories in progress because it could damage ongoing reporting 
(Wasserman, 2009). It’s a fair concern. Would-be sources could gain a false impression 
of a story and decline to talk to reporters. Or, news of the story could tip off a source 
before the reporter was prepared to seek comment, which might affect how the source 
later answers questions.  
Technological advances have made the practice of reader engagement far more 
commonplace in newsrooms throughout the country. Since at least 2000, online 
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publications, including newspapers, have used analytic technology to determine which 
stories are the most popular with readers. Based on the results, editors can adjust story 
placement online accordingly (Brill, 2001; Kiron and Shockey, 2011). When the online 
news site Huffington Post began hiring newspaper journalists in the mid-2000s, managers 
found that their new hires were largely unfamiliar with using data analytics. The new 
hires had to be re-trained to understand how Huffington Post uses data to better 
understand what its readers, and readers everywhere, are interested in knowing about 
(Shafer, 2011). A number of newspapers now use online readership data to pursue future 
like-minded stories for print and online (MacGregor, 2007). A 2009 survey of news 
managers found that approximately two-thirds checked their papers’ online analytics on a 
daily basis, and more than half said the readership/page view data were discussed in news 
planning meetings at least “fairly frequently” (Lowrey and Woo, 2010).  
As newsrooms continue to merge their print and online operations (Niles, 2005; 
Romenesko, 2009), such attention to audiences’ content interests will likely only 
increase, leading to continued consternation over the role of journalistic authority in 
determining the value of information, both from an editorial and business standpoint. Of 
course, the practice is not without its detractors. The market-oriented approach to 
determining news criteria, substituting journalists’ “expert opinion” (Beam, 1998, 2) with 
perceived reader interest, has been subject to widespread derision from practitioners and 
scholars for years. By and large, they have characterized market-oriented journalism 
strategies as an affront to the news media industry’s responsibility to provide public 
affairs information to their communities (Postman, 1985; Squires, 1993; Underwood, 
1993; McManus, 1994; Patterson, 2000; Downie Jr. and Kaiser, 2003; Bagdikian, 2004). 
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“Traditionally, the fact-gatherers and storytellers have been schooled to ignore publishing 
economics in favor of ‘objectivity’ and ‘editorial independence’ ” (Scott and Sieber, 
1992, 193). Professional journalism is a public service and a civic responsibility to serve 
as a watchdog over the various social, political and economic institutions of power that 
wield great influence over society, the argument goes. By maintaining a “church-state” 
divide between newsrooms and business departments, journalists are protected from 
potential undue influences over their work. It’s not that advertisers necessarily place 
overt pressure on newspapers to write certain stories, opponents of market-oriented 
journalism argue; rather, newspapers with strong market orientations tend to publish 
fewer stories about the government and public affairs and more stories about sports, 
amusement and lifestyle topics to create an editorial environment that is welcoming to 
would-be advertisers (Beam, 2003). “In short, the constant and increasing pressures 
growing out of the economics of modern American journalism clash with editorial 
values” (Gordon, 1998, 143). A 1999 study by Editor & Publisher magazine found that 
72% of top newspaper executives sought closer cooperation between their publications’ 
news and business departments (Mitchell, 1999). 
In the early 1940s, a private effort spearheaded by magazine publisher Henry 
Luce and University of Chicago president Robert Hutchins sought to address this very 
clash. The Commission for Freedom of the Press, formed in 1943, was charged with 
studying and clarifying the changing social and civic needs of the U.S. citizenry and how 
the news media could best serve the public in a modern democracy. It was the perceived 
over-commercialization of the news media that prompted a number of media executives, 
political leaders, business leaders and academics in the late 1940s to call for a new 
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direction within America’s news organizations. Concerned by the virtual monopoly status 
of an increasing number of metropolitan daily newspapers, they felt that too many papers 
were operating as instruments of business, seeking to appeal to prospective consumers 
rather than perform a social function on behalf of all. “The American newspaper is now 
as much a medium of entertainment, specialized information, and advertising as it is of 
news,” the Hutchins Commission, as the group became known, would later report (The 
Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947).  
The dominant theory of the press that the commission employed in making its 
recommendations was that of social responsibility, which holds that the press has a moral 
responsibility to cover the essential activities of government. The press must analyze and 
interpret occurrences of public concern so that readers can take the necessary actions to 
protect their individual, community and national interests through informed participation 
in civil society (Siebert et al, 1956). However, this notion was more ideological than 
theoretical, critics would later argue. Nerone, for example, claimed that social 
responsibility—while a laudable goal—was actually little more than a “mystification the 
media owners propound to explain their own existence. The myth of the free press in the 
service of society exists because it is in the interests of media owners to perpetuate it” 
(1995, 29). For example, libertarian theory—from whose roots social responsibility was 
born—views newspapers, first and foremost, as private enterprises that hold no moral 
obligations to the public. Newspapers are a product, a manufactured good that attempts to 
generate profits for their owners through the sales and advertising functions. “In the end, 
the success of the enterprise would be determined by the public which it sought to 
service” (Siebert et al, 1956, 52). Merrill and Lowenstein (1979) rejected the whole idea 
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of a social responsibility theory, and tried to replace it with what they deemed a “social-
libertarian theory.” Tied to the economic realities of the media industry, social-libertarian 
theory would require some governmental regulation of the press to curtail 
monopolization. With greater competition, the authors argued, the news media would be 
more likely to serve people’s informational and educational needs. Ultimately, according 
to Merrill (1989), the public will decide what type of news media they want. “The 
question of responsibility in journalism, as always in an open society, today must be 
settled by the personal definitions of the persons who use it and by the market forces in 
the society, in line with the pluralistic model and the market model” (188). One of the 
problems with Merrill’s argument is that it is prefaced on the assumption that competition 
will drive news media entities to strive to reach the highest levels of journalistic 
responsibility. Given that no news media organization utilizes metrics to measure the 
social value of their editorial content—such as political or civic engagement, for 
example—and that the market is based largely on quantity numbers such as paid 
circulation and page views, competition is just as likely to compel a news organization to 
forsake social responsibility and instead focus on sensationalism and entertainment 
coverage. Moreover, Merrill’s contention was made prior to the commercial release of 
the Internet, which has brought far more competition to traditional news media 
companies than anyone could have previously imagined.  
Nonetheless, the Commission’s critique of the news media was hardly the first. 
Dating back to 1910 and the era of the Yellow Press, social psychologist Edward 
Alsworth Ross wrote a scathing column in Atlantic Monthly magazine, calling newspaper 
editors and reporters “hired men” who put in the newspaper whatever content yielded the 
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“biggest return from the investment” to create “the largest possible marketable product” 
(1910, 305). Ross called on newspapers to become financially endowed, to disentangle 
professional editorial values from the pursuit of profit, which can get in the way of truth 
telling. Far more recently, others have proposed changes to the news media industry’s 
advertising-based business model in an effort to bolster journalism in the public’s service. 
These include governmental subsidies (McChesney and Nichols, 2010), foundation 
support (Gilmor, 2009), and creating nonprofit news operations (Guensburg, 2008). 
To be sure, the news media industry’s business model has greatly influenced the 
types of issues and events journalists choose to cover, as well as how things get covered. 
Because of the advertising-to-circulation revenue-generating disparity—typically 80%-
to-20%, respectively—advertisers tend to wield an often unspoken influence over the 
type of content generated out of many newsrooms. “A portion of the advertisers’ payment 
often goes to having the editorial content better reflect the advertisers’ interests” (Baker, 
1994, 13). This poses some significant problems when viewed through the lens of critical 
political economy, specifically how economic dynamics negatively affect public cultural 
expressions and often the flow of information to low-status social groups (Golding and 
Murdock, 1991), most notably people of modest economic means.  
Through a lens of political economy, Gomery (2003) writes that monopolies and 
strongly cooperative oligopolies, such as the broadcast television industry, have often 
used their influence of public opinion to pressure government officials to legislate in such 
a way as to protect existing media enterprises, which have long resisted new technologies 
to protect their market shares. Smythe defined the political economy of communications 
somewhat generally, as a means to “evaluate the effects of communication agencies in 
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terms of the policies by which they are organized and operated” (1960, 564). With the 
near-monopoly status many newspapers enjoyed in mid-sized markets between 1910 and 
1950, for example, newspapers increasingly focused on minimizing offensive material so 
as to appeal to the widest possible—yet commercially desirable—audience. Media 
companies that operate in an oligopoly or monopoly market structure similarly have little 
incentive to offer more innovative programming or editorial content (Webster and 
Phalen, 1994).  
However, Demers contends that the operational structure of a company is often a 
poor indicator of the journalistic value of the newspaper it publishes. In studying 
newspaper concentration and the corporatization of newspaper companies, as well as an 
extensive review of the literature, he found that bottom-line-driven corporate, or chain, 
newspapers were often “more vigorous” editorially (1999, 94) than were many privately 
owned smaller newspapers, publishing more stories that challenged established 
authorities and more tolerant of differing points of view. Others still have found few 
differences in the type of content published by privately owned versus publicly owned 
daily newspapers (Beam, 2008).4 Contrary to many of the criticisms of publicly owned 
newspaper companies, the papers Beam studied actually covered civic activities slightly 
more often than the privately owned papers did, and there was no demonstrable 
difference between the quantity of the two groups’ coverage of “soft” content, such as 
sports, home life, arts, and entertainment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Beam performed a content analysis of eight general-circulation daily newspapers, four 
privately owned and four publicly owned, in 2004. For the publicly owned sample, he 
excluded such papers as USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times 
because they seek a national audience, which influenced content decisions.	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Whether publicly owned or private, newspapers are highly likely increasingly to 
feature more editorial content of particular interest to high-paying readers and the 
advertisers who covet them; the challenge is in determining what that content should be. 
Due to advertising revenue shortfalls in recent years, newspapers continue to increase the 
price of their print products to make up for the lost revenues and, to a lesser degree, 
become less vulnerable to advertising market fluctuations. But even before large 
subscription rate hikes by newspapers, critics derided much of the news media industry 
for providing scant coverage of low-income neighborhoods, focusing instead on affluent 
communities and commercial enterprises (Squires, 1993; Badgikian, 2004). It hasn’t 
slowed. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, for example, preemptively reduced its 
circulation size in response to higher paper costs and advertising declines (AJC Staff, 
2008). The Journal-Constitution curbed distribution from outlying areas far from Atlanta, 
where the paper is headquartered, as well as from various low-income areas communities 
that are unattractive to advertisers. The ultimate goal is to bolster the “quality” of 
readership over the mere “quantity.” Said one New York Times marketing executive, 
speaking about the merits of limiting certain people’s access to the print newspaper, “We 
make no effort to sell to the mob” (Baker, 1994, 67). Squires (1993) is equally pointed in 
his critical explanation of the practice: “Because advertisers want only high-income, 
well-educated readers, [newspaper] publishers don’t really want higher penetration in 
their market. They want what magazine publishers have always wanted—higher 
penetration in the top 35% of the market. But unlike magazine publishers, newspaper 
owners can’t just admit that and begin basing rates on audience profiles” (89). The top 
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35% refers to the most demographically valuable readers, namely educated and affluent 
adults. 
 
The Elimination of Advertising  
Through the years, a number of publishers have experimented with eliminating 
advertising altogether in the name of complete editorial freedom, but most each effort 
failed due to financial constraints. Edward W. Scripps, a publisher with a growing 
newspaper empire in Ohio, had long sought to see if a daily newspaper free of advertising 
pressures could not only survive but also thrive. In September 1911, Scripps and editor 
N.D. Cochran launched the Day Book in Chicago and sold copies for a then still typical 
one cent to win the business of the widest possible audience, namely working-class 
readers. Editorial content focused on issues of particular interest to this population, 
namely stories about low wages and poor working conditions in the Chicago area, as well 
as a bevy of entertainment stories. “The Day Book remained a steadfast ally of the 
working class and the dispossessed, and a primary source of news on their struggles. The 
Day Book showed how a newspaper might keep a vigilant watch over department stores 
and other powerful advertisers, the government, and the mainstream press against which 
it competed” (Stoltzfus, 2007, 5). However, the publication lasted a mere six years, 
ending in 1917 with the anticipated rise in newsprint prices due to World War I rationing. 
With the increase in white paper costs—the publication carried a visual appeal more 
similar to a magazine than to a traditional newsprint newspaper—Cochran attempted to 
increase the Day Book’s price to two cents, but circulation dropped off. It never turned a 
profit (Stoltzfus, 2007). 
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A second notable effort to publish a newspaper absent of advertising premiered in 
New York City on June 18, 1940. The brainchild of Ralph Ingersoll, a longtime magazine 
man—Ingersoll was a former reporter at The New Yorker, managing editor of Fortune 
magazine and a general manager at Time—PM featured many of the content innovations 
that USA Today, some 50 years later, would be credited with packaging together. A 
newspaper-magazine hybrid of sorts, PM featured color pages, bold uses of photography, 
and ample graphics. But it was the fact that PM carried no advertising that most 
distinguished it from other newspapers of its time. Ingersoll believed that a newspaper 
beholden to advertisers for financial support—PM was instead funded through circulation 
and private investors, such as department store magnate Marshall Fields III—could not 
effectively provide readers with the types of stories they needed and, he believed, wanted. 
It was a newspaper with a perspective, with an attitude and, most definitely, an agenda 
(Hoopes, 1984). “Most great newspapers become great by their crusades. We propose to 
follow this tradition. But we shall crusade in a modern way,” Ingersoll wrote in his 
business proposal for PM. “However, we who are working on this new newspaper, as 
human beings, love and hate certain things. We shall not be unbiased journalists. We do 
not believe that unbiased journalism exists. Claims to emotional disinterest are, 
consciously or unconsciously, usually fraudulent” (Becker, 1964, 205). 
PM, a tabloid, was sold for 5 cents and lost money from the start. Six years into 
the venture, Field ordered the reversal of the no-advertising experiment. PM began 
accepting advertising, but the publication wasn’t able to effectively reinvent its editorial 
identity in a way that invited much business. In 1949, PM shuttered its operation (Becker, 
1964). 
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Other publications, most notably magazines, have attempted to publish without 
any advertising revenue support. In 1976, for example, a group of liberal journalists 
created a new political magazine called Mother Jones that purposefully carried no 
advertising so that editors could be free from external commercial pressures that might 
somehow impugn the editorial integrity of the publication. Mother Jones was published 
by the Foundation for National Progress, a politically progressive nonprofit group based 
out of San Francisco. Membership dues were $12 annually, of which $4 went to 
publication costs. But $4 wasn’t nearly enough, even with additional reader donations, to 
cover the actual expenses of publishing and distributing a magazine. Mother Jones’ 
editorial board put the decision to readers. It polled 2,000 of them and asked if they 
would be willing to pay up to 25% more for a Mother Jones without any advertising. A 
whopping 87% of respondents said no (Mother Jones, January 1978). “Rest assured, 
though, that more advertising will in no way change what we say in our articles,” editors 
wrote in explaining their rationale for advertising. “Indeed, after each issue goes to bed, 
we mentally cross off one or two corporations we know will never buy an ad” (Mother 
Jones, January 1978, 3). Mother Jones still publishes today, six times a year, and received 
the 2008 and 2010 National Magazine Award for general excellence, perhaps proving 
that a reliance on advertising as a revenue source does not mean editorial quality or 
integrity must suffer as a consequence.   
Gloria Steinem founded Ms. magazine as a monthly in 1972 and said she chose to 
carry advertising primarily to defray the subscription and newsstand prices for readers; 
Steinem wanted as many women as possible to read her feminist magazine. But many 
advertisers didn’t want to be in a feminist magazine, even though it reached a largely 
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educated market of readers. Moreover, those that did implicitly sought to influence 
editorial content. In a 1990 article in Ms., Steinem decried the influence advertisers had 
over content in women’s magazines in general, noting that food, clothing and beauty 
product companies often required women’s magazines to publish favorable, non-
controversial editorial content in return for an ad buy. “That’s why women’s magazines 
look the way they do….The myth that advertisers simply follow readers is very strong” 
(Steinem, 1990, 28). In actuality, she contended, advertisers followed editorial content in 
magazines that dutifully affirmed the commercialism that such advertisements promoted.  
In 1989, after 17 years of losing money, Ms. suspended publication. It returned 
one year later with a new plan: publish six times a year, and with no advertising. The 
magazine would be reader-supported. The company was bought and sold a number of 
time, due to its weak finances. Steinem and group of financers purchased the magazine in 
1998, but it filed for bankruptcy in 2001. It was then purchased by a nonprofit group 
called Feminist Majority Foundation and began publishing on a quarterly basis, with 
advertising.   
The other magazine most notable for publishing without advertising is Consumer 
Reports, a monthly with a circulation of approximately 4.5 million. Launched in 1936 
through a nonprofit, Consumer Reports has operated under the mission of “seeking to 
create and maintain decent living standards for ultimate consumers” (Siklos, 1999) by 
reviewing and rating an array of products, from cars to car seats, potting soil to pop-up 
toasters. Because the magazine doesn’t feature advertising, product recommendations are 
almost never subjected to questions of credibility. The specialty publication even makes 
money through its website, where people pay to access Consumer Reports rich archive of 
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product data and reviews (Flamm, 2009). Ultimately, however, it’s the utility of the 
editorial content. Ironically, Consumer Reports has long proven that people will 
financially support an ad-less print, and online since 1999, publication that helps their 
personal consumerism. They want information they can trust, but also information they 
can actively use. Newspaper journalism practiced under the auspices of social 
responsibility tends not to possess the same level of personal and immediate utility. That 
doesn’t mean it’s a bad thing, but it might mean that readers aren’t likely to fully 
subsidize any publication that fails to meet specific needs.   
 
Going Soft    
In an effort to better blend editorial with business strategies, the magazine 
industry began moving away from mass-marketed general-interest publications in the 
post-World War II era of the late 1940s. Thanks to technological advances in printing and 
distribution, and the growth of consumer research, magazines could publish at lower 
costs and to more narrowly defined audiences of their choosing. From a business 
standpoint, this niche publishing approach enabled magazines to better compete against 
television for advertising revenues (Peterson, 1964; Shaw, 1977; Abramson, 1996; 
Pendergast, 2000). General-interest newsmagazines such as Time and Newsweek have 
long struggled to maintain their mass appeal in an increasingly fragmented media world. 
By the late 1980s, both magazines were decreasing the amount of space given to “hard” 
news and replacing it with more “soft,” or lifestyle/feature, stories. National affairs 
stories received just 30% of space in both newsmagazines in 1980, and that number 
dropped to about 25% by 1988. “Conditioned by television and such pseudo-
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newsmagazines as People, many readers appeared to find the ‘soft’ material more 
enjoyable than the ‘hard’” (Tebbel and Zuckerman, 1991, 305). Of course, this was not 
new. In addressing many of his professional contemporaries at an editor-educator 
conference in 1951, Newsweek Washington bureau chief Kenneth Crawford spoke of the 
challenge in giving readers the content they craved in addition to the content editors 
believed readers needed. “We can’t be more substantial than our audience will let us be,” 
he said. “We print pictures of Marilyn Monroe along with articles trying to explain why 
Albert Einstein was the great man of our time; anatomical studies along with intellectual 
exercise” (Wood, 1971, 231). The Washington Post Co., which purchased Newsweek in 
1961, sold the magazine in 2008 after it accumulated many years of debt due to weak 
advertising support. Within four years, its new owners ceased publication of the print 
edition, although Newsweek still maintains an online presence.  
Some researchers believe that newspapers should take a page from the magazine 
industry, and move away from general interest. Picard, for example, has argued that 
newspapers would be well served by no longer “offering an all-you-can-eat buffet of 
content” (as quoted in Meyer, 2008). People who don’t read the newspaper have already 
abandoned the idea of ever doing so, he contended; stop wasting limited editorial 
resources to win them over. Instead, target educated news junkies through additional 
newsroom investments in news analyses and investigative journalism. Market-oriented 
journalism doesn’t need to be viewed as selling out or pandering; it’s simply recognition 
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Conclusion 
In late 1999, the Los Angeles Times used its Sunday magazine to publish a 168-
page special edition about the new $400 million Staples Center sports and entertainment 
complex in downtown Los Angeles. However, unbeknownst to the magazine’s editorial 
staff, which produced the content, a business-side arrangement existed to split that 
edition’s advertising revenues with the Staples Center in return for full access to the 
facility and key executives. When the news emerged—the Los Angeles Business Journal, 
not the Times, broke the story—the paper’s newsroom erupted in anger. Within hours, 
more than 300 editorial employees signed a petition expressing their indignation over the 
hidden deal (Smith, 1999). Publisher Kathryn Downing, who was new to her job and to 
the newspaper industry—she previously ran a legal and healthcare publishing company—
apologized to the some 1,000 employees who turned out for a staff meeting about the 
incident, promising to spend more time with journalists to “gain a better appreciation of 
their efforts” (Smith, 1999) and the editorial culture in which they operate. 
It’s unclear whether Downing and other Los Angeles Times leaders originally 
found the business arrangement acceptable because it occurred through the Sunday 
magazine, as opposed to a more traditional news section. For all that has been written by 
the news media, trade journals and media scholars about the Times’ Staples Center 
episode, it seems no one has addressed the issue of whether internal perceptions of the 
magazine influenced business-side leaders to agree to the arrangement. Was the magazine 
held to a lower professional standard than other sections of the Sunday newspaper? Did 
business-side leaders perceive the magazine’s primary purpose as an advertising-revenue 
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generator, as opposed to an editorial product like other sections? Such questions would 
make for an interesting future study. 
The lesson the newspaper industry did glean from the Times magazine/Staples 
Center episode was the need for greater transparency when taking a market-oriented 
approach to any editorial section. In 2004, executives at the South Florida Sun-Sentinel 
heeded that lesson when launching an initiative called the Editorial-Marketing Bridge, a 
strategy that “carries marketing people into daily news meetings, allows newsroom 
access to extensive audience research and has changed what the newsroom produces” 
(Edwardsen, 2006, 8). Marketing Director Jeff Levine noted that the effort to use 
readership survey data to inform editorial decision making could not have gotten off the 
ground without the full support of the paper’s editor, Earl Mauker, who spent a 
tremendous amount of time allaying the concerns of newsroom personnel about “editorial 
meddling by marketing” (9). So unusual was it for a newspaper editor to break free from 
institutionalized routines and practices that Mauker was named Editor & Publisher 
magazine’s 2006 Editor of the Year.  
Editorial decision-making at newspapers involves a complex mix of news values, 
technical and operational capabilities, as well as economic, social and political 
considerations. Other content determination factors include the specific audience a 
publication or broadcast aims to reach and the organizational identity of the publishing 
company itself.  At The Washington Post, news values are rooted in industry standards 
but they are maintained through an institutional identity that has been shaped by the many 
professionals who have plied their journalistic craft there. As Post political reporter 
David Broder wrote: “With the Watergate story, the Post became America’s preeminent 
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investigative newspaper, with a keen eye for the ‘big hit’ that might change history—or 
at least the makeup and direction of government. For years before that, it had championed 
civil liberties, civil rights, social legislation and political reform….The values of the 
editorial page drifted into the newsroom. And though the editorial and news sides have 
always been separate, with no one carrying the title or authority of editor over both, the 
paper’s civil libertarian—social justice—reformist values and its prized self-image as 
skeptic and perhaps even scourge of governmental secrecy and abuse of power are 
evident to anyone who works here” (1987, 334). 
 I believe Broder was correct in his assessment of the Post, but I also believe those 
values have been both a blessing and a curse for sections such as Sunday magazines. As 
something of a specialty publication, in no small part because it is produced, printed and 
distributed through a process largely separate from the rest of the newspaper, Sunday 
magazines face possible extinction if their editors and business-side leaders cannot find a 
way to at least cover costs. The wall that has long separated editorial and advertising 
departments rightly protects those journalists who are scourges of governmental secrecy 
and abuses of power. But sometimes, as the Sun-Sentinel’s Mauker and others have 
shown, a little marketing and attention to readers’ content interests can go a long way in 
securing a publication’s future.  
As this chapter illustrates, technological and economic forces cannot be 
decoupled from the editorial process; they are interwoven. Journalists need readers, and 
those readers expect editorial content that serves their interests. If journalists fail in that 
service, readers will simply go elsewhere; today, unlike years past, there is no lack of 
editorial alternatives. In addition, advertisers need readers, and most publications need 
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those advertisers to subsidize the editorial operations through which readers’ content 
interests are served. The challenge for newspaper editors moving forward is figuring out 
how to balance their news values with their publications’ business values to keep pace 
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Chapter 3 
History of Sunday Newspaper Magazine Sections 
Cracking the Sunday Market 
Sunday used to be a “day of rest” in America. It was a time for religious reflection 
and family gatherings, traditions brought to the colonies by the British settlers of the 
early 1600s. Each colony, over the next 200 years, passed and maintained their own laws 
to prohibit the “cares of business” (Laband and Heinbuch, 1987, 39) on the Sabbath day. 
In Massachusetts, for example, people were prohibited from conducting business of any 
kind, dancing, playing sports and attending entertainment of any kind. In New York, you 
also couldn’t travel on Sundays. Violations were punishable by fines. 
In the mid-19th century, a large number of Irish and other European immigrants 
came to the United States without the same level of religious conservatism that earlier 
settlers carried toward the observance of the Sabbath (Smith, 2006). They increasingly 
violated Sunday restrictions and tested local officials’ ability and will to enforce religious 
observance. In an effort to find a middle ground of sorts, local governments began to 
open libraries and museums, offering people more secular activities that “could be 
beneficial for moral development and democracy” (Smith, 2006, 127). In short time, 
people and businesses began clamoring for even greater freedoms on their day of rest. 
Yet, the newspaper industry had already undergone great change starting in the 
1830s. Prior to that time, political parties subsidized most newspaper operations, which 
primarily published stories and editorials that promoted their funders’ ideological 
worldviews. Neither objectivity nor economic considerations were the goal (Schudson, 
1978, Sloan et al, 1993; Chalaby, 1998; Croteau and Hoynes, 2006). Newspapers were 
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typically sold by subscription for $6 to $10 annually, a price that was beyond the 
financial means of the average person, or 6 cents on the street (Demers, 2007).  
That began to change in the 1830s with Benjamin Day, who is largely credited 
with ushering in the era of the Penny Press through the New York Sun. The business 
model was simple and its influence on future newspaper operations in the United States 
and throughout the world would be profound. By focusing almost entirely on street sales 
and lowering the per-copy price of the newspaper to just one penny—a cost that a wide 
swath of laborers, immigrants and readers of all social strata could afford—newspaper 
publishers were able to grow a sizable audience and earn revenues from the sale of 
advertising space in their papers. It was this model, argued New York Herald Publisher 
James Gordon Bennett Sr., that truly fostered a free press, “simply because it is 
subservient to none of its readers—and entirely ignorant of who are its readers and who 
are not” (quoted in Schudson, 1978, 21). 
But lower prices alone didn’t spur expanded circulation. To appeal to the masses 
and foster a readership habit, newspapers began publishing stories about issues of actual 
interest to people, providing both entertainment and escapism through tales of crime, 
sorrow and general human interest, such as sports, entertainment and fashion (Croteau 
and Hoynes, 2006). Day saw partisan newspapers as a turnoff to the masses and to 
advertisers; by not taking an editorial stance on a variety of controversial issues, Day 
offended few and his paper appealed to many (Picard, 2002; Demers, 2007).  
James Gordon Bennett’s New York Herald, which was the first newspaper to 
publish a Sunday edition, in 1841. Bennett received significant opposition from religious 
leaders who frowned upon any distraction from the week’s holy day (Mott, 1941), yet 
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other papers slowly followed over the following decades. “In ways insufficiently 
appreciated, [blue laws] were eventually undermined by the gradual public acceptance of 
the commercialization of Sunday, part of the spreading culture of consumption that 
included buying, selling and leisure activities” (Raucher, 1994, 13).  
People were hungry for news and information, particularly during the course of 
the Civil War in the 1860s, and publishers soon raced to extend their newspapers into the 
weekend market. This extension was a financial boon to both newspapers and local 
businesses, which used the papers to advertise their products and services during a time 
of the week when people typically didn’t work. The “Sunday dateline was essential to its 
cultural importance, connoting the secularization of leisure and family time even as it 
provided a key means of creating it” (Moore and Gabriele, 2009, 20). It was also a way to 
keep pace competitively with the burgeoning magazine industry. There were 
approximately 700 magazines in 1865, and that number ballooned to 3,300 over the next 
20 years due to advances in printing technology, distribution and increased literacy rates 
throughout the country (Peterson, 1964). 
 
The Birth of the Sunday Magazine Section 
Among the early contributors to Sunday circulation growth was a new type of 
newspaper section. The Sunday newspaper magazine, or supplement as it was called 
(Mott, 1941)—the terms “magazines” and “supplement” are used interchangeably in 
research studies, trade press reports and news stories—largely featured lengthy tales of 
scandal and intrigue, illustrations, comics and, years later, four-color section fronts. The 
San Francisco Chronicle is credited with publishing the first Sunday magazine section in 
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the country, on December 19, 1869. Published on the same paper stock and paper size as 
the rest of the newspaper, the Chronicle’s magazine section largely carried works of 
fiction, stories about leisure pursuits such as sailing, horseback riding and gardening, and 
articles about literature and art (Haney, 1953). Other newspapers soon followed, and 
these feature-oriented Sunday magazine sections would contribute mightily to the era of 
“yellow journalism,” starting in the 1880s. The era was born from competition between 
Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World and William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal, as 
both publishers sought to reach as many readers as possible in one of the nation’s most 
competitive markets. They introduced large-type headlines intended to alarm readers; 
extensive use of drawings based not on the artist’s first-hand witness of an event, but on 
how the artist believed an event might have occurred; the use of misleading headlines and 
poorly attributed sourcing that included false “experts”; and an editorial slant that favored 
the downtrodden or the underdogs of society (Mott, 1941). Newspapers also filled their 
daily and Sunday editions with numerous sections, including sports, features and comics. 
The term “yellow journalism” came from the popular comic strip “The Yellow Kid,” 
which Pulitzer and Hearst battled over for exclusive publishing rights (Everbach, 2008). 
By the end of the 19th century, many Sunday newspapers sold themselves wrapped in a 
comics supplement to bolster circulation (Harvey, R.C., 1994). Taking a page from 
general interest commercial magazines, Sunday newspapers offered a little something for 
everyone, from local, national and international news, to features, fashion and fiction. 
The Boston Globe became so enamored with the formula that in 1891 it began calling 
itself, “The People’s Favorite Magazine” (Johanningsmeier, 1997).  
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 As color printing technology improved, Sunday magazine sections quickly 
became big business for newspapers. Eager to promote their wares and services in full 
color, advertisers flocked to the magazine sections, which, along with the comics, were 
typically the only sections of the Sunday newspaper printed in color.   
By the 1920s, Sunday magazines increasingly became photo sections thanks to 
advances in photography and printing technologies. It has been said that these sections, 
commonly known as “roto’s” for the rotogravure printing process through which they 
were produced, “democratized journalism” and created “the ‘local Life magazines’ of a 
region, telling their stories,” as opposed to only the stories of high society, politicians and 
members of the entertainment industries (Smothers, 2005, B1). By 1930, approximately 
80 newspapers were publishing their own photography supplements (Haney, 1953), and a 
readership survey by George Gallop at the time found that rotogravure-produced 
photography sections were the best read of those Sunday newspapers (Friedricks, 2000).  
The “modern” newspaper magazine, printed as a tabloid-sized publication of 
approximately 10 ¾ inches x 11 ½ inches and featuring both photography and a mix of 
general-interest feature stories, was largely born in the late 1950s. Often local in editorial 
scope, these Sunday magazines largely contained timeless and feature-oriented editorial 
content that was only loosely based on current events. Because of lengthy production, 
printing and distribution processes that usually involved the work of third-party vendors, 
the magazines required anywhere from three to eight weeks of advance editorial 
operations. Moreover, content was typically light-hearted, giving advertisers an editorial 
environment of mostly consumer-friendly lifestyle stories (Danilov, 1957; Turbett, 1999; 
	  
	   69	  
Herron, 2010). Over the next 50 years, however, the once mighty Sunday magazine 
would lose much of its luster. 
Throughout much of the 1980s and ’90s, newspapers throughout the country 
shuttered their magazine sections. Many reasons have been given for the closures, 
including lengthy production schedules, which limit inclusion of most direct-response 
advertisements; the newfound ability of newspapers to run four-color ads in other 
sections; the growth of the pre-printed insert business, which enabled advertisers to target 
readers by ZIP code, at a far lower cost, while still running four-color glossy ads; 
consolidation in the department store industry, which had long been the biggest 
advertising supporter of Sunday magazines; the rising costs of glossy paper; and the 
availability of relatively inexpensive nationally syndicated magazines such as Parade and 
USA Weekend. In almost all cases involving a Sunday magazine section’s closure, 
decisions were publicly blamed on high expenses and a lack of advertising support, as 
opposed to readers’ evolving content interests (Garneau, 1991; Editor & Publisher, 1995; 
Fitzgerald, 1998). In some cases, newspapers began carrying national supplements such 
as Parade or USA Weekend in lieu of their locally produced Sunday magazine (Mann, 
2000). Today, fewer than 10 newspapers currently publish their own Sunday magazine on 
a weekly basis.  
 To examine the attitudes and perceptions of former and current Washington Post 
magazine editors, so as to better understand how and why they navigated the gray areas 
between news values and business values, it is essential to first understand the history of 
Sunday magazines and their impact on the newspaper industry. This chapter will examine 
the advent and evolution of Sunday newspaper magazine sections, including nationally 
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syndicated Sunday magazines, the technological advancements that largely defined 
newspaper magazines, and the various content elements that made Sunday magazines 
unlike every other newspaper section—for better or worse.    
 
Syndication Spreads 
With the exception of improved page design and finer paper quality, today’s 
national newspaper supplements are not significantly different from the earliest 
syndicated Sunday newspaper magazines.  
In the mid- to late 1890s, Morrill Goddard was at the heart of the newspaper wars 
between Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst. As someone who understood the 
intricacies of newspaper readership, Goddard led efforts at Pulitzer’s New York World to 
create a Sunday edition that could be enjoyed by the masses, a publication that “a man 
would buy even if he could not read it” (Park, 1923, 288). Because most people didn’t 
work on Sundays, Goddard, the “father of razzle-dazzle Sunday journalism” (Hachten, 
1963, 24), sought to produce a publication that entertained rather than informed. He 
assigned stories about sensational crimes and local entertainment, often with little fact 
checking and exaggerated claims (Park, 1923; Evensen, 1993). The Sunday edition of the 
World routinely featured stories about romance and travel, advice on everything from 
tipping to gambling. And there was imagery, with cartoons, caricatures and illustrations 
that “made your eyeballs bustle and bounce around the department-store display of every 
page” (Baker and Brentano, 2005, vii). The goal was to compel “a dull-minded and 
reluctant public to read” (Park, 1923, 288).  
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In 1896, Goddard changed allegiances and went to work for Hearst, for whom he 
created the Sunday American Magazine, Popular Periodical of the New York Journal and 
Advertiser. The new magazine section carried editorial content based on values that 
Goddard believed his readers were most intrigued by: love, hate, fear, morality, 
superstition, ambition, culture and amusement (Haney, 1953). “The supplement 
specialized in sensational copy with big headlines, many-colored sketches and bizarre 
makeup” (Danilov, 1957, 9). The magazine was later renamed American Weekly and 
became among the earliest nationally syndicated Sunday supplements. For many years, 
American Weekly was available only to Hearst-owned newspapers as a way to build 
Sunday circulation (Peters, 1969). Nonetheless, it was still widely distributed throughout 
Hearst’s various newspapers, and Goddard understood that editorial content had to appeal 
to a diverse cross-section of readers (Hachten, 1963). “Because it must appeal to millions 
of readers with vastly different educations and interests, it dares not touch any subject 
that does not concern virtually all elements in the population, and it must be made short 
and simple enough so that even the least educated segment of that population will be 
willing to read it and able to comprehend it. This results in excluding many significant 
topics and over-simplifying many others” (Haney, 1953, 374). Moreover, syndicated 
magazines produced editorial content that was unlikely to offend their diverse customer 
base of editors and publishers (Hachten, 1963). 
Competitors in the Sunday supplement space would soon emerge to challenge 
American Weekly, particularly since Hearst refused to syndicate his magazine to papers 
he didn’t own. Joseph Knapp started Every Week in 1905, but it was short-lived due 
largely to paper shortages around the start of World War I. Knapp returned to the 
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syndication space in 1935 and founded the United Newspaper Magazine Corporation, 
through which he published, printed and syndicated This Week. At its peak, This Week 
was distributed by 43 newspapers and had a circulation of more than 13 million 
(Raymont, 1969). The tabloid-sized supplement was printed in four-color and, for its first 
seven years, largely featured fiction articles written by authors well known at the time, 
including the English novelist Sax Rohmer, Pulitzer and Nobel Prize winner in literature 
Pearl Buck, and the British humorist P.G. Wodehouse. Approximately 80% of This 
Week’s editorial content was fiction. It was lowered to half following an editorial 
redesign in 1942 because newspaper publishers wanted more news features, lifestyle 
stories and photography (Raymont, 1969; Lee, 2000). That’s what they got, including 
occasional stories by such national political figures as former President Herbert Hoover, 
Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover 
(Hachten, 1963; Peterson, 1964).  
Among the competitors that ultimately buried This Week was Parade, which got 
its start on May 31, 1941, as an offshoot of a money-losing daily newspaper published 
out of New York City named PM. The birth of the weekend supplement, initially known 
as The Weekly Picture Newspaper, was little more than a way to utilize excess 
photographs and feature content from PM (Becker, 1964). Financed by Marshall Field 
III, heir to a department store dynasty and the largest financial backer of PM, the 
magazine was conceived as an advertising-supported publication that daily newspapers 
would pay to carry. At the time, This Week and The American Weekly dominated the 
Sunday supplement space, but an opportunity existed in the relatively large number of 
cities where at least three dailies competed. Quite often, the third paper in those markets 
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didn’t carry a Sunday supplement (Haney, 1953). The goal was for Parade to 
differentiate itself by publishing high-quality photography as stories unto themselves. 
Parade would be the first syndicated pictorial Sunday newspaper supplement. Modeled 
somewhat after Life in design, editor Ross Lasley pursued content that was 
“noncontroversial and educational” (Haney, 1953, 330), although every bit of it was 
borrowed from PM. The first issue featured 32 pages printed with black ink.  
Parade’s first sale as a newspaper supplement was to the Nashville Tennessean in 
July 1941 for 125,000 copies. The Washington Post signed on the following month and 
remains its oldest continuing carrier. Parade switched to rotogravure printing in October 
of that year, adding color to its pages, and by the start of 1942 it had been sold to 12 
newspapers with a combined circulation of 1,760,000 (Becker, 1969, 315). By the end of 
the year, Parade was operating independent from PM, in no small part because the 
publications’ editorial directions were “growing further apart” (Haney, 1953, 335). PM 
was founded as an advertising-free, largely anti-business daily newspaper. It regularly 
featured stories about the horrid employments conditions of local blue-collar workers, 
women and children. In contrast, Parade was advertising supported and noncontroversial 
to the extreme. 
Parade’s editorial formula was relatively simple: Pictures should feature women 
in bathing suits, the different ways people (often attractive women) earned a living, and 
entertainment activities, such as football games or theater performances (Haney, 1953). 
The more a subject was photographed in action the better. Because the magazine’s editors 
saw the publication as a consumer product, they regularly tested ideas on readers through 
content sampling and reader panels. At one point, randomly selected readers would be 
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shown a bunch of funny editorial cartoons and asked to pick their three favorites; the 
winning three were then published in the magazine (Time.com, 1942). 
The rationing of newsprint during World War II hampered all newspapers’ and 
magazines’ growth, and Parade was no exception. By the end of 1944, the magazine was 
carried in 15 newspapers, an increase of only three in two years, with a total circulation 
of slightly more than 2 million. Nonetheless, it was close to breaking even financially 
thanks to annual increases in advertising revenue.  
The end of the war and an influx of new management drastically changed 
Parade’s fortunes soon thereafter. Under the leadership of Arthur “Red” Motley, former 
publisher of The American Weekly who became president of Parade Publications Inc. in 
1947, the magazine’s editorial content “grew more serious, shifting from frivolity and 
cheesecake to current events of importance; the ratio of pictures to text dropped from 
75:25 to 35:65” (Becker, 1969, 466). This was despite the fact that the magazine’s name 
was changed to Parade, the Sunday Picture Magazine in 1946, the last year Lasley was 
editor. By late 1947, Parade was a profitable company, albeit with relatively miniscule 
advertising revenues of $1.7 million.  
Parade’s circulation would climb to 5 million in 1950 and 6.5 million in 1954. At 
that point it was carried in 50 newspapers and had advertising revenues of nearly $11 
million; Parade began selling color advertisements in 1952 (Haney, 1953). In the early 
1950s, newspapers again experimented in producing their own general-interest Sunday 
magazine sections. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution was among the first major 
metropolitan dailies to move away from supplements, in 1952, in an attempt to offer 
readers greater local coverage and to win a greater share of magazine revenues. The 
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Journal and Constitution ceased carrying American Weekly and This Week (Associated 
Press, 1952). Other magazines followed suit in creating their own general-interest 
features magazines, but they often continued to carry at least one syndicated magazine. 
When Parade was sold in 1958, to John Hay Whitney, it was in 61 papers, had a 
total circulation of 8.6 million and ad revenues of almost $24 million (Becker, 1969). 
Throughout the country, newspapers were still embracing syndicated magazines to 
bolster their own Sunday circulation. In 1961, the four major supplements—Parade, 
American Weekly, Family Weekly and This Week—had a combined circulation of 38.4 
million, appearing in 334 different newspapers (Hachten, 1963). In a number of cases, 
newspapers carried multiple syndicated magazines. The Washington Post, for example, 
included American Weekly and Parade until American Weekly went out of business in 
1963. They were each produced in New York City, and although their staffs came from 
both the magazine and newspaper industries, younger employees tended to use jobs at the 
syndicates as steppingstones to consumer magazines. Like many consumer magazines of 
the time, the supplements employed bright color photographs and illustrations, ample 
feature stories and lifestyle-oriented content (Hachten, 1963). They were also accustomed 
to working on stories that weren’t based on immediacy. Because of production, printing 
and distribution challenges, all magazines produced editorial content that attempted to 
skirt time elements, either through generic features or stories that were more predictive in 
nature. That occasionally backfired. In 1962, Parade ran a relatively negative cover story 
on actress Marilyn Monroe. But by the time the issue appeared in newspapers, Monroe 
had died due to a drug overdose (Hachten, 1963). It happened again in January 2008, 
when Parade featured former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on its cover and 
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touted her as “America’s best hope against Al-Qaeda.” But between the time when the 
magazine was printed and when it appeared in newspapers three weeks later, Bhutto was 
assassinated in her home country. Parade’s publisher opted not to recall the magazine 
from the newspapers it serves, arguing that the article was still politically and socially 
significant. The story was updated for Parade’s online edition, and many newspapers 
added a short note on their own pages explaining how and why Bhutto was still being 
featured (Matthews, 2008). Every magazine has surely published editorial content that 
became out of date prior to distribution due to lengthy production and printing cycles. In 
late 1994, The Washington Post’s Sunday magazine ran a 5,000 story by Post sports 
columnist Michael Wilbon that criticized the Washington Bullets basketball team for 
being a losing and uninspiring organization for the previous 15 years. However, in the 
time between the magazine was printed and the week or so it was distributed to readers, 
the Bullets pulled off a blockbuster trade that brought two the NBA’s most exciting 
young forwards, Chris Webber and Juwan Howard, to Washington. Webber and Howard 
were former teammates at the University of Michigan and led the Wolverines to back-to-
back NCAA championship game appearances during their freshmen and sophomore year 
together, in 1992 and ’93. There was nothing the Post could do to update the story; 
Wilbon wrote a column for the first page of the sports section that day, explaining what 
happened and making light of his own professional embarrassment (Wilbon, 1994, D1).  
Lengthy production and distribution lag times didn’t directly damage the business 
of the syndicated Sunday magazines. Rather, national advertisers—largely from the 
supplements’ three main categories of advertisers: food, medication and cigarettes—
began shifting their buys to television, where specific audiences could be better targeted. 
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As the supplements’ advertising revenues shrunk, so did the number of pages they printed 
per issue.  
Parade, however, would continue to grow and thrive. Booth Newspapers 
purchased the supplement in 1973 and sold it to Advance Publications Inc. three years 
later. Today, the privately owned Advance media corporation owns some 25 newspapers, 
Condé Nast Publications—publisher of various lifestyle, fashion and news magazines, 
including Vogue, The New Yorker and Bon Appetit—and large number of TV holdings. 
But it was the purchase of Family Weekly by the Gannett Corp. in 1985 that provided 
Parade with one of its greatest financial windfalls. After buying Family Weekly from 
CBS, Gannett quickly redesigned and renamed the magazine USA Weekend to resemble 
its fledgling national daily, USA Today. The move spurred a precipitous backlash. 
Newspapers throughout the country were already concerned about the possibility of USA 
Today making circulation inroads in their local markets. They weren’t about to now carry 
a syndicated magazine that they viewed as little more than a marketing tool for the 
competition. More than 100 newspapers that had carried Family Weekly immediately 
switched to Parade, increasing its circulation by the millions (Randolph, 1985).  
By the summer of 1986, Parade’s circulation stood at 31.4 million. It had 
advertising revenues of nearly $200 million in 1985 (Gloede, 1986). In addition, the 
magazine launched a new Sunday supplement titled Parade Countryside, which featured 
the same content as the traditional Parade but lower advertising rates to win the business 
of smaller-market papers. Those smaller-market papers had typically carried Family 
Weekly (Jones, 1985). By 1991, Parade earned more gross advertising dollars than any 
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magazine in America, charging a then-national high of $460,000 for a single four-color, 
full-page ad (Reilly, 1991). 
It wasn’t long before Sunday newspapers began to cease publication of their own 
locally produced magazines in favor of the far less expensive alternative of Parade or 
USA Weekend. The business model was and remains relatively simple: a newspaper pays 
the syndication companies a fixed rate based on the newspaper’s circulation, and receives 
in return a small percentage of the advertising revenues that the syndicated magazine 
generates (Wilson, 1998).  
In the mid- to late 1980s, the Houston Chronicle and the Atlanta Journal and 
Constitution each experimented with inserting thinned down versions of their own 
Sunday magazines inside Parade, citing cost containment as the reason. “We did it 
because the cost of production [to create their own magazines] was outpacing advertising 
revenues,” said Ferguson Rood, vice president and assistant to the president of the 
Atlanta Journal and Constitution (Bloom, 1985, 23). However, each paper eventually 
found little value in the approach and returned briefly to publishing and distributing their 
full Sunday magazines in addition to carrying Parade (Hammond, 2001). Although it’s 
somewhat counterintuitive for a newspaper to publish its own Sunday magazine and still 
carry a national supplement that is a competitor for regional and national advertising, a 
number of newspapers, including The Washington Post and The Boston Globe, have long 
chosen to provide their readers with both. According to former Washington Post 
publisher Donald Graham, the readership appeal of Parade is so great that a newspaper 
risks losing a substantial number of local Sunday subscribers if it stops carrying the 
national supplement (Graham, 2010). Thomas Ferguson, former president of The 
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Washington Post, noted in 1982 that Parade was the second-best read section in his 
Sunday paper, after the main news section. This was despite the fact that the Post carried 
its own locally produced Sunday magazine. “The editors would like it (Parade) out, but 
the circulation department would kill to keep Parade,” he said (Machalaba, 1982). 
In 1996, The Record newspaper in Hackensack, N.J., let its readers decide which 
syndicated Sunday magazine they preferred. Even though The Record had been carrying 
Parade for nearly 20 years, it launched a contest of sorts over six months by also carrying 
USA Weekend. “We finally felt it was time to give our readers a chance to be involved 
with what’s in the paper,” said John Kimball, vice president of sales at The Record 
(Reina, 1996, 15). That chance was short-lived, however. The Record cut the contest 
short and declared Parade the winner. Although readers reportedly liked both 
magazines—it was unclear how responses were collected—the newspaper opted to stick 
with Parade and “mitigate the change factor” (Reina, 1997, 24).  
Parade is the largest-circulation weekly magazine in the country at approximately 
33 million, as of July 2012, appearing with 650 Sunday newspapers (Parade, 2012). 
Moreover, the publication offers 10 different zoned advertising options, including a six 
state buy that includes Washington, D.C., Maryland and Virginia—the direct market area 
of The Washington Post. USA Weekend is carried in more newspapers than Parade is, but 
the supplement has a smaller reach due to the size of those papers. USA Weekend has a 
weekly circulation of 22.6 million. However, economic conditions hit USA Weekend hard 
in 2009, as it did for many print publications throughout the country. Total ad pages for 
the weekend supplement were down 14.7% that year (Sass, 2010), prompting Gannett to 
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lay off 11 people at the magazine and using writers at the national daily USA Today to 
produce feature content (Calderone, 2009). 
As Hachten wrote in 1963, “At their best, the supplements offer a national, 
professional flavor—a whiff of the quality general magazine—that is not within the 
power of the local newspaper” (28). That hasn’t stopped a number of newspapers from 
trying to bolster their “professional flavor,” often through partnerships with other 
newspapers and occasionally by attempting to target niche audiences.  
For example, New Jersey Focus was launched in 1989 as a syndicated weekly 
Sunday newspaper magazine and was carried in eight New Jersey dailies that didn’t 
publish their own locally produced magazine. Each issue was built around a subject 
matter theme, such as health, education and fashion, and provided advertisers a purely 
statewide advertising vehicle without having to buy into the New York or Philadelphia 
markets (Anderson, 1989). However, the publication was short lived—as was a similar 
effort in Texas a few years earlier—due to a lack of interest among advertisers. At the 
now-defunct Houston Post, executives in the mid-1990s signed a distribution partnership 
with a monthly city magazine named Houston Life. The Post received no advertising 
revenue from the deal, but instead sought to bolster its Sunday package by including a 
magazine that it didn’t have to create (Giobbe, 1995).  
Another model was a supplement to locally produced Sunday magazines. Five 
major metropolitan dailies—The New York Times, The Boston Globe, The Washington 
Post, the Los Angeles Times and The Chicago Tribune—joined forces in 1989 to produce 
The Good Health Magazine. Each newspaper produced unique editorial content for its 
own version of Good Health, which carried a common cover and common national 
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advertising, although companies could also just buy space in any one magazine. The New 
York Times had been publishing Good Health as a biannual “Part 2” supplement to its 
own Sunday magazine since 1986, but agreed to broaden the approach as an experiment 
driven by the American Newspaper Publishers Association to bolster national advertising 
in newspapers. The effort lasted just a few years; the reason for ending this project is 
unclear, as neither the news media nor the trade press has covered it.   
Vista was started in 1985 as an English-language Sunday newspaper magazine 
aimed at America’s ever-growing Hispanic population. Within a few years, the 
publication was inserted in 26 Sunday newspapers with a total circulation of 1.2 million, 
with many of those copies going to communities with relatively large Hispanic 
populations. The monthly publication—which catered almost exclusively to national 
advertisers—struggled for a period due to changing readership and advertising trends, but 
continues to publish by focusing on female readers and the national advertisers who want 
to reach them. Vista is now carried mostly in Spanish-language newspapers and has a 
circulation of approximately 900,000 (Impremedia.com, 2011). Current advertisers are 
still mostly national and span a range of categories, from banks and food to cars and 
beauty products.  
 
A Printing Revolution 
The development and decline of Sunday newspaper magazines are intrinsically 
tied to innovations in printing technology. Most notably, advancements in color printing 
and, later, photo reproduction made Sunday magazines and newspaper comics sections 
the only places in a newspaper where readers could actually see the world and experience 
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more than black and white. Because photo processing was still cumbersome and time-
consuming in the early part of the 20th century, many newspapers employed illustrators to 
hand-sketch photographs for reproduction in print (Harris, 1978).  
Newspapers began printing supplement sections in four-color in the early 1890s. 
The New York World first printed a color section in 1893 (Baker and Brentano, 2005), 
while The Boston Globe introduced its readers to color the following year (Harris, 1978). 
On March 27, 1898, the World promoted the launch of a brand-new printing press, by R. 
Hoe & Co. of New York, through a full-page advertisement on the back page of its 
magazine section. The ad featured a colored illustration of the new electrotype press, and 
accompanying text explained that the press could print and fold the paper’s color 
supplements at a then-speedy rate of up to 20,000 copies an hour. That Sunday edition 
featured three colored supplements: the magazine, the comics and an eight-page Easter-
related women’s fashion section (Baker and Brentano, 2005).   
By the mid to late 1890s, line drawings were sent to papers via a new system 
called telautograph, with the Chicago Times-Herald among the first to employ the 
technology (Lee, 2000). It would be the forebear to telephotography, whereby halftone 
photographs could be sent electronically to newspapers. However, high-quality 
reproduction of those photographs onto newsprint required a technology all its own. 
Developed and first used in Germany in 1910, rotogravure presses employed 
etched cylindrical plates, as opposed to the typical flat copper ones used for the letter-
press halftones employed by most every newspaper. The plates were attached to rollers, 
allowing the press to operate at speeds fast enough for mass production of color images. 
Also known as intaglio printing, the cylindrical plates would pass through a long bucket 
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of warm colored ink, typically sepia, and only the multi-depths of recessed “cells” on the 
etched plate would take in the ink. “The varying depths enabled highlights, middle tones, 
and shadings to be applied to images at a high rate of speed for the first time. Natural 
shadows, which imparted depth and perspective, were possible, but only in one color” 
(Goldsmith, 2008, 100-101). Despite initial limitations in color usage, the technology 
created far more clear reproductions on the inexpensive newsprint newspapers then used 
for their Sunday magazine sections. “Rotogravure printing is so consistent that color 
variations are rare, ink does not smear, and pages can be handled (and bundled for 
shipping) immediately. Newly equipped newspapers were able to print large pictorial 
sections that increased readership and advertising revenue” (Library of Congress, 
undated). 
The technology soon became so synonymous with the publishing of photographs 
and illustrations in newspapers that many Sunday newspaper magazines were simply 
titled “Rotogravure” or “Roto” for short. Although The New York Times was the first 
U.S. newspaper to carry a rotogravure photo section, in December 1913, The Cleveland 
Leader was the first to actually own a gravure press. The Leader bought one in early 
1914, and the Times followed suit just months later (Mott, 1941). The New York Times 
used it to publish a special stand-alone newsstand rotogravure section during the week to 
make greater use of excess photographs from the European battlefields of World War I.  
The publication is widely regarded as the first modern picture magazine (Kobre, 2008). 
The Times printed “Mid-Week Pictorial” until 1934, when it sold its rights to the section 
in a cost-cutting move (Tifft and Jones, 1999). It ceased publication three years later. 
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The New York Times began printing its Sunday magazine section via rotogravure 
in August 1917, improving the clarity of type and visual impact of its many photographs. 
It installed four new rotogravure presses to expand usage to the magazine and, in time, 
other parts of the paper (New York Times, 1917). In a self-congratulatory story about 
readers’ pleasure with the changes, the president of the local merchants’ association was 
quoted as saying: 
“I wish to congratulate THE TIMES upon its progressiveness in the improvement 
to the Magazine section. I noticed it the first thing when I opened my paper this 
morning. It is a big improvement, one that is not approached by any other paper. I 
took especial pleasure in the Magazine pictures printed by the rotogravure 
process. The type is much clearer, too, but I think the biggest improvement is in 
the presentation of pictures” (The New York Times, 1917, 9). 
 
The Detroit Free Press launched a rotogravure section in March 1916, 
announcing in the paper that the “beauty of the velvety shadows that are found in 
reproduction by the intaglio process delights the eye of all who enjoy artistic printing” 
(Detroit Free Press, 1916a, 8). With the addition of the rotogravure pictorial supplement, 
the Free Press’ Sunday edition contained six special sections in all, including a fiction 
section, a feature section, a women’s section, the “Boys’ and Girls’ Magazine,” a comics 
section and an illustrated Sunday magazine (Detroit Free Press, 1916b, C12). In time, 
most of these sections would be printed through rotogravure to utilize the technology’s 
color printing capabilities. The Washington Post began publishing its Sunday 
photography section, simply titled “Rotogravure,” in 1917. The Post’s section typically 
ran eight pages and featured color and black-and-white pictures from around the world, 
with particular emphasis on photographs of soldiers from various countries during World 
War I relaxing, eating or just talking. Camera technology was still in its infancy and few 
photographers were adept at capturing action; almost all photographs that appeared in 
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print featured sedentary subjects (Harris, 1978). Photos in the Post’s rotogravure section 
also included traditional and unusual fashion. For example, an early spread included 
female models wearing military hats from around the world (Washington Post, 1917a, 
RS6). Photojournalism during the early years of the Post’s rotogravure section largely 
centered on human interest and feature-oriented pieces. One such element highlighted 
nine different men who were individually “worth $500,000 each year to the business of 
the United States,” yet were now working for just $10 a year heading up various 
governmental agencies, defense councils and shipping boards (Washington Post, 1918). 
Like many newspapers, the Post claimed its rotogravure section made the entire Sunday 
edition the best in the Washington, D.C. market. “The Most Elaborately Illustrated 
Supplement South of New York,” read one in-paper advertisement. “Destined to Intrench 
(sic) THE WASHINGTON POST More Firmly Than Ever in Its Position as ‘The 
National Capital’s Favorite Sunday Newspaper” (Washington Post, Oct. 24, 1917). To be 
sure, rotogravure picture sections were a circulation boon to Sunday editions. The 
Houston Chronicle began publishing a weekly eight-page “Pictorial Gravure Section” in 
1919; the first issue sold out by early afternoon and circulation increased by a then-
whopping 3,000 copies (Hammond, 2001). By 1918, 47 newspapers had a rotogravure 
picture section (Danilov, 1957), with numerous other sections and special supplements 
designed to appeal to distinct audiences. Despite fragmenting its mass audience based on 
readers’ specific content interests, thereby addressing “itself to a collection of publics, 
each with its own scale of values” (Hughes, 1981, 56-57), the addition of new sections 
became a winning financial strategy for newspapers.  
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But it was the Chicago Tribune that took rotogravure printing technology to new 
heights, in 1920, owning the first full-color rotogravure press in the United States, called 
coloroto (Goldsmith, 2008). Soon thereafter, the Tribune became the highest circulation 
newspaper in America, with color advertising capabilities helping the paper to “capitalize 
the extensive news coverage” (Goldsmith, 2008, 199). By 1925, 72 newspapers carried a 
rotogravure section (Danilov, 1957). The photo-rotogravure section of the Des Moines 
Register and Tribune, published by brothers Johns and Mike Cowles, was met with such 
great fanfare in the late 1920s that the brothers sought to capitalize on reader interest by 
expanding into new markets (Friedricks, 2000). The Register and Tribune’s photo section 
became the template for Look, the Cowles’ monthly feature-oriented photography 
magazine that premiered on newsstands on January 5, 1937. Life magazine was first 
published five weeks earlier, even though the two magazines were developed around the 
same time, as a weekly news photography magazine aimed at affluent readers. Both 
consumer magazines became incredibly successful with readers. By April 1937, Look 
became a biweekly and had a per-issue circulation of 2 million by October (Friedricks, 
2007). 
Other Sunday newspaper magazines began experimenting with four-color usage, 
with Joseph Pulitzer’s New York Sunday World among the first paper to do so, adapting 
the rotogravure technology to a new process dubbed “tintogravure.” The Sunday World 
employed spot color to comics, specifically the strip “The Yellow Kid,” but soon 
expanded its revolutionary comics section into full color (Sloan, Stovall and Startt, 1993). 
The Washington Post followed suit with color rotogravure printing in 1927 through a 
sheet-fed press. The Post touted its color reproduction as something akin to art, with the 
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slogan “Pictures you’ll frame and name” (The Washington Post, 1927). “The color 
rotogravure press enabled art and photographs to be finely reproduced for the masses. For 
the five-cent cost of a Sunday newspaper, readers could regularly enjoy news art and fine 
art with the credibility of color” (Goldsmith, 2008, 97). However, it would take decades 
before most daily newspapers could employ color-printing technology. High costs had 
discouraged many daily newspapers from using color, even when advertisers were 
threatening to take their business elsewhere—namely the growing number of consumer 
magazines that were printing in color. By 1936, only about 20 percent of newspapers 
could offer advertisers color printing on weekdays (Johnston, 1997). For that reason, 
Sunday magazine rotogravure sections were incredibly valuable in terms of circulation 
and advertising draws.  
By the mid-1960s, many newspapers still offered readers and advertisers little by 
way of color. Although the technology existed for newspapers to print run-of-paper color, 
reproduction was typically poor because of newsprint quality—particularly in 
comparison to the type of coated paper stock most consumer magazines used. 
Nonetheless, studies showed that readers remembered color advertisements more than 
they remembered black-and-white ads, that readers viewed the stores that ran color 
advertisements as higher status than stores that only advertised in black and white 
(Gardner and Cohen, 1964) and that readers viewed even mediocre color reproduction in 
newspapers as more visually enjoyable than black-and-white reproduction (McGann and 
Snook-Luther, 1993). Because color printing was expensive, however, few newspapers 
opted to offer it. In 1965, the only color sections in The Washington Post, for example, 
were its locally produced Sunday magazine Potomac, its weekly TV Week publication, 
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the comics section and the syndicated Sunday magazine Parade. The Post was so wedded 
to its earlier investments in printing technology that the newspaper was among the last 
U.S. metropolitan dailies to use color printing on its section fronts; it began in 1999 (New 
York Times, 1999).  
Color or not, rotogravure sections became so popular with readers that some in 
the newspaper industry felt for the first time that newspapers could almost compete with 
the aesthetics of commercial magazines (Haney, 1953). By employing rotogravure 
presses to print pages and pages of photography, newspapers “democratized journalism” 
and created “‘the local Life Magazines’ of a region, telling their stories” (Smothers, 2005, 
B1). A survey by George Gallop in the early 1930s found that rotogravure sections were 
the best read of any section in the Sunday newspaper (Friedricks, 2000).  
By 1930, approximately 80 newspapers were publishing their own rotogravure 
supplements (Haney, 1953), although only 10 newspapers were doing the printing 
themselves. Most, including The Washington Post, outsourced the work, which led to 
even lengthier production cycles as materials and rotogravure publications were shipped 
back and forth by train. This forced Sunday magazine editors to approach content in a 
manner unlike other editors at their newspaper. Because of the long production process—
four-color printing through rotogravure typically required editorial deadlines of around 
six weeks in advance (Danilov, 1957)—and off-site printing and distribution operations, 
magazine editors had to focus their editorial efforts on content that wasn’t time sensitive 
or immediately evolving, as many breaking news stories are. Such a schedule often posed 
significant challenges to editorial and business operations. The Denver Post, for example, 
outsourced its rotogravure printing needs to a press operator in Chicago when it launched 
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its Sunday magazine, Empire, in September 1950. Problems in the shipping process 
would lead to delays in editorial and advertising schedules, damaging revenue and 
readership (Kisling, 1995). Despite the lag time involved in production, printing and 
distribution, and the great risks of delay, few newspapers printed their own rotogravure 
sections. Instead, they used one of a handful of commercial publishers that specialized in 
the technique. While there were approximately 120 locally edited magazine supplements 
in the late 1950s, for example, only a “handful” of their parent newspapers did the 
printing (Danilov, 1957, 10). 
The industry leader was Standard Gravure Corp. in Louisville, Ky. Founded in 
1922 by Judge Robert Worth Bingham, who also owned The Courier-Journal in 
Louisville, Standard Gravure served to diversify Bingham’s revenue streams while also 
securing for The Courier-Journal the kind of high-end printing capabilities that no other 
local publisher had. By the mid-1940s, Standard Gravure was printing the rotogravure 
sections of The Atlanta Journal, The Columbus Dispatch, the Houston Chronicle and The 
Nashville Tennessean, among others (Editor & Publisher, 1947). Some 30 years later, 
Standard Gravure was printing 26 different Sunday newspaper magazines and worked to 
support the medium by underwriting the Sunday Magazine Editors Association, which 
organized and hosted annual conferences and gave out journalism awards for the best 
Sunday magazine sections; the group disbanded in 2001 due to a lack of members, as so 
few papers still produced their own Sunday magazine (Strupp et al, 2003). Chapter 2 
briefly explores the role that the Sunday Magazine Editors Association played in 
influencing editorial standards and news values at locally produced Sunday magazines 
throughout the country.  
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In 1986, Standard Gravure was sold to Atlanta-based businessman Michael Shea 
and struggled under the weight of numerous lawsuits over health risks from the chemicals 
used in the printing process. In 1989, the Louisville facility was also the site of a 
workplace shooting by a former pressman who was on disability leave for mental illness. 
Eight people were killed and 12 were injured; the shooter, Joseph Wesbecker, committed 
suicide on the spot (Harrison, 1989). The company went out of business in 1992. 
Other printers serviced newspapers’ Sunday magazine needs throughout much of 
the 20th century, including Art Gravure and Cuneo Press, but it was Alco-Gravure Inc., 
owned by Joseph Knapp, that challenged Standard Gravure for national supremacy. In 
1935, Knapp used his printing company to support a new syndicated Sunday newspaper 
magazine titled This Week, which some 21 newspapers began to carry.   
By the 1980s, rotogravure was no longer the printing technology of choice in the 
newspaper industry. Because rotogravure is only economical for large print runs, many 
smaller papers turned to heatset offset, a process that uses special inks that don’t easily 
rub off and is 15% less costly than rotogravure for print runs smaller than 200,000 
(Machalaba, 1982). In other cases, newspapers transitioned to offset lithography, a 
printing technique that was faster than rotogravure, relatively easy to set up (Hynds, 
1994) and could be done in-house. 
 
Content Matters 
From the late 19th century through most of the 20th, locally produced Sunday 
newspaper magazines were one of the principal weapons employed by metropolitan 
dailies in their battle for circulation and advertising gain. The earliest newspaper 
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magazines featured vivid illustrations, line art, long-form narratives, poems, fiction 
stories, and news about fun and frivolity; the sections were printed on the same exact size 
and type of newsprint used for other sections, 
but featured slightly more page design thanks to 
line art, illustrations and distinct font styles for 
headline typography (Haney, 1953; Hachten, 
1963). They were also routinely filled with 
“tales of sex abnormalities, horror, 
romance…and oddities” (Lee, 2000, 403). The 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch promoted its Sunday 
magazine in an in-paper ad in 1898 by writing 
that “frivolity has no place in its table of 
contents” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1898, 5). 
Nonetheless, the magazine featured such stories as a local woman who performs 
exorcisms and true-life tales about medical mysteries, including a woman who grew ill 
from eating poison candy. In 1912, The New York Times’ magazine section—it launched 
in 1896, three weeks after Adolph Ochs purchased the newspaper (Lee, 2000)—carried a 
full-page feature headline, “French Savant Tells of Life on Venus and Mars,” in which a 
zoologist wrote about the animal and plant life that surely lived on the two planets. The 
feature included illustrations of unusual flora, fauna and an array of lizards and large-
eared creatures (Friedman, 2011). The Sunday syndicates weren’t immune to a bit of 
sensationalism either. American Weekly carried stories questioning, “Does Modern 
Figure	  1:	  The	  St.	  Louis	  Post	  Dispatch	  
used	  vivid	  illustrations	  to	  depict	  the	  
Spanish-­American	  War,	  and	  its	  heroes,	  
in	  this	  June	  19,	  1898	  magazine	  section.	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Photography Incite Women to Brutality?” and “Are the Huge Mammoths Still Roaming 
the Wilds of Alaska?” (Hachten, 1963, 25). 
By the early part of the 20th century, newspapers were routinely publishing 
photographs in their Sunday magazine sections, often of people and places well beyond 
the newspapers’ circulation areas. For example, the May 8, 1904 cover of the New York 
World’s magazine featured five pictures of the St. Louis Fair lit up at night, with a 
declaration on the bottom of the page that the images were “declared by experts to be the 
best night photographs ever taken” (New York World, 1904, SM1). The primacy of 
photography and illustrations in Sunday magazines were born from technological and 
operational limitations within the print publishing industry. Because of the time-
consuming processes of capturing, processing, delivering and pre-producing photographs 
for publication, newspapers used pictures largely for feature and human-interest stories 
that could run at most any time. And by making the Sunday magazine the primary section 
for photography, editors could better plan and organize news production operations; 
Sunday magazines—along with comics sections and other special supplements—were 
often printed on smaller presses that had the ability to print with color inks (Baker and 
Brentano, 2005). Photography had became so prevalent within print publishing by the 
early 1900s that some in the industry were questioning whether any consumer magazine 
“can live today on literary excellence alone, or whether it must have recourse to the aid of 
pictures” (San Francisco Chronicle, 1905, 6). The authors noted that the long-popular 
literary magazine Longman’s was ceasing publication because readers were opting 
instead for magazines and newspapers that carried some degree of visual aesthetics, 
including the use of color inks.  
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Most Sunday magazines were general-interest publications. When the New York 
Tribune launched its Sunday magazine in 1904, it featured original feature stories, poetry 
and fiction that was suitable for “family perusal.” “It is lively without being vulgar, and is 
so nicely balanced that the boy with a passion for outdoor sports will find it as interesting 
as his more serious-minded parents. As for the girls, they all like it, regarding of their 
temperament or disposition” (New York Tribune, 1904, 6). Sunday magazines continued 
to operate as general-interest publications, particularly when they became rotogravure-
printed photography magazines. The goal was editorial variety, with photos that were 
local, national and international. In some cases, editors used their magazines to shock or 
surprise readers. For example, early editions of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch’s Sunday 
photography magazine—it premiered in 1938—included pictures of a man in New York 
jumping out of a building to his death, pictures of people with no arms feeding 
themselves with their feet, pictures of voo-doo dance rituals, and pictures of Hollywood 
starlets (Mcguire, 1996). The Washington Post’s Sunday photo magazine was similarly 
unpredictable in the early 1940s, with photographs and extended cutlines about women’s 
fashion, sports, female actresses and attractive women in the workforce, including a 
spread on commercial airline stewardess in training (Washington Post, 1940, RG3); the 
rotogravure section was renamed “Pictures” in 1941. Yet, although much of the content 
was seemingly geared toward male readers, advertising in the Post’s rotogravure section 
was mostly targeted toward a female audience, with ads for hairdressers, makeup, jewelry 
and women’s clothing.  
An exception to the general-interest Sunday magazine format was Hearst’s San 
Francisco Chronicle, which launched an eight-page Sunday magazine titled “A Woman’s 
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Magazine” in June 1909 to run in addition to the paper’s existing magazine section. 
“Devoted entirely to everything that concerns women” (San Francisco Chronicle, 1909, 
4), the new magazine featured articles and illustrations about fashion, beauty, food, work 
and more. The first and last page of the Sunday women’s magazine featured color. In 
explaining the rationale for the new publication, editors wrote that the existing magazine 
was increasingly geared toward men. It featured articles with “good red blood in them 
and written by ‘men with the bark on’….Sea stories, with the tang of the brine in them, 
pioneer stories, Indian stories, war stories, detective stories, hunting stories” (San 
Francisco Chronicle, 1909, 4). While some women likely read those stories too, the 
article explained, “A Woman’s Magazine” was to cater solely to “feminine readers.” 
Around the same time, the New York Tribune revamped its Sunday magazine section to 
focus more on the human side of artists, entertainers and celebrities. “When a man 
achieves distinction, most of us want to know all about him. Certain very interesting folk, 
whose names are widely familiar, have been sadly neglected in this age of personalities,” 
read an article promoting the new-look magazine (New York Tribune, 1909, SM2). 
Profilees included playwright Clyde Fitch and actor William Gillette.  
 
Publication of Fiction 
Sunday magazines also became home to an increasing amount of fiction stories. 
Such works—clearly labeled as such, as opposed to the “straight” Sunday magazine 
features about life on Mars—had previously been a part of newspapers’ main sections, 
with short stories and serial tales of fiction, particularly by authors that readers were 
familiar with and enjoyed, serving to bolster circulation around the turn of 20th century 
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(Johanningsmeier, 1997). The Washington Post, Chicago Tribune and New York Herald 
Tribune, among many others daily newspapers, all published fiction in an effort to bolster 
circulation. When Adolph Ochs purchased The New York Times in 1896, he put an 
immediate end to fiction and comics within the pages of the “Grey Lady,” claiming that 
false information and frivolity had no place in a serious newspaper (Davis, 1921; Tifft 
and Jones, 1999). So serious was the Times about being so serious that it wasn’t until 
1942, seven years after Ochs’s death, that the Times published its first crossword 
puzzle—in its Sunday magazine. Newspapers had been publishing crosswords since the 
early 1900s. The Times’ new puzzle was so popular with readers that editors added a 
crossword to the daily paper as well, albeit eight years after it premiered in the Sunday 
magazine (Douglas, 1999).  
Far more recently, The New York Times Magazine took inspiration from the early 
days of Sunday magazine publishing and launched a variety of fiction and graphic novel 
content elements under the section title “The Funny Pages.” According to editors of the 
magazine, the Times took “its inspiration from the Sunday supplements that newspapers 
first published more than a century ago….We hope to engage our readers in some ways 
we haven’t yet tried—and to acknowledge that it takes many different types of writing to 
tell the story of our time” (New York Times, 2005). In their pursuit of younger readers, 
editors decided to add a bit of frivolity by carrying serialized fiction and other content 
elements in a section of the magazine titled “The Funny Pages,” which included a 
serialized cartoon novel; the Sunday Serial, a straight serial novel that would span weeks; 
and True-Life Tales, a personal essay by different authors. The Sunday Serial featured 
nationally renowned writers such as Patricia Cornwell, who wrote 15 chapters that were 
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published over three months in 2006, and Michael Chabon, who wrote 15 chapters that 
ran over five months in 2007. The Funny Pages were discontinued in 2008 due to 
lackluster reader response. 
However, many newspapers embraced fiction as a mode of storytelling long 
before the Times’ Funny Page experiment, and they often used their Sunday magazines to 
carry the stories. After government-mandated newsprint restrictions were lifted following 
World War I, newspapers were quick to add new magazine sections, and many featured 
fiction. In 1921, The Chicago Tribune created the Blue Ribbon Fiction Section, which it 
sold to other newspapers via its syndication service. In 1925, the Sunday magazine of The 
New Orleans Times-Picayune carried a series of short fiction stories by a then relatively 
unknown writer named William Faulkner, who would go on to write such acclaimed 
novels as “The Sound and the Fury” and “Light in August” (Collins, 1954). The 
Washington Post launched a stand-alone Sunday fiction section in January 1934; it 
carried short stories, serials and illustrations. The section ran in addition to the Post’s 
magazine section and its rotogravure photo section (Washington Post, 1934). In 1940, the 
Post replaced its fiction section with “The Sunday Novel,” a 16-page section that was a 
complete novel broken into approximately 20 sections, or chapters. The Post last 
published “The Sunday Novel” in 1942 without explanation as to why the section was 
eliminated.  
The Post’s Sunday magazine occasionally carried works of fiction in the mid- to 
late 1970s, but the practice ended for unknown reasons. However, in 2007, Post Sunday 
magazine editor Tom Shroder produced an entire fiction edition through a reader-
submission contest that garnered significant interest from local writers (the contest was 
	  
	   97	  
open only to residents of DC, Maryland and Virginia). So popular was the fiction issue 
with readers that the Post magazine has continued it ever since. As editor of the Miami 
Herald’s Sunday magazine, Tropic, in the mid-’90s, Shroder experimented with a serial 
fiction tale titled “Naked Came the Manatee.” The serial ran from November 1995 to 
February 1996. But what made it particularly unusual was that a different writer penned 
each chapter. The writers—all popular writers in South Florida, including the Herald’s 
Dave Barry and Carl Hiaasen as well as crime novelist Edna Buchanan—simply reacted 
to the previous chapter, and took the story in whichever direction they desired (Reina, 
1996b). The stories were so popular with readers that Tropic gave fiction its own weekly 
section called “True Lies,” which featured 900-word stories that occasionally included 
reader submissions.  
Throughout much of the 1980s, the Sunday magazine sections of The Boston 
Globe, Providence Journal, Hartford Courant, Milwaukee Journal and San Francisco 
Chronicle all sporadically experimented with fiction as a readership driver. Chronicle 
features/Sunday editor Rosalie M. Wright went so far as to call it a lure for her “smart” 
readers (Schaefer, 1987, 13). Alan Rosenberg, editor of the Providence Journal’s Sunday 
Journal Magazine, saw the content element as something more: “Newspapers try to 
explain life in as many ways as they can. Fiction is another tool for doing that” (Schaefer, 
1987, 12).  
 
Editorial Distinctions 
To be sure, modern Sunday newspaper magazines have been as editorially distinct 
from one another as were the newspapers that published them. Over the past 50 years, 
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Sunday magazines have featured everything from long-form narratives, photojournalism, 
service articles, first-person essays, fiction, product listings and even poetry. For some 
publications, the Sunday magazine was a place to experiment with different storytelling 
techniques that couldn’t find a home in the hard news main sections of the newspaper 
(Hynds, 1979; Oney, 1985). Yet, critics have contended that many Sunday magazines, 
particularly the 1970s and ’80s, were editorial embarrassments to the newspapers that 
published them. More often than not, the magazines served as repositories for local and 
light fare, and they were staffed with mediocre journalists who no other section editor 
wanted (Shields, 1986). Newspapers “haven’t done enough to make the Sunday magazine 
a provocative, point-of-view section that stands out from the rest of the newspaper,” said 
James Bellows, a former editor of the New York Herald Tribune, among other 
publications. “They’re bland and boring” (Machalaba, 1982, 29).  
Comparing Sunday newspaper magazine editors with commercial city magazine 
editors in the same markets, Costen (1978) found that Sunday magazines mostly 
published editorial content about “leisure” activities, often built around “locally oriented 
subjects,” and “people articles” (33). Few Sunday magazine editors provided “thought-
provoking” or “interpretive” coverage, viewing their sections mostly as an “entertaining 
vehicle.” Conversely, city magazine editors claimed to provide nearly double the amount 
of interpretive journalism and half the people-oriented content that Sunday magazine 
editors did. Costen argued that Sunday magazine editors were not as concerned with 
understanding their readers as were city magazine editors because Sunday magazines 
automatically reach readers via insertion into the main paper. Kurtz (1982) conducted a 
similar study a few years later, comparing locally produced Sunday newspaper magazines 
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to metropolitan-focused newsstand magazines, and found that Sunday magazines carried 
ample personality profiles, TV and movie reviews, service journalism pieces, and home 
and gardening articles. However, Sunday magazines, unlike metropolitan magazines, 
published very little investigative journalism. In addition, metropolitan magazine editors 
were far more aware than Sunday magazine editors were of advertisers’ needs, and 
actively attempted to “create a specific audience…to appeal to advertisers” (93). Sunday 
magazine editors were also far less familiar with who their readers were. Ranly (1981) 
similarly found that Sunday magazine editors had strongly held beliefs that they should 
maintain complete independence from their newspapers’ advertising and marketing 
departments. In many cases, Sunday magazine editors believed that generating revenues 
was the sole responsibility of those who run the newspaper as a whole, as opposed to 
section editors.  
Of course, there are many exceptions to the content critics. A number of Sunday 
magazines have published Pulitzer Prize-winning journalism through the years, including 
articles by Madeleine Blais (Tropic, of the Miami Herald, 1980), Alice Steinback (the 
Baltimore Sun’s Sunday magazine, 1985) and Steve Twomey (Inquirer Magazine, 1987). 
Other newspapers whose Sunday magazines carried Pulitzer-winning work include: The 
Boston Globe (in-depth national reporting, staff, 1983); Miami Herald (commentary, 
Gene Weingarten, 1988); The Washington Post (feature photography, Matthew Lewis, 
1975; feature writing, Weingarten, 2008 and 2010), and The New York Times 
(photography, Michelle Agins, 2008; and investigative reporting, Sheri Fink, 2009). 
Lewis’ Pulitzer-winning photographs for the Post were the first color pictures ever 
awarded the top prize. 
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Clay Felker is largely credited with bolstering the prestige of Sunday magazines 
in terms of editorial quality and reader engagement. As editor of the New York Herald 
Tribune’s Sunday magazine New York in the mid-1960s, Felker tapped staff reporters 
from the main newspaper and granted them the freedom to experiment in their writing 
styles. The Herald Tribune was attempting to create a niche for itself in the competitive 
New York newspaper market, and literary-oriented journalism became that niche. Herald 
Tribune staffers Tom Wolfe and Jimmy Breslin wrote numerous long-form narrative 
articles for the Sunday magazine; Wolfe alone reportedly wrote 20 pieces for the 
magazine in late 1963 and early 1964 (Harvey, 1994). In his book The New Journalism, 
as reported by Harvey (1994, 42), Wolfe explained that the goal was to emotionally and 
intellectually engage the reader. To say, “Come here! Look! This is the way people live 
these days! These are the things they do!” Sandwiching these stories in New York were 
recurring columns and consumer-oriented sections, including restaurant reviews, fashion 
tips and other service journalism items that helped readers navigate life in New York 
City. Felker proved a newspaper magazine could examine and even promote 
consumerism, while at the same time publish hard-hitting and thoughtful journalism 
about any number of social and cultural issues. It was an editorial formula many Sunday 
magazine editors and city weekly magazine editors emulated.   
When the Herald Tribune went out of business in 1967, Felker bought the rights 
to the Sunday magazine and spun it off one year later as an independent weekly city 
magazine, which continues to publish today.  
To be sure, Wolfe wasn’t alone in bringing narrative nonfiction to magazines and, 
to a far lesser degree, newspapers in the 1960 and early ’70s. Joan Didion, Hunter S. 
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Thompson, Gay Talese and Gail Sheehy were just some of the writers who embraced the 
New Journalism, defined by extended dialogue, point of view and even subjects’ internal 
monologues (Harvey, 1994). Critics of the form called it “parajournalism” that 
undermined the authors’ credibility because New Journalism attempted to blend factual 
authority with fictional literary devices (Macdonald, 1965). Eugene Roberts, former 
managing editor of The New York Times, similarly worried about the challenges of 
newspapers publishing narrative nonfiction. “When you’re picking up a newspaper, 
you’re picking up a product of not just individuals, but an institution, with a past, present 
and hopefully a future. And the institutional integrity is all tied up in it” (Harvey, 1994, 
46). 
 For that reason—as well as the reality of production limitations, such as space and 
time—Sunday magazines were often the sections where newspapers experimented with 
long-form narrative nonfiction. The Washington Post’s magazine has so embraced the 
style that the section’s current tagline reads: “Telling the stories of the Washington region 
through narrative journalism” (Washington Post, 2013). This literary style of journalism 
is among the most distinctive editorial qualities of Sunday magazines, and it’s what helps 
make them a valuable piece of the entire Sunday newspaper package. “A Sunday 
magazine, if well done, can bring a dimension not ordinarily available in the newspaper’s 
conventional pages. It’s the place where staff writers and freelancers can step out with 
literary pieces that explore local institutions, people and legends in ways that go beyond 
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Conclusion 
History has shown that good journalism alone cannot sustain a newspaper section, 
or even a newspaper as a whole. The newspaper industry has long been structured around 
a business model that is reliant on advertising revenues to cover editorial, printing and 
distribution expenses, among many other costs.  
With the popularity of TV in general in the 1950s and ’60s, and the advent of 
cable television in the ’70s, an increasing number of people were spending more and 
more of their free time in front of television sets, where an explosion of diverse content—
from sitcoms and sports, to 24-hour news stations, weather and general entertainment—
could be found no matter the day or time. In the late 1990s, researchers found that ad 
agencies were decreasing their reliance on newspapers. Among the reasons cited by the 
agency executives were a belief that other media were better at reaching target audiences 
and that newspaper advertising space was too expensive compared to other media 
(Maxwell and Wanta, 2001).  
Although daily newspaper circulation increased almost 12% in a 40-year span, 
between 1950 and 1990, the number of U.S. households rose by 100% over that time 
(Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2004). The decline in household penetration over 
that period has been attributed to a number of factors, including that young people aren’t 
picking up the newspaper reading “habit” as they get older (Cobb, 1986), English isn’t 
the primary language for a growing number of U.S. residents, and media audiences are 
increasingly fractionalized based on demographic and lifestyle interests (Bianco, 2004). 
Entering 2010, paid weekday circulation for daily newspapers was down 31.5% over the 
previous 25 years, to approximately 43.5 million, while Sunday circulation was down 
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27%, to 45.6 million, according to the Newspaper Association of America (Project for 
Excellence in Journalism, 2010).  
Moreover, advertising revenues—which still make up the bulk of newspapers’ 
earnings—declined a whopping 28% in the third quarter of 2009, compared to the same 
period a year earlier (Liedtke, 2009). It was the 13th consecutive quarter that newspaper 
advertising revenues have dropped year-over-year. Although circulation and advertising 
are intrinsically linked, the latter still determines the longevity of most any print product. 
Newspapers with relatively high readership will often go out of business if they are 
unable to win sufficient financial support from local and/or national advertisers. The 
Rocky Mountain News, for example, ceased publication with a paid circulation of more 
than 210,000 (The Associated Press, 2009), while the Seattle Post-Intelligencer carried a 
paid circulation of approximately 117,000 when it stopped publishing (Bensinger, 2009).  
As both Shaver and Lewis (1997) and Attaway-Fink (2004) have found, 
newspapers almost always create new sections and subsidiary publications for the 
primary purpose of generating advertising revenues. When a new section or publication 
fails to earn revenues in excess of its expenses, it is often discontinued. The same has 
held true for many established sections, such as Sunday magazines. Unlike sports 
sections or op-ed sections that rarely cover their costs—former Washington Post Sunday 
magazine editor Steve Coll, who later became managing editor of the entire newspaper, 
said the Post’s sports department used to lose $25 million a year; “You think the tire ads 
pay for all that road game travel?” (Coll, 2010)—a Sunday magazine’s editorial content 
can easily run in other sections of the newspaper, and often does when publishers shutter 
their paper’s magazines (Garneau, 1991; Fitzgerald, 1998).  
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In other cases, newspapers create new sections that unintentionally undermine the 
editorial uniqueness of their own Sunday magazines. In 1977, for example, The 
Washington Post launched a new Friday section called “Weekend.” Editorial content 
included entertainment and restaurant guides, how-to articles and general feature stories 
(Editor & Publisher, 1977). Years later, some within the Post were still trying to discern 
what made their Sunday magazine editorially distinct from other sections in the 
newspaper. In 1986, for example, The Washington Post’s front-page was almost always 
filled with hard-news stories, often tied to politics and government. By 1991, however, 
the Post was running cover stories on suburban traffic jams, teenage boredom, and 
drivers who run red lights (Kurtz, 1993). “A lot of stories you used to find only in Sunday 
magazines you now will find in other sections of the paper,” said Post assistant managing 
editor Mary Hadar, who in the late 1980s served as president of the Association of 
Sunday and Feature Editors. “When asked what the magazine does that no other section 
of the paper does, it’s hard to come up with an answer” (Rosenthal, 1989, 16).  
From more than 120 locally produced Sunday newspapers magazines in the late 
1950s (Danilov, 1957), their numbers ballooned to approximately 225 in 1979 (Kurtz, 
1982).5 Costen attributed the growth of locally produced Sunday magazines, particularly 
in the 1970s, to four factors: competitive pressure for Sunday readership and advertising 
revenues from commercial weekly magazines; greater advertising interest from 
department stores; a desire on the part of publishers to make greater use of auxiliary 
presses, which were mostly used for extra editions; and the recognition of editors that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Slightly	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  Sunday	  magazines	  the	  author	  identified	  were	  printed	  
on	  basic	  newsprint,	  and	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  the	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  News	  &	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  as	  feature	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readers were increasingly interested in such topics as crime, romance, science and 
celebrities (1978).  
However, the economics simply did not work out. Turbett (1999) reported just 60 
locally produced Sunday magazines in the 1980s, and that number dropped to 22 in 1997 
(Jones, 1997). In announcing the closure of the Hartford Courant’s Sunday magazine, 
Northeast, magazine editor Jenifer Frank called it a “non-essential newspaper section” 
that was ceasing publication due to “insufficient money.” But she also pointed out that 
the mission of Northeast was “to be as different as possible from the daily news pages. 
Otherwise, what was the point of a magazine? (Frank, 2006). In Frank’s eyes, earning 
revenue was not the point of the magazine. It is to certain executive editors. When asked 
in 1991 why the Honolulu Star-Bulletin didn’t publish its own locally produced Sunday 
magazine, executive editor John Flanagan’s response was simple: “Advertisers don’t 
support them…they don’t pay their own way” (Stein, 1991, 15). Interestingly, a 1992 
survey by American Opinion Research found that adults under the age of 50 preferred to 
read, by a 2-to-1 margin, magazines rather than newspapers. Respondents said they 
preferred magazines—the specific types of magazine were undefined—because “they 
provide more variety and information, they are easier to handle and less depressing, and 
have better graphics and more detail” (Garneau, 1992, 15). 
By the end of 2011, only six newspapers published their own weekly Sunday 
magazine. They are The Boston Globe, The Kansas City Star, The New York Times, The 
Seattle Times, The Washington Post and the Albuquerque Journal. The Journal actually 
publishes four different magazines, with each subject-specific magazine appearing on a 
different Sunday every month. The other five magazines largely remain general-interest 
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publications; all are published on a higher quality paper stock than the rest of the 
newspaper and maintain printing dimensions similar to most consumer magazines. The 
New York Times Magazine is the lone locally produced Sunday magazine that has a 
national circulation.  
Over the past 25 years, the following newspapers have ceased publishing their 
own Sunday magazine, often for the stated reason that they were losing too much money:  
• The Denver Post (Empire, 1986; the magazine was resurrected in 1995 
before again getting the axe, in 1998) 
• Times Picayune in New Orleans (Dixie, 1986) 
• Dayton Daily News (The Magazine, 1988) 
• The Columbus Dispatch (Capitol, 1989) 
• Sacramento Bee (Sacramento Bee Sunday Magazine, 1989) 
• New York Daily News (New York Daily News Magazine, 1991) 
• Newsday (Newsday Magazine, 1991) 
• Akron Beacon Journal (Sunday Beacon Magazine, 1995; the paper re-
launched it three years but again killed it, in 2000) 
• Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Wisconsin Magazine, 1995) 
• Providence Journal (Rhode Islander, 1995) 
• Dallas Morning News (Dallas Life, 1995) 
• Buffalo News (BUFFALO, 1996; the magazine became a monthly in 
1997. The name was later changed to First Sunday, but that publication 
was also eliminated, in 2007) 
• Miami Herald (Tropic, 1998) 
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• South Florida Sun-Sentinel (Sunshine, 2000) 
• San Jose Mercury News (SV, 2001) 
• Philadelphia Inquirer (Philadelphia Inquirer Sunday Magazine, 2003)  
• Houston Chronicle (Texas, 2005) 
• Plain Dealer, Cleveland (Sunday Magazine, 2005) 
• Hartford Courant (Northeast, 2006) 
• Los Angeles Times (2008; the company shuttered the weekly Los 
Angeles Times Magazine, then re-launched and renamed it as a monthly) 
and 
• Chicago Tribune (Chicago Tribune Magazine, 2009).  
Locally produced Sunday magazines used to generate tens of millions of dollars 
in national advertising, but the dollars mostly dried up in the late 1980s as national 
advertisers sought more targeted and cost-effective ways to reach would-be consumers. 
Metropolitan Sunday Newspapers, or MSN, a member-owned cooperative that sold 
national ad space in locally produced Sunday magazines throughout the country, was 
among the chief financial rainmakers. When it began operations in 1932, the group 
promoted Sunday magazines as the “ideal concept” for print advertising, enabling 
companies to run four-color advertising with good reproduction on a mass scale (Giobbe, 
1995). The cooperative contended that readers of Sunday magazines were largely 
affluent; they owned two or more cars and spent a large amount of money on groceries. 
In 1983, MSN boasted a reach of 48 million readers through 54 newspapers, many in big 
markets (Dougherty, 1983), and advertising revenues in excess of $80 million. However, 
nearly half of that revenue total came from tobacco advertising (Giobbe, 1995).  
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Cigarette advertising was big business for newspapers and magazines starting in 
1971, when the federal government banned cigarette advertising from radio and 
television (Teel, Teel and Bearden, 1979). In 1970, the last year cigarette makers could 
advertise via broadcast, newspapers earned approximately $16.5 million in advertising 
revenue from them. By 1976, that number increased to $197.6 million; magazines in total 
were earning about $158.5 million, up from $55 million in 1970 (Teel et al, 1979). By 
1985, cigarette advertising accounted for 52% of locally produced Sunday magazines’ 
national advertising revenue. However, that number dropped to about 16% just three 
years later, as tobacco companies transitioned their marketed efforts to direct mail and 
other venues that enabled them to better target their messages (Giobbe, 1995). As a 
result, national advertising became a smaller and smaller part of the total ad mix for most 
locally produced Sunday magazines.  
Larry Israel, former president of the Washington Post Co. (he left in 1977), 
banned the Post’s television operations from accepting advertising from cigarette 
companies a full year prior to the federal broadcasting ban. The move cost the Post 
millions of dollars in revenue. However, no such restrictions were placed on the print 
operations of the company, either the Post newspaper, its Sunday magazine, or 
Newsweek, all of which reaped significant revenue gains following the broadcast 
prohibition. The Washington Post eventually instituted a policy against carrying tobacco 
advertising, citing the health dangers of the product (Campbell and Sato, 2009). 
Sunday magazines similarly lost a lot of advertising revenues when grocery stores 
and food manufacturers switched their ad buys from Sunday magazines to full-color free-
standing inserts in the late 1970s and early ‘80s because newspapers began offering 
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geographically zoned distribution of inserts—at less cost than a full-page Sunday 
magazine ad, no less. Coupon advertising used to account for nearly 35% of Sunday 
magazine ad revenue, but almost all of that money was lost with the advent of free-
standing inserts (Dougherty, 1983; Giobbe, 1995).  
For locally produced Sunday magazines to survive, and perhaps for others to 
experience a resurrection, some have argued that publishers need to come to grips with 
the fact that the section won’t often produce much if any profit (Bloom, 1985; 
Woodward, 1999). Rather, Sunday magazines are readership draws on the day of the 
week newspapers earn the vast majority of their advertising revenues. As Michael J. 
Davies, who wore the usual dual hats of publisher and editor of the Hartford Courant in 
the mid-1980s, once said: “A good magazine offers prestige, enormously high readership, 
and it can be to the Sunday paper what the gallon of milk is to the supermarket” (Bloom, 
1985, 25).  
To win renewed interest from advertisers, some newspapers have attempted to 
change the editorial approach and format of their Sunday magazines, from general 
interest to more thematic issues and advertising-friendly lifestyle coverage (Hynds, 
1994). In 1994, the San Francisco Chronicle replaced its Sunday magazine Image with a 
magazine that largely centered on culture, arts, entertainment, fashion, wine reviews and 
home design (Editor & Publisher, 1994). The magazine was carried in both the Sunday 
Chronicle and the San Francisco Examiner; the papers operated under a joint-operating 
agreement at the time. Today, the magazine is a monthly that still largely focuses on 
lifestyle-oriented content.  
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In 1998, the Akron Beacon Journal resurrected its Sunday Beacon Magazine at 
the behest of area furniture stores (Turbett, 1999). The magazine had ceased publication 
just three years earlier, after a 40-year run, due to a lack of advertising revenue. Yet, 
despite increased ad support and production changes that enabled the Beacon Journal to 
print the magazine in-house, saving the company money and dramatically shortening the 
lag time between printing and distribution, Sunday Beacon Magazine was again closed 
down just three years later for failing to generate sufficient ad revenues. “Once again…it 
was draining us financially,” said Jim Cruthfield, publisher and president of the then 
Knight Ridder-owned newspaper (Huey, 2001). 
More recently, newspapers have created monthly weekend magazine sections that 
are largely focused on lifestyle content and high-end advertisers. The Wall Street Journal, 
for example, relaunched its two-year-old quarterly news and lifestyle magazine WSJ. in 
December 2010, rebranding it the “world’s largest luxury magazine.” The publication’s 
media kit said the magazine, to publish six times a year with distribution through the 
Weekend edition, “acts as an escape and inspiration for [readers’] diverse and 
sophisticated lives” (The Wall Street Journal, 2011). Today, the magazine publishes 11 
times a year, and will become a monthly in 2014. In the press release announcing the 
magazine’s expansion, there was no mention of circulation growth. However, it did note 
that WSJ experienced a 76% increase in ad pages between 2010 and 2011. “It’s 
thoughtful and genuine, and it has really resonated with the advertising community, 
becoming a core outlet for marketers looking to reach the most affluent and influential 
audience possible,” said WSJ publisher Anthony Cenname (Wall Street Journal, 2012).  
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The Baltimore Sun brought back its Sunday magazine in September 2010 after 
retiring it in 1996 due to financial considerations. The magazine was founded in 1946 as 
“a picture magazine with an idea. The idea is PEOPLE” (Corey, 2010), but returned in 
2010 as a quarterly publication that focuses on a combination of fashion, celebrity, 
health, and home and gardening. In the March 2011 edition of Sun Magazine, for 
example, the publication profiled the swank home of Debbie Phelps, mother of Olympic 
swimming champion and Baltimore native Michael Phelps. Her luxurious two-bedroom 
garden apartment is part of The Ritz-Carlton Residences along the Baltimore Harbor. Not 
far from that feature, titled “Debbie Phelps is puttin’ on the Glitz,” is a full-page 
advertisement for The Ritz-Carlton Residences, where one to three-bedrooms 
condominiums sell from $500,000 to $4 million. This isn’t to say the feature was done at 
the request of Ritz-Carlton, or that it was conceived of with the hope that Ritz-Carlton 
would advertise. Neither scenario is known. It’s merely an example of how lifestyle-
oriented editorial content is of great appeal to the advertisers necessary to support such 
specialty publications. A number of other newspapers have launched new niche 
magazines, yet publish them on a monthly or quarterly basis and distribute them separate 
from the Sunday newspaper to better target specific readers. Each magazine is geared 
toward relatively affluent, educated readers, and focuses narrowly on such topics as food, 
fashion, travel or home design. These include the St. Louis Post-Dispatch’s FEAST, a 
free quarterly magazine that’s available through hundreds of distribution points around 
the city, the Miami Herald’s Indulge, a free monthly that’s available through South 
Florida retail outlets; and the Dallas Morning News’ FD Luxe, a free monthly about 
fashion, beauty, dining and travel. In each case, distributing the magazine independent 
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from the Sunday newspaper is a way to better target specific types of readers whom 
advertisers want to reach. The value of these types of magazines will be expanded upon 
in Chapter 8. 
The weekly Sunday magazines still publishing today, including those of The 
Boston Globe, Kansas City Star, Seattle Times and The Washington Post, have largely 
struck a balance between general-interest storytelling and consumer-oriented special 
editions, which are favored by advertisers because such editions tend to be 
complementary to the advertisers’ promotional messages. In addition, the magazines have 
added a number of consumer-oriented content elements into their editorial mix, often to 
appeal to specific types of readers and the advertiser who want to reach them. For 
example, when the Globe redesigned and revamped its Sunday magazine in 2003, it 
added short features on food and fashion to the front of the magazine with the goal of 
reaching younger readers, those “champs of American consumption, the 18- to 35-year-
olds” (Lehmann-Haupt, 2004, 24). Today, more than half of the Globe’s Sunday 
magazines over the course of the year are consumer-oriented editorially themed editions, 
including home and design, food, travel, and fashion (Boston Globe, 2013). The 
Washington Post follows a similar schedule, with about half of the magazines published 
over the course of a year based on a consumer-oriented theme that aims to appeal to 
category-specific advertisers.  
In the early ’90s, Sunday magazines were characterized as either a “profit center, 
a reader bonus or a showcase for editorial” (Silber, 1991, 54), depending on who you 
asked within a newspaper company. This lack of a shared vision for the value of Sunday 
magazines was among the mains reasons so many of the sections failed to survive. 
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Sunday newspapers used to have an identity: they featured lively storytelling, service 
journalism, narrative nonfiction, photographs, and color reproduction. However, as each 
of those elements found homes in other sections of the newspaper, Sunday magazines 
have struggled to reestablish a distinct identity that balances editorial values with the 
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Chapter 4 
Inside The Washington Post 
The Washington Post is the dominant daily, in terms of circulation and advertising 
revenue, in the Greater Washington, D.C. area. Its coverage of politics and policy has 
become a must-read for many on Capitol Hill, the epicenter of political power in the 
United States. Moreover, although The Washington Post Co. has been publicly traded 
since 1971, it has largely remained a family-owned company, with the Graham family 
and trusted advisers maintaining financial and operational control through a two-tiered, 
voting-and-nonvoting stock ownership structure. Unlike some newspaper companies that 
must cater to pure market demands—for instance, Knight Ridder, once the second-largest 
newspaper chain in America, was publicly traded as a single-class stock and forced into 
sale under pressure in 2005 from institutional investors unhappy with the company’s 
financial performance (Said, 2005)—the Post has been able to weather advertising 
slumps and circulation declines through the years. This is largely thanks to a 
diversification of corporate revenue streams—from broadcasting to education, the 
company owns the test prep and for-profit education centers Kaplan—and the Graham 
family’s commitment to quality journalism rather than short-term financial gain. 
Journalistically, the Post has long been among the elite newspapers in the United States. 
In many ways, the Post’s operation is like most any other major metropolitan 
daily, with a hierarchy of newsroom employees, consistent advertising and circulation 
pressures, and well-established cultural norms and practices that inform decision-making 
at most every turn. For all these reasons, it’s important to examine the history and 
evolution of The Washington Post Co., the culture and character of its namesake daily 
newspaper, and then that of the locally produced Sunday magazine at the center of this 
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study. A short exploration of the Post Co. and its flagship daily, past and present, will 
also provide a better understanding of how internal business practices and cultural values 
have shaped the Post’s Sunday magazine over the past 50 years. 
  
The Early Years, 1877-1948 
 The Washington Post newspaper began publishing on December 6, 1877. The 
company added a Sunday edition in 1880. The paper was purchased and sold a few times 
over the next 25 years, when John McLean, owner of the Cincinnati Enquirer, purchased 
the paper. Although McLean helped increase the Post’s circulation and advertising 
revenues, it was largely regarded as a partisan publication; McLean was a committed 
Democrat. McLean’s son, Edward, took over the newspaper following his father’s death 
in 1916, and largely ran the Post into court receivership because the company could no 
longer pay its bills (Washington Post, undated, 1). 
Despite the Post’s financial troubles—the paper had been losing $1 million 
annually in the early ’30s and boasted a daily circulation of only 50,000—it was a highly 
sought-after property. The Washington Herald, the city’s dominant daily with a 
circulation of approximately 120,000, wanted the Post so as to obtain a morning 
newspaper monopoly, while the afternoon Washington Star sought a foothold in the 
growing morning market. Eugene Meyer, a wealthy former Wall Street businessman and 
former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, had tried to buy the Post on two separate 
occasions, in 1925 and 1929, but failed to strike a deal each time (Kelly, 1983). Finally, 
in 1933, Meyer turned his dream into a reality by outbidding his competitors and 
purchasing the then-bankrupt Post for $825,000 (Johnson, 1977). Upon purchasing the 
	  
	   116	  
newspaper, Meyer announced on the front page: “It will be my aim and purpose steadily 
to improve The Post and to make it an even better paper than it has been in the past” 
(Meyer, 1933, A1). 
In the early 1930s, only the Herald, owned by William Randolph Hearst, The New 
York Times and the New York Herald Tribune were the must-read dailies for 
congressional power brokers (Kelly, 1983). The Star was largely a District of Columbia 
publication, and as such “had a headlock on local advertising” (Kelley, 1983 60). The 
Evening Times, also owned by Hearst, the Post and the tabloid Daily News largely 
rounded out the mix of dailies in D.C. 
Meyer’s stewardship of the Post got off to rough start. The publisher of the 
Herald convinced the comics syndicate used by both newspapers to no longer do 
business with the Post (Whitelaw, 1999). In an effort to tighten the reigns of the Post’s 
business operation, Meyer announced in late 1934 that the paper’s business manager 
would henceforth oversee all salary raises and promotions of journalists, responsibilities 
that had long resided in the newsroom. Twelve editors, including the Post’s managing 
editor, complained and demanded the return of autonomy in personnel and newsroom 
management matters. Meyer refused and all 12 quit in protest (Kelly, 1983). New to the 
industry, Meyer was unaware, unsympathetic or perhaps uninterested in the established 
cultural norms of a daily newspaper newsroom. Although he cared deeply about the 
public service responsibilities of his company, he viewed the Post primarily as a 
company. If he couldn’t help the newspaper make money, the newspaper would fail to 
exist (Whitelaw, 1999).  
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By the end of 1935, the Post was losing $1.3 million annually, yet Meyer refused 
to cut his losses and sell. He led in the addition a women’s section and new advice 
column, and he launched a lawsuit that brought the comics back to his paper. According 
to his friend Elizabeth Young, “Mr. Meyer kept the Post because of his determination not 
to be a failure” (Kelly, 1983, 66).  
In time, the Post began to reverse its fortunes. By 1938, the paper doubled its 
circulation, to 112,000, and annual losses were down to $400,000 a year through 
improved content—editorial writer Felix Morley won the Post its first Pulitzer Prize 
award, in 1936—greater marketing of the paper, and operational cost cutting. Meyer 
purchased a variety of syndicated columns from The New York Herald Tribune, including 
those of Walter Lippmann, Dorothy Thompson, drama critic Richard Watts Jr. and sports 
columnist Richard Vidmer. Among the paper’s more popular content elements were the 
colored Sunday comics, featuring “Andy Gump,” “Dick Tracy” and “Winnie Winkle” 
(Kelly, 1983). Interestingly, the Post actually marketed its entire Sunday newspaper as 
“entertainment.” In an October 1941 in-paper advertisement, the Post trumpeted its 
Sunday edition’s 11 sections, including two photography magazine sections (including 
the 32-page Parade magazine), an eight-page sports section, and a “complete novel” 
through the fiction section. Other content elements were movies, hobbies, comics, society 
news, politics and special articles (Washington Post, 1941, 9). 
 
The Grahams Build an Empire 
With his planned retirement looming, Meyer in 1948 transferred ownership of the 
Post to his daughter Katharine and her husband, Philip L. Graham. Meyer also gave 
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Graham $75,000; he gave the same amount to Katharine and each of her siblings. 
Graham used the money to purchase 5,000 additional voting shares in the company, 
reportedly saying, “A man should never feel that he is working for his wife” (Whitelaw, 
1999). Two years earlier, Phil Graham had been named associate publisher of the Post to 
learn the business that he would soon take over.  
Under Phil’s leadership, the company would rise to new heights, economically 
and politically. He purchased WTOP radio in D.C., as well as a local TV station. He then 
bought a TV station in Jacksonville, Florida, which became a cash cow for the company. 
But the biggest deal came in March 1954, when the Post Co. consolidated it power in the 
Greater Washington, D.C. area by purchasing the Washington Times-Herald, for $8.5 
million, giving the Post a morning monopoly. (The Washington Herald had purchased the 
Washington Times in 1939, and the two papers were merged.) In buying the Times-
Herald, the Post absorbed most of its circulation, with the increased audience leading to 
higher advertising returns. Of the Times-Herald’s 250,000 Sunday circulation, the Post 
picked up 200,000, nearly doubling its Sunday numbers. The Washington Star, an 
evening paper that carried far more advertising linage than the Post did at the time, added 
only about 8,000 new Sunday subscribers (Roberts, 1977, 315). The Post’s new Sunday 
paper included two syndicated magazines—Parade, which the paper had carried since 
1941, and American Weekly, which had run in the Times-Herald—as well as two full 
sections of comics. Three years later, in 1957, the Post opened its first foreign bureau, in 
London (Felsenthal, 1993). 
By 1959, the new Washington Post and Times-Herald—the paper shed its 
extended name in 1973, returning simply to The Washington Post—finally surpassed the 
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Star in advertising lineage and never again trailed. Sunday circulation was more than 
400,000, by far the best of any newspaper in the District, and advertising sales ranked 
seventh in the nation among all U.S. dailies (Roberts, 1977). Between its growing 
circulation, diminished competition, and the mounting influence of its journalism among 
the politically powerful and economically elite of the nation’s capital, the Post was able 
to steadily increase its advertising rates through the years (Felsenthal, 1993). When 
combined with surrounding suburbs, the D.C. area constituted “one of journalism’s 
soundest economic bases” (Johnson, 1977, A1). 
In the early 1960s, the company created a news service with the Los Angeles 
Times that bolstered both papers’ foreign news coverage. Within time, it also became a 
profitable subscription service. The Post Co. additionally acquired a partial ownership 
stake in the Paris-based English-language newspaper Herald Tribune, and entered the 
magazine business with the purchases of Newsweek in 1961, as well as Art News, a 
widely read monthly, and Portfolio, a hard-cover art quarterly, in 1962.  
In August 1963, the Post Co. came under new leadership virtually over night. 
Following years of manic depression and mental illness, Phil Graham, chairman of the 
board of Newsweek and president and CEO of The Washington Post Co., committed 
suicide in his home in Middleburg, Virginia. He was 48 (New York Times, 1963). 
His wife, Katharine, took over the company at age 45 out of duty to both her 
father, who died in 1959, and to Phil. Although she worked for a short time in the Post’s 
circulation department soon after Meyer purchased the paper, Katharine knew very little 
about the inner-workings of a newspaper, let alone a diversified media company with 
magazine, TV, radio and other holdings. She had devoted herself to raising their four 
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children, performing various philanthropic work, hosting social gatherings related to Post 
business, and caring for Meyer. She held a seat on the company’s board of directors and 
event spent some time in the late 1940s writing for the newspaper. Interestingly, 
Katharine was the author of the Post’s “The Magazine Rack” Sunday column, through 
which she reviewed and highlighted many of the nation’s top magazines (Whitelaw, 
1999). 
And as if learning the business on the fly wasn’t hard enough, Katharine faced a 
tremendous amount of sexism both within her own company and in her external 
professional dealings. “When Katharine took over, the Post was a male bastion in every 
department, from news to editorial to business….Male executives held little belief in 
women as leaders….The business world was a man’s world, and it had been a long time 
in the making” (Gerber, 2005, 69). Graham later said she originally thought so many 
people in the industry were condescending to her simply because she was new to the 
industry. “It took the passage of time and the women’s lib years to alert me properly to 
the real problems of women in the workplace, including my own,” she wrote in her 
widely acclaimed biography (Graham, 1997, 351).  
Graham immediately got to work learning the newspaper industry. She toured all 
parts of the company’s operation, traveling with a notebook to take notes. She learned 
about typesetting, printing and distribution. She took courses on management and read 
textbooks and manuals. She became a student of the Post newspaper, often calling 
reporters into her office to have them answer questions she had after reading their work. 
She traveled to New York once a week to learn about the operations of Newsweek, as 
well as to sit in on the main editorial meeting through which the cover story was decided. 
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However, Graham “rarely spoke at these meetings. When asked her opinion, she usually 
said, ‘Well, I’m depending on you guys to make it a better magazine’ ” (Whitelaw, 1999, 
68).  
In 1963, she took the title of president, yet left the running of the larger 
company’s business to Fritz Beebe, chairman of the board who also largely oversaw the 
Newsweek operation, and John Sweeterman, publisher of the Post. However, with a 
growing interest in the business side of her company, Graham gradually inserted herself 
into the financial operations. From 1963 to 1969, the Post Co. continued to grow through 
acquisition. It bought a partial ownership stake in a Canadian newsprint company and a 
Virginia-based warehouse and storage facility, and made the outright purchase of an 
ABC-TV affiliate station in Miami (Washington Post, 2011). Sweeterman, who Graham 
often had “difficulties with” professionally (Graham, 1997, 412), announced his 
retirement in 1968 and Graham reluctantly took over the title and responsibilities of 
publisher. To fill her old spot as president, Graham hired Paul Ignatius, a former 
Secretary of the Navy with a Harvard MBA but no experience in the newspaper industry. 
She wanted an outsider, someone who didn’t know her late husband or many of the other 
executives in the newspaper industry who “could not bring themselves to take her 
seriously” (Felsenthal, 1993, 283). In addition, former governmental colleagues of 
Ignatius’ described him as “budget-minded” and “profit-oriented,” both of which 
appealed to Graham, and he had experience leading several building projects. Graham 
was eager to create a new headquarters for the Post (Graham, 1997, 413). However, 
Ignatius—his son, David, later became an editor, columnist and reporter for the paper, 
specializing in international affairs—was a poor fit in the job and within the company. 
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According to Graham (1997, 509), he was a “thoroughly nice, well-intentioned man, but 
he came from a very different culture and never really learned the communication 
business.” Ignatius was asked to resign, and the Post announced it in October 1971. 
A few months earlier, in June, Graham took the Post Co. public through a two-
tiered dual-class ownership structure that earned the company $35 million. The “Class A” 
stock stayed with the Graham family, giving them controlling interest in the company, as 
well as the ability to elect 70% of the board of directors. Flush with new capital, the Post 
Co. further invested in its core print publishing business and diversified through new 
industries, such as TV, cable and education (Gerber, 2005). The two-tiered public 
offering wasn’t entirely unique. The Sulzberger family took The New York Times Co. 
public in much the same way in 1967 (Gerber, 2005), as the Bancroft family did with 
Dow Jones & Co. around the same time. From a business standpoint, companies such as 
the Fitch Ratings Agency have argued that the dual-class stock structure is good for long-
term financial success: “Family or trust-owned enterprises with dual-class stock 
structures are better positioned to take a longer-term view of the risks and opportunities 
in the newspaper space and to weather near-term turbulence in the stock markets, thereby 
better insulating them from shareholder activist-driven event risk” (E&P staff, 2007). 
Graham would become chairman of the board, balancing new responsibilities 
with the existing ones of running the newspaper as its publisher. It was a difficult task for 
someone with no formal business training. As Graham later admitted, she was constantly 
struggling with how best to balance her paper’s journalistic responsibilities with the 
financial responsibilities she held as the chief executive officer of a public company 
(Graham, 1997).  
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Yet, by 1971 the Post was clearly the dominant paper in the Greater D.C. area. Its 
circulation ranked seventh largest nationally, with a daily circulation of 510,000 and 
671,000 on Sundays. It had the highest circulation of any newspaper in Virginia, and was 
the largest daily in Maryland. From an advertising standpoint, the Post carried more than 
71.3 million lines of advertising, fifth most of any paper in the country (Washington Post, 
1971). The Post’s only local print competitor was the afternoon Star. “With suburban and 
upscale readers drifting away, a growing percentage of [the Star’s] remaining readership 
consisted of the relatively downscale residents of the District of Columbia and downtown 
office workers who bought it on the newsstands. These were not the flossy, upscale 
advertisers’ darlings who motored off to the suburbs each evening” (Benjaminson, 1984, 
88). Although the Star under new editor Jim Bellows arguably provided more coverage 
of the communities of Washington, D.C.—as opposed to the federal government—and 
became a more light-hearted and irreverent read than was the Post, “many people decided 
that reading the Star was equivalent to reading a supplement to a supplement and stopped 
it altogether” (Benjaminson, 1984, 101). Even though the Star’s circulation rose slightly 
under Bellow’s leadership, advertisers didn’t follow.  
In writing about The Washington Post’s 100-year anniversary, in 1977—it was 
one piece of a 10-part series of articles the newspaper published in celebration of itself— 
reporter Haynes Johnson referred to the company’s “morning monopoly” and how 
publishing in the “affluent nation’s capital gives it one of journalism’s soundest economic 
bases” (1977, A1). By the late 1970s, the Post was earning approximately 70% of all 
daily newspaper advertising in the D.C. area, and ranked fifth nationally in terms of 
advertising lineage (Bray, 1980). In 1977, the Post Co. earned a whopping $94.6 million 
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in the first quarter alone on the strength of advertising and circulation growth at the 
newspaper, advertising gains at Newsweek—the magazine added color-printing 
capabilities for all pages the previous year, which led to a surge in advertising—and 
adverting and licensing growth through its broadcasting properties. In all of 1976, the 
Post Co. earned $24.5 million (Jones, 1977). 
Graham’s oldest child, Donald, was handed control of the Post in 1979 when he 
was named publisher; Katharine transitioned to CEO of the Post Co. that same year. 
Unlike his mother, who had to learn the publishing business on the fly, Don came to the 
job with a strong understanding of the Post’s inner-workings through years of grooming 
and preparation. He had previously served in a variety of positions at the Post, from city 
reporter to sports editor, from working in marketing and promotions to serving as 
assistant general manager (Gerber, 2005).  
 In August 1981, the struggling Washington Star—under the new leadership of 
Time Inc.—finally went out of business, even though it still had a circulation of 
approximately 300,000. It was losing about $20 million annually and its share of local 
advertising dollars was at an all-time low (Benjaminson, 1984). The Post became the 
lone daily in the nation’s capital, and by the end of that year the paper’s Sunday 
circulation had risen 17% and its daily circulation by 25% (Felsenthal, 1993). The 
newspaper soon had little trouble increasing its ad rates and bolstering its already strong 
revenue performance (Fink, 1996). However, it wasn’t long before a new daily 
competitor arrived in Washington, D.C. The Washington Times began publishing in 1982, 
but the conservative-leaning newspaper—it was funded largely by the fringe religious 
	  
	   125	  
group Unification Church—was never able to generate more than a small fraction of the 
Post’s advertising or circulation revenue. 
The Post Co. continued to acquire new businesses, both within the media industry 
as well as beyond. In 1984, the company bought the K-12 tutoring/test preparation 
company Stanley H. Kaplan Educational Centers Limited for $45 million, and in January 
1986 paid Capital Cities Communication $350 million for 53 cable TV systems, largely 
in Western, Midwestern and Southern states (Rivera, 1985). Although both deals were 
significant for the Post Co., enabling it to diversify revenue streams, the Kaplan 
acquisition has grown more significant with time, expanding into the lucrative higher 
education and professional training fields. In 1975, the Post Co. posted annual profits of 
$12 million. By 1989, that number stood at $197 million (Kurtz, 1993).  
The diversification of business interests has partially shielded the newspaper 
division from more severe cutbacks during times of financial hardship. For example, 
following a pressmen’s strike in 1975 and 1976 that greatly damaged earnings at the 
newspaper, advertising revenues from the Post Co.’s television stations and Newsweek 
magazine prevented what would otherwise have been tough times financially for the 
company (Bray, 1980). In 2009, the Kaplan educational unit generates more than 60% of 
the company’s revenues and 75% of its operating income (Mufson, 2010). Two years 
earlier, Chairman Don Graham actually rebranded the Post Co. an “education and media 
company” to highlight for Wall Street analysts and investors the breadth of its 
diversification. At the time of the announcement, on December 5, 2007, the company’s 
newspaper division—which is largely the Post—accounted for just 21 cents of every 
dollar earned (Aherns, 2007). Katharine Graham passed away on July 17, 2001. 
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In the first quarter of 2010, the Post Co. reported a $45.4 million profit with 
revenues of $1.17 billion. However, revenue gains, which were 11% higher from the 
same period a year earlier, were attributed to growth at Kaplan, the Cable One cable 
company and six television stations. Such growth offset losses in the newspaper division, 
which dropped $13.8 million in that first quarter (Aherns, 2010).  
 
A Business Challenged 
The newspaper’s financial woes are not particularly unique to the Post. The 
newspaper industry as a whole has faced historic economic challenges from the 
emergence of the Internet, with its free content and low advertising rates. As is the case at 
newspapers nationwide, online advertising still accounts for only about 15% of all 
advertising revenues. Although online advertising revenues have grown slightly in recent 
years, the increases haven’t been nearly enough to make up for losses on the print side. 
At metropolitan daily newspapers, online advertising sells for approximately 10 cents to 
the print dollar. Print advertising revenues at the Post were down 6% in the second 
quarter of 2010, year over year, while daily circulation dropped 10.7% in the first six 
months of 2010—Sunday circulation fell 9%—compared to the same period one year 
earlier. Daily circulation was 556,300, while Sunday stood at 776,900 (Politico.com, 
2010). The Post Co.’s newspaper division posted operating losses of $193 million in 
2008 and $164 million in 2009, numbers that include online advertising (Sherman, 2010). 
The shortfalls have forced some major cuts in the paper’s much-heralded 
newsgathering operation, with hundreds of newsroom staff members leaving the 
company through a combination of retirements, general departures and four rounds of 
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voluntary buyouts (Sherman, 2010; Kindred, 2010). The Post lost a bevy of top writers, 
including foreign correspondent and two-time Pulitzer winner Anthony Shadid and 
political reporter Mark Leibovich, to The New York Times and other news media 
organizations. (Shadid died while working in Syria in 2012.) As of fall 2010, the paper 
still had a robust newsroom of approximately 600 employees and, as of May 2011, the 
Post ranked sixth nationally in daily circulation, at nearly 551,000, and third in Sunday 
circulation, at nearly 853,000 (Romenesko, 2011). 
In other cost-cutting moves in 2011, the Post closed its three national bureaus—in 
New York, Chicago and Los Angeles—stopped printing its daily business section as a 
stand-alone section, opting instead to run only a few pages as part of the “A” section, and 
killed its book review section. The book section was launched in September 1963 as a 
“literary supplement” to the Sunday paper. Titled “Book Week,” the rotogravure section 
was developed in partnership with the New York Herald Tribune and the San Francisco 
Examiner (The Washington Post, 1963, A1). That partnership ended when the Herald 
Tribune went out of business in 1966, although the Post continued the Sunday book 
section by joining forces with The Chicago Tribune in 1967 to produce a new 
“rotogravure magazine of modern design” titled “Book World” (The Washington Post, 
1967, A17). The Post would eventually publish the section entirely on its own. Other 
cutbacks in recent years included the Post’s National Weekly Edition, a subscription-
based print tabloid launched in 1983 that repurposed many of the Post’s top national 
news stories, book reviews, editorials and cartoons each week. The Weekly’s subscriber 
base had fallen from about 150,000 in the late 1990s to just 20,000 in 2009, and 
advertising revenues were similarly on the decline (Alexander, 2009). In 2008, the Post 
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discontinued publishing its very own crossword puzzle, which ran in the magazine 
section on Sundays. Fred Piscop held the job from 2002 to 2008, and was let go by the 
paper to cut costs (Horne, 2009). The Post immediately replaced Piscop’s puzzles with a 
syndicated puzzle, created by famed puzzle-maker Merl Reagle.  
Although painful, the various cuts to the newspaper weren’t as deep as they might 
otherwise have been if not for the Post Co.’s diversification of business interests. 
However, according to some, such diversification carried a possible downside for the 
flagship daily: “The success of Kaplan may have also provided a financial cushion that 
insulated the Post from making changes necessary to survive in a new climate” 
(Sherman, 2010).  
 
Journalistic Culture and the Pursuit of Greatness 
In the early 1970s, The Washington Post was among the elite U.S. daily 
newspapers, both journalistically and economically. On June 15, 1971, Katharine Graham 
took her company public through a two-tiered stock offering that earned the Post a quick 
$35 million—and many millions more over the years—while consolidating corporate 
decision-making authority within her family and among close associates (Gerber, 2005). 
Just days later, the Post cemented its journalistic reputation by publishing a front-page 
story based on what became known as “The Pentagon Papers.” The 47-volume report, 
formally titled “History of Decision Making in Vietnam: 1945-1968,” chronicled more 
than 20 years of misjudgments and outright lies by various U.S. administrations in the 
execution of the war with Vietnam. The U.S. government commissioned the classified 
report, which was written by the foreign policy think tank Rand Corp. (Kelly, 1983). 
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 The New York Times broke the Pentagon Papers story on Sunday, June 13, 1971, 
with six full pages of stories and documents based on the report. It looked at little known 
policy decisions by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, and how the 
CIA had argued, to no avail, in 1964 that the war couldn’t be won by bombing the 
Vietnamese. Graham and executive editor Ben Bradlee “were humiliated that the Times 
broke the story first and felt that the Post now had to catch up” (Davis, 1979, 257). The 
paper got its chance in part thanks to the Nixon administration, which quickly sought and 
won a temporary restraining order against the Times, preventing the paper from 
publishing additional stories from the classified report. By Thursday of that week, the 
Post acquired a full copy of the report. Despite a bevy of legal and financial fears, namely 
its new status as a public company as well as the future maintenance of its broadcasting 
licenses (Davis, 1979)—the Post Co. owned a variety of TV stations—the Post published 
a front-page story chronicling the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to delay elections 
in Vietnam in 1954, as well as other stories based on the report. The Nixon 
administration quickly sued the Post as well, winning another restraining order against 
further publication of the “Papers.” The Times and Post quickly joined forces, 
consolidated their appeals, and on June 30 won their case, 6-3, before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Wrote Associate Justice Hugo Black for the majority: 
“In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their courageous reporting, the 
New York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers should be 
commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In 
revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the 
newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they 
would do” (New York Times Co. v. United States, 1971, 717). 
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The Post challenged and defeated a U.S. president in the protection of such 
journalistic principles as truth and accountability, and the newspaper became something 
of a hero within the news media industry. One year later, the Post not only again 
challenged that president, but it also played a role in forcing his resignation from office.  
 On the evening of Friday, June 16, 1972, a group of burglars were caught 
breaking into the offices of the Democratic National Committee, located in the Watergate 
office building in Washington, D.C. The following day, a group of Post reporters and 
editors began looking into the break-in. Their findings culminated in a front-page story 
on Sunday, June 18 titled “5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats’ Office Here” (Kelly, 1983, 
183). Among other details, the article noted that one of the men who attempted to wiretap 
the DNC’s office was a former CIA agent. Within days, the Post discovered and reported 
that James McCord, the former agent, was the chief security officer for President Richard 
Nixon’s reelection committee, and that the burglars had other ties to the White House.  
 Over the next four-plus months, Post Metro reporters Bob Woodward and Carl 
Bernstein were tasked with further exploration of the burglary and its connections to 
those within the Nixon administration. Aided by confidential sources within the federal 
government—it was revealed only in 2005 that the primary source, famously code-named 
“Deep Throat,” had been FBI Associate Director W. Mark Felt—the Post got far ahead of 
everyone in the news media in chronicling a laundered money trail from former Attorney 
General John Mitchell, who resigned in early 1972 to manage Nixon’s reelection 
campaign, and the Watergate burglars. Nixon nonetheless won reelection in a landslide in 
November 1972, yet would resign his office less than two years later, the result of a 
steady stream of details from criminal trials, Senate hearings, special prosecutor 
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investigations and, ultimately, a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that finally cleared the way to 
the truth: Nixon knew about the break-in and was directly involved in trying to thwart 
any investigation. The Post and its executive editor, Ben Bradlee, would become national 
heroes. Woodward and Bernstein would go on to write two best-selling books about the 
Watergate break-in and cover up, with one of those books, All the President’s Men, 
adapted into a screenplay and made into a movie in 1976.  
Thanks largely to its investigative reporting of the Watergate scandal, the Post 
quickly became known as “the most exciting paper to work on, the most interesting one 
to read, and the one from which wrongdoers had most to fear” (Fallows, 1976, 145).  
When Bradlee announced his retirement in 1991, many in the newsroom thought 
former Post editor and Bradlee protégé Shelby Coffey was his likely successor. Coffey 
had held a variety of positions at the paper over the years, from editor of the Post’s 
Sunday magazine, to editor of the Style section, to deputy managing editor of the paper. 
An avid proponent of feature writing and narrative journalism, Coffey had left the Post in 
1985 and joined the Los Angeles Times one year later. He became that paper’s editor on 
January 1, 1989, although many in and around the Post expected him to return to D.C. 
(Kindred, 2010). But the offer never came. By instead choosing Post managing editor 
Leonard Downie Jr. to replace Bradlee, in 1991, Publisher Donald Graham “told editors 
and reporters that style was good, and there was a place for style, but the values of his 
newspaper would be based solely on substance” (Kindred, 2010, 140).  
Whereas Bradlee led the Post to national prominence, Downie is credited with 
professionalizing the newsroom and shaping “the institution’s culture” (Sherman, 2010). 
A longtime Post reporter, Downie became an editor on the Metro section in 1974 and a 
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London correspondent in 1979. He returned to D.C. in 1982 as the national editor and 
was promoted to managing editor two years later. Downie served as executive editor of 
the Post for 17 years, from 1991 to 2008, leading the paper to 25 Pulitzer Prizes, 
including three for Public Service, the newspaper industry’s highest honor (Kurtz, 2008). 
However, some have argued that Downie was almost too focused on the greatness 
of the print newspaper, at the expense of new opportunities and emerging threats, namely 
the Internet (Sherman, 2010). The Post, like The New York Times, had increasingly 
become a “centrist institution given to glacial movements” (Sherman, 2002, 49). 
Although the Post was among the first newspapers to start publishing online, in 1996—it 
was the first major U.S. newspaper to carry a staff-written blog, in 2005 (Kindred, 
2010)—the Post kept its print and online news operations separate, with the online team 
based in Arlington, Va., and the print operation in the company’s headquarters in 
downtown Washington, D.C. Some have argued that housing the web unit in Virginia 
was a way to prevent unionization (Virginia had tough union-forming laws), while others 
have contended that separate offices gave the digital operation the freedom to experiment 
and innovate in ways it would unlikely be able to if housed within a print newsroom 
culture that was deeply protective of established journalistic norms and practices 
(Wemple, 2008). “The website people were kids from a computer culture of video, audio, 
databases, photo galleries, interactivity—all those gadgets that were alien to the veterans” 
in the Post’s print headquarters (Kindred, 2010, 120). Said Steve Coll, former editor of 
the Post’s Sunday magazine and, later, starting in 1998, managing editor of the 
newspaper, “Even the most creative of us were imprisoned by our inherited newspaper 
assumptions” (Kindred, 2010, 120). Ultimately, the Post was among the last major 
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metropolitan newspapers to merge its print and online newsrooms, finally doing so in 
2009 under new executive editor Marcus Brauchli.  
 
Pulitzers, Power and Prestige 
  While The New York Times won the 1972 Pulitzer Prize in Public Service for its 
coverage of the Pentagon Papers, the Post won the top award one year later for its 
ongoing investigation into the Watergate break-in and White House cover up. Post 
political columnist David Broder also won that year in the Commentary category. It was 
a crowning achievement for the paper. Prior to 1973, the Post had won “just” seven 
Pulitzers, starting with its first, in 1936. However, in the years that Bradlee served as 
executive editor, from 1968 to 1991, the Post won 19 Pulitzers, not counting the 1981 
award for feature writing, which was returned by Post reporter Janet Cooke after 
admitting she fabricated the story. Since 2000, the Post has won 24 of the awards, second 
only to The New York Times’ 27 (Pulitzer.org, 2011). Pulitzer “winners become the 
nobility of American journalism,” wrote former Post ombudsman Bill Green (1981, 
A15). Studies have shown that reporters and editors are perceived to carry greater 
professional prestige after winning a journalism award (Kosicki et al, 1985), and that a 
newspaper’s prestige is elevated through the industry when one of its journalists is 
honored for his or her work, particularly investigative journalism (Coulson, 1989).  
 “So prestigious is The Post among journalists and would-be journalists in this 
country and abroad that one could feel comfortable betting that the entire staff could be 
replaced, at least numerically, once a month by the applications the paper receives” 
(Green, 1981, A15). However, such success often comes with professional pressure, 
	  
	   134	  
which hasn’t always served Post journalists or the paper very well. Said Lewis Simons of 
the Post’s Metro section in explaining what might have compelled his former colleague 
Janet Cooke to fabricate a story and then repeatedly lie about it: “Pressures are so great to 
produce, to go beyond excellence to the ‘holy s---’ story. Everyone knows that’s what the 
editors want. The pressure is to get the incredible story, the extraordinary story” (Green, 
1981, A15).  
 In the search for reporters who can handle that pressure, newsroom-hiring 
decisions at the Post have long been group decisions, with various editors meeting with 
and interviewing job candidates. It’s a system of checks and balances to determine if 
aspiring Post journalists would likely survive and thrive within the company’s fast-paced, 
politically charged (both internally and externally) environment. Editors at the company 
called the process a professionally “collegial” one (Green, 1981, A14), although 
collegiality suffers at times during the rigors of producing a brand-new product each and 
every day. As is the case at many newspapers, Post editors are often protective of their 
sections and reporters, and will lobby for ever-more resources—be they staff, budgetary 
or news hole—while reporters guard their beats and stories from potential encroachment 
by colleagues vying for a front-page article that might bring internal plaudits, promotions 
and external prestige (Sherman, 2002). Said former Post national section reporter Joanne 
Omang: “There is little interest in yeoman labor covering a subject that only affects 
people’s lives; what counts in the glory department is page one, and everyone is supposed 
to ‘write it out’ onto the front, no matter how mundane the topic. This is part of the 
creative tension business” (Green, 1981, A15).  
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 In writing about her experiences as a Metro and Sunday magazine reporter at the 
Post in the mid- to late 1980s, Jill Nelson chronicled the early thrills, frustrations and 
ongoing challenges of those tensions. The book is pointedly titled Volunteer Slavery: My 
Authentic Negro Experience. “Being hired by the Post is for many journalists the 
pinnacle of their careers. Wooed from some other newspaper because they are stars, 
enterprising hot shots with great reportorial skills, they came to the Post prepared to take 
their rightful place in the ultimate journalistic constellation, to join the elite club of the 
country’s finest reporters and writers. Once arrived, they abruptly find themselves tossed 
into a newsroom filled with several hundred other stars fighting to see who can shine the 
brightest, eclipse each other, continue to ascend, and yet avoid the always imminent 
danger of crashing and burning” (Nelson, 1993, 84).  
 
Getting Style 
Although The Washington Post is largely known for its investigative journalism 
and award-winning coverage of U.S. politics and policy, the newspaper was at the 
forefront of a new model of newspaper journalism beginning in the late 1960s. Bradlee, a 
former Washington bureau chief for Newsweek, joined the Post as managing editor in 
1965 and brought a “magazine flair and style” to the paper (Roberts, 1977, 378). Bradlee 
was named executive editor of the Post in late 1968, and he wasted little time putting his 
personal stamp on the newspaper. 
In the mid- to late 1960s, at the height of America’s “new journalism” movement, 
which emphasized narrative storytelling and the writer’s point of view, Bradlee led the 
charge in shuttering the Post’s often dry daily women’s section “for and about Women.” 
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Bradlee wanted the Post instead to cover the private lives of his high-powered readers 
and shine a light on the cultural trends taking shape throughout the country (Felsenthal, 
1993), but with a magazine’s breezy editorial voice and sophistication of design.  
In 1952, “for and about Women” editor Marie Sauer had actually lobbied top Post 
editors to revamp her section and replace it with a new general interest section that 
catered to men and women alike. She sought to challenge the newspaper industry’s 
“gendered definition of news” (Yang, 1996, 367), which held that women’s sections 
should largely contain soft news stories about food, fashion and furnishings geared to 
housewives. However, Post business-side executives rebuffed Sauer’s efforts due largely 
to advertisers’ desire for an ever-upbeat section through which they could market their 
products to affluent suburban housewives. “From the management’s point of view, these 
pages were to serve the advertisers more than the readers of the Post” (Yang, 1996, 368).  
As such, Sauer and her team of reporters were stuck in a no-win situation. 
Because they mostly covered society news and fluffy lifestyle stories, Sauer and her staff 
were held in low esteem among many other journalists throughout the newsroom. And 
yet, when Sauer began to incorporate more “hard news” into her section, by having her 
reporters pursue more substance from such soft-news beats as community luncheons or 
embassy receptions, editors of other Post sections complained that such substance 
belonged in their sections, not the women’s section (Yang, 1996). She occasionally won 
those battles, and she occasionally lost some, too. 
The inaugural issue of Style appeared on January 6, 1969, and it was among the 
first newspaper sections in America that carried a magazine-like editorial sensibility, 
packaging graphics, photography, witty and controversial features, short items of gossip, 
	  
	   137	  
news interlaced with opinion and context, and narrative storytelling. “It soon became the 
voice of the precious few and an affront to many” (Kelly, 1983, 158). For Bradlee, Style 
was a place where the Post could cover “the revolution in how people were living” and 
what “real people were doing, rather than criminals murdering or leaders leading” 
(Bradlee, 1995, 297). That’s not exactly how Style started out, though. For the inaugural 
issue, the cover story featured Ruth Eisemann-Schier, the first woman to appear on the 
FBI’s 10-most wanted list. Eisemann-Schier played a role in the December 1968 
kidnapping and ransom of a Florida land heiress. To be sure, it was not the typical 
women’s page fare. “Readers were shocked, but none more than Kay Graham. She 
worried about losing the fashion advertising (including that of department stores) and the 
respect of her friends who were accustomed to polite coverage of their teas, not stories 
about abortion, homosexuality, extramarital sex—all of which were soon fare for ‘Style’” 
(Felsenthal, 1993, 267). Post business executives, including Graham, were deeply 
worried about the potential loss of advertisers as a result of Style’s edgier content 
(Bradlee, 1995), but the new feature section soon became a hit with readers and 
advertisers alike.  
 Coverage of area social events and weddings, as well as articles on child rearing, 
markedly declined over the next 10-plus years, while coverage of entertainment and the 
arts blossomed (Franklin, 1991). The number of stories focused entirely on women also 
significantly decreased (Miller, 1976). “We wanted to look at the culture of America as it 
was changing in front of our eyes,” Bradlee (1995, 298) would later write. “The sexual 
revolution, the drug culture, the women’s movement. And we wanted it to be interesting, 
exciting, different.” 
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 But Style’s success came at a cost to the broader newspaper. In fulfilling 
Bradlee’s desire for a top-notch daily feature section, some of the paper’s best writers 
were pulled from other sections and assigned to write for Style. As a result, those sections 
would increasingly become “feature-free” and “top-heavy with straight news” (Bradlee, 
1995, 300), which, in many ways, would shape the editorial culture of the Post for years 
to come. 
 
Magazines and Lifestyle 
Demographic shifts in the Greater Washington, D.C. area in the late 1940s 
dramatically effected operations at the Post as well as at other local dailies. People were 
increasingly moving away from the urban center of the District and into the surrounding 
suburbs. From 1940 to 1950, the area’s suburban population doubled, and by 1960 the 
surrounding suburbs had twice the population of the District of Columbia (Grier, 1973). 
This geographic shift had a direct affect on the Post’s editorial coverage and business 
operations. The newspaper quickly broadened its news coverage into the suburbs and 
sought new ways to appeal specifically to women. That’s because advertisers were 
similarly chasing these affluent suburbanites, often at the expense of inner-city 
residents—African-Americans represented 76% of the D.C. population in the early 1970s 
(Bray, 1980)—as the expansion of homes, yards and living conditions gave rise to a vast 
market of domestic products. Businesses wanted to reach suburbanites, but women in 
particular because they often did their family’s shopping (Roberts, 1977; Benjaminson, 
1984).  
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The Post introduced new special content sections throughout the 1950s and early 
’60s. Editors of these sections were given great freedom to pursue more or less whatever 
stories they deemed important to tell, although food, travel and real estate were largely a 
“reflection of the advertisers” (Roberts, 1977, 359). Entertainment was another content 
area the Post used to pursue new ad revenue. In response to the popularity of the booklet-
sized consumer magazine TV Guide, which premiered with national listings in 1953, the 
Post began publishing its own weekly color TV magazine in 1960. Printed in a 7-inch-
by-10 1/4-inch format through rotogravure, the Sunday Post’s television magazine 
featured local channel listings, program highlights, movie guides, celebrity interviews, 
pictures of famous TV personalities, and a column about the Washington area TV scene.  
 The company moved into the magazine publishing business in earnest in 1961, 
both with the February launch of a new locally produced Post Sunday magazine, 
Potomac, and the $15 million purchase of Newsweek one month later. The Post Co. 
quickly added two art magazines, Art News and Portfolio, to its stable in late 1961 and 
early 1962, respectively.  
Newsweek was founded as a news digest in 1933 and was originally called News-
Week; it merged with Today magazine in 1937 and the named was tweaked to become 
Newsweek. The magazine attempted to compete with Time, the nation’s leading general-
interest newsmagazine, and did so by avoiding the type of “point of view” journalism that 
defined Time (Tebbel, 1969, 228). By the 1960s, following its purchase by the 
Washington Post Co., Newsweek discovered it editorial voice through news analyses and 
signed columns; Time typically ran anonymous columns. Under the guidance of Philip 
Graham, Newsweek took on a more politically progressive viewpoint in stories, mirroring 
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its new owner’s politics and further distinguishing itself from the more conservative-
leaning Time. Graham invested additional cash into the magazine, enabling it to expand 
its editorial staff both in the United States and abroad (Tebbel and Zuckerman, 1991). In 
1967, Newsweek received wide acclaim from news media insiders, community activists 
and political leaders alike when it veered from its typical news analyses approach and 
toward open advocacy in support of the civil rights movement. In November of that year, 
Newsweek produced a 20-page section titled “What Must Be Done” that identified 
various steps the government should take to meet the needs and demands of black 
communities throughout the country. “As the media critic Edwin Diamond put it, 
‘Newsweek was the ‘hot book’ for Madison Avenue in the ‘60s’ ” (Tebbel and 
Zuckerman, 1991, 306). Throughout its history, however, the magazine was always 
second to Time in circulation. In a span of 12 years, from 1972 to 1984, Newsweek had a 
whopping six different editors and seven different presidents, “perhaps a reflection of its 
owner, Katharine Graham, head of the Washington Post Company, who had been 
periodically impatient with Newsweek’s failure to overtake Time” (Tebbel and 
Zuckerman, 1991, 306). Although it has been widely reported that she left editorial 
management of the Post newspaper to Bradlee, she was actively involved in the hiring 
and firing of editors at Newsweek. Her primary interests were not budgetary or even 
advertising related; she simply wanted Newsweek to be “better, quicker, more thoughtful, 
[and] more rewarding to its readers” (Kosner, 2006, 162).  
In the late 1970s, Katharine Graham and the Post Co. turned their sights to the 
city magazine market, with specific interest in Clay Felker’s New York. With the demise 
of the New York World Journal Tribune in 1966, Felker purchased the rights to the 
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paper’s locally produced Sunday magazine, of which he was editor, and spun it off a year 
later as a weekly consumer magazine. The Post’s new Style section, which premiered in 
1969, used the magazine as something of an editorial template, as did Potomac under the 
editorship of Walter Pincus and Steve Isaacs in the late 1960s. Bradlee even instructed 
Isaacs to visit Felker to better understand the elements of what Bradlee called “boutique 
journalism.” “Use light and frivolous covers and you can get away with serious pieces 
inside,” Felker told Isaacs, a former reporter and editor of the Post’s city section (Bray, 
1980, 215). New York was renowned for its “upscale service journalism,” such as stories 
about where to find the best bagels or where to go to have an invaluable family heirloom 
repaired. Such stories sandwiched feature articles by such journalistic luminaries as 
Gloria Steinem, Tom Wolfe, Jimmy Breslin and Gail Sheehy (Kosner, 2006). Felker 
described the editorial philosophy of New York as a “subtle, sophisticated formula for a 
literate and active, upwardly mobile audience, depending on constant surprise, and 
unique writing and visual talents” (Felker, 1968, 9). 
 Later feeling creatively squeezed and disempowered, Felker in 1976 sought to 
gain greater control of his magazine’s future and began to quietly pursue new investors. 
The New York Magazine Company owned New York, the Village Voice and New West, a 
California-based city magazine Felker had started one year earlier, but Felker owned just 
10% of the company and he was increasingly at odds with other board members, namely 
Carter Burden, who held the largest block of company stock. Felker appealed to both 
Rupert Murdock, who purchased The New York Post in 1976, and Graham, whom he had 
a friendship with. However, after a protracted negotiation process, Burden sold his shares 
to Murdock, “an embarrassing defeat” for Graham (Gerber, 2005, 179).  
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 Other efforts and failures in magazine publishing would follow, including 
numerous attempts at redeveloping the Post’s Sunday magazine. In 1979, the Post Co.’s 
magazine group launched Inside Sports, a monthly competitor to Time Inc.’s weekly 
Sports Illustrated, but the subscription and newsstand publication became a financial 
drain on the company. Inside Sports lost $12 million its first year, four times more than 
expected, and quickly lost support among Post Co. executives in Washington, D.C. and 
New York. The magazine was projected to lose money in its first four to five years—it 
took Sports Illustrated 12 years to gain profitability; it premiered in 1951 (Brinkley, 
2010)—yet Katharine Graham and Post Co. President Richards Simmons didn’t want to 
risk the magazine becoming a drag on the company’s bottom line. Inside Sports 
ultimately cost the Post Co. $20 million, and was sold in 1982 (Felsenthal, 1993). 
 Today, the magazine business represents a sliver of the Post’s operation, although 
the company has developed an array of niche publishing interests. Although the Post Co. 
purchased Foreign Policy magazine in 2008, it sold Newsweek two years later to 
businessman and philanthropist Sidney Harman in a dumping of debt. The magazine 
hadn’t earned a profit since 2007 and lost a reported $30 million in 2009 (Olivarez-Giles, 
2010).6 Among the Post’s niche titles, the company owns a free, young adult-oriented 
commuter daily, Express, which it launched in 2003, and a Spanish-language 
newsweekly, El Tiempo Latino, which it purchased in 2004. Both print publications 
feature additional online content, as is the case with Foreign Policy. The Post Co. also 
currently owns a pair of online-only daily magazines, Slate.com, a general-interest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Harman	  later	  partnered	  with	  Barry	  Diller’s	  InterActiveCorp,	  which	  owned	  The	  
Daily	  Beast	  website.	  Newsweek	  and	  The	  Daily	  Beast	  were	  jointly	  operated,	  but	  
Newsweek	  still	  wasn’t	  able	  to	  generate	  a	  profit.	  The	  print	  edition	  ceased	  publication	  
on	  December	  31,	  2012,	  but	  continues	  to	  publish	  online	  (Daniel	  and	  Hagey,	  2012).	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publication purchased from Microsoft in 2005, and TheRoot.com, which delivers an 
African-American perspective on news, politics and culture. The Post launched Root in 
2008.  
 Taken together, the Post Co. remains deeply committed to publishing. However, 
with the exception of the main section of its flagship daily, that commitment has 
increasingly moved away from general interest—as is the case throughout much of the 
print publishing industry (Morton, 2004)—and toward a niche content and advertiser 
strategy.  
 
The Evolution of the Post’s Sunday Magazine 
In the early part of the 1900s, The Washington Post published a number of 
Sunday-only niche sections dedicated to culture and lifestyle. This included an illustrated 
fiction section, starting in the late 1910s, as well as an eight-page rotogravure photo 
section in 1917, providing readers with “pictorial presentations of places and people the 
whole world over” (Washington Post, Dec. 1917, 10). The Sunday-only section was 
marketed heavily through advertisements in the main paper during the week, often in 
conjunction with other promotions for Sunday content offerings, including the fiction 
section, the sports section and comics. Clearly, the Post sought to win readers through 
offering a package of lifestyle and entertainment-based content. 
In promoting its rotogravure section, the Post, like many newspapers of the time, 
turned to over-the-top rhetoric: “The most elaborately illustrated supplement south of 
New York. Destined to entrench The Washington Post more firmly than ever in its 
position as ‘The National Capital’s Favorite Sunday Newspaper’” (Washington Post, 
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1917, 12). The newspaper sought to engage its readers partly by inviting them to submit 
their own creative content for publication, a practice regularly employed by most 
newspaper websites today. In March 1918, the Post announced its first photography 
contest, open to experts and amateurs alike in the Washington, D.C. area, with the top 
winner receiving $50 and his/her pictures published in the paper’s Sunday rotogravure 
section (Washington Post, March 1918). More than 1,000 photographs were submitted, 
with the winners announced through the Sunday publication of their pictures 
(Washington Post, June 1918). In 1923, the Post took its pursuit of user-generated 
content to new heights, or perhaps lows, with a rotogravure section photo contest for the 
“prettiest feet” in the Greater D.C. area. Nearly 2,000 women submitted pictures, 
proving, according to a write up about the contest, “Washington women are proud of 
their feet, and justly so” (Washington Post, 1923, 2). 
In 1919, the Post began publishing a new broadsheet section that the paper called 
“the best magazine ever printed by a Sunday newspaper” (Washington Post, 1919, 9). 
The “magazine” carried mostly fiction, opinion pieces and illustrations, but also the 
occasional traditional feature story, including some based on life on the European 
battlefields of World War I. The Post launched a new standalone fiction section in 1934 
and continued to carry a bevy of other Sunday sections, including the magazine, a 
rotogravure photo section, colored comics, sports, society, real estate and news 
(Washington Post, 1934). However, the magazine section would come and go throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century due, in part, to paper shortages and shifting editorial 
strategies. It wasn’t until February 5, 1961 that the Post introduced what might be seen 
today as a traditional Sunday magazine section.  
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Printed through rotogravure, the new publication featured four-color on the front 
and back page as well as sporadically throughout, with content completely local and 
generally “light and fluffy” (Bradlee, 1986, C7). The goal, in addition to bolstering local 
retail advertising, was to give “some bulk” (Bradlee, 1986, C7) to the Post’s Sunday 
paper, which was then in serious competition with the Washington Star’s Sunday edition 
for readers and advertisers. “You’ll be able to share it with your entire family—the places 
you know, the people you’ve seen—the familiar events that are so much a party of the 
Washington scene,” read a full-page ad announcing Potomac. The ad also touted the fact 
that more than 75% the magazine, which measured 10 ¾ inches-by-13 inches, would be 
photographs (Washington Post, 1961, A11).  
 Led by Paul Herron, a former real estate reporter and editor at the Post, Potomac 
was launched as a way to offer area businesses color advertising through rotogravure 
printing. No other section of the paper could print in color. Editorially, editor Russell 
Wiggins conceived of Potomac as “local and low key. No controversy and keep the thing 
short,” according to Herron (Herron, 2009). To that end, Potomac consistently featured 
local feel-good stories and photo spreads, highlighting such things as high school 
marching bands, art shows, area luncheons and local golf tournaments. Later in this 
study, in the chapter detailing findings, I will explore in greater detail some of unique 
content elements and the evolution of the Post’s Sunday magazine under its various 
editors. 
But soon after Bradlee joined the Post as managing editor in 1965, he replaced 
Herron as editor of Potomac with Washington Star politics and campaign finance reporter 
Walter Pincus. According to Pincus, the Post and Star had an informal agreement that 
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they wouldn’t hire reporters away from each other. But by having Pincus edit the 
magazine, as opposed to work on the main paper, Bradlee believed he found a loophole 
(Pincus, 2010).  
Unlike Herron, Pincus came to the Post with at least a 
working knowledge of the magazine industry. He was an 
early investor in The New Yorker and good friends with Clay 
Felker, editor of New York magazine (Pincus, 2010). Pincus, 
Bradlee and a small team of Post journalists would redesign 
Potomac to be more like a general-interest city magazine, 
with recurring sections such as restaurant reviews, and three 
to four features and personality profiles each week. The 
ultimate goal, Pincus said, was to make the magazine 
substantive enough to one day compete directly with Parade 
on a national level. However, that plan never came to fruition 
due to infighting between section editors over resources and 
stories ideas—Pincus would get various Metro and city 
reporters at the Post to write for the magazine as a way to 
improve its journalistic quality—as well as Post executives’ 
unwillingness to experiment with a section that was already 
generating a lot of advertising revenue (Pincus, 2010). On 
October 13, 1968, the entire issue of Potomac was dedicated 
to a chapter from the upcoming book Ten Blocks From The 
White House, a story about the race riots that engulfed D.C. that year. A few Post 
Figure	  2:	  In	  the	  late	  1960s,	  
the	  Post	  largely	  promoted	  
Potomac’s	  color-­printing	  
capabilities,	  showcasing	  
both	  photography	  and	  
illustrations.	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reporters and photographers had produced the book; the newspaper sought to use the 
magazine to promote their upcoming work (Washington Post, 1968). 
Tired of the internal politics, Pincus left the magazine in 1968 and returned to 
traditional newspaper reporting. From 1972 to 1975, he served as executive editor of The 
New Republic magazine before returning to the Post’s national staff; he was part of the 
2002 team that won a Pulitzer Prize for national reporting.  
Pincus would be followed by a number of temporary fill-in editors, including Joe 
Anderson and former Post city editor Stephen Isaacs, who years later became editor of 
the Minneapolis Star. In 1971, Bradlee hired a New York-based magazine editor named 
Robert Wool to help remake Potomac into a Sunday magazine that paralleled The New 
York Times Magazine both journalistically and financially, in terms of national 
advertising revenues earned. The goal, according to Wool, was to rename Potomac and 
overhaul its design and editorial identity; Bradlee wanted the magazine to tap top-notch 
writers, focus on local, national and international news, and appeal to high-end luxury 
goods advertisers. The plan was estimated to cost around $15 million over three years. 
However, after a year of planning, Katharine Graham refused to back the project. She 
simply didn’t believe the cost was worth the potential reward of a more editorially 
sophisticated magazine of appeal to national advertisers (Wool, 2012). In his short time 
as editor, Wool largely maintained Potomac as it had been; short stories that were largely 
light and local. The December 26, 1971 issue, for instance, featured a photo essay about 
the Washington Redskins football team, a variety of games—including crosswords, 
bridge, and a cryptogram—a listing of popular records for readers’ stereo systems, and a 
restaurant review (Potomac, 1971, 4). Since the magazine was not to receive the financial 
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support needed to overhaul it, Wool left the Post and returned to New York to take an 
editorial position at The New York Times Magazine.  
Wool was replaced by Shelby Coffey, a 25-year-old sports reporter at the Post. 
Coffey’s first exposure to the magazine was as a freelance writer during his 
undergraduate years at the University of Virginia. Pincus assigned Coffey a feature 
article about the social scene on the Charlottesville campus. As editor, Coffey infused 
Potomac with longer stories—some winning awards from the Sunday Magazine Editors 
group—although still largely local in nature. He was allowed to stretch his editorial 
boundaries to North Carolina and Pennsylvania because that’s where many affluent 
Washingtonians vacationed (Williams and Touster, 1976). “We wanted it to be lively. To 
have impact was one of Ben’s favorite words,” said Coffey (Coffey, 2010). Among the 
Potomac features Coffey most remembers as impactful, or at least generating significant 
buzz inside the newsroom and beyond, was a 1973 profile by Bob Woodward on E. 
Howard Hunt, a former CIA officer who helped engineer the Watergate burglary on 
behalf of President Nixon’s reelection team. Hunt would later be convicted of burglary 
and wiretapping, among other things, and serve nearly three years in prison. In 
conceiving of stories for the magazine, Coffey said he often thought about how those 
around him would perceive his editorial judgment. “Is this going to be something that 
Katharine Graham, Ben Bradlee, [managing editor] Howard Simons, peers within the 
newsroom, people I care about outside, people I hear from, will they think this is a strong 
piece?” said Coffey (2010). 
The magazine would run 40 to 60 pages in length each week—up from around 32 
during its early days—with half and sometimes as much as three-quarters of the 
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publication filled with advertising. Reader surveys routinely conveyed complaints about 
the amount of advertising in Potomac, as well as the fact that “the stories were buried 
among the ads,” which were often “garish looking and jarring in their typefaces and 
design” (Williams and Touster, 1976, 145) 
Coffey left Potomac in 1976 to become editor of the Style section and, years later, 
editor of the Los Angeles Times. It was around the time he moved to Style that the Post 
sought to revamp the magazine yet again, changing the title from Potomac to The 
Washington Post Magazine. Marion Clark was editor of Potomac as it underwent the 
redesign, but was killed in a freak accident on the tarmac of a Michigan airport one week 
prior to the launch of the new-look publication. She was 35 (Allen, 1977).  
Some of the Post magazine editors 
interviewed for this study claimed that the 
name change—the new magazine 
premiered on September 11, 1977—was 
based on the paper’s inferiority complex in 
comparison to The New York Times, whose 
Sunday magazine was of top journalistic 
quality and had always carried the main 
paper’s name. Other Post magazine editors 
attributed the switch to internal desires to 
better align the magazine with the Post’s 
strong brand as an institution of journalistic excellence. But for the brand extension to 
work, the magazine had to exemplify the journalistic standards that had long defined the 
Figure	  3:	  Following	  its	  name	  change	  from	  
Potomac	  to	  The	  Washington	  Post	  Magazine,	  the	  
publication	  began	  carrying	  more	  politics-­
related	  features.	  However,	  it	  also	  maintained	  
many	  articles	  about	  fashion	  and	  beauty.	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main paper. Research has shown that brands face significant risk of dilution or outright 
damage if extended products fail to live up to quality standards (Barwise and Robertson, 
1992). Because the Post’s magazine was distributed with the Sunday newspaper, at no 
additional expense to readers, there were few ways to measure the effectiveness of the 
name change from a business standpoint. Rather, if anything, the extension perhaps 
served a psychological purpose of aligning the magazine with the paper’s brand in the 
minds of advertisers. The magazine soon attempted to bolster advertising by running 
more of its already popular social and lifestyle-specific special editions, such as home 
design, fashion, dining out, holiday entertainment and education, for example. Over the 
years, these special editions would become great revenue generators for the magazine. 
Following Clark’s death, Laura Longley took over as editor of the Post magazine. 
When she went on maternity leave in 1979, her deputy editor, Stephen Petranek, filled in. 
However, Longley didn’t return to the company; she became communications director for 
the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D.C. Prior to joining the 
Post, Petranek was editor of the Rochester (N.Y.) Democrat and Chronicle’s Sunday 
magazine, Up State, and the Miami Herald’s award-winning Sunday magazine, Tropic. 
But it was the year he spent working under Longley, learning the competitive and 
journalistic culture of the Post newsroom and how to navigate various professional 
relationships, that Petranek credits with his success at the magazine. 
The Post’s magazine would win its share of Sunday Magazine Editor awards 
under Petranek, but the publication began to rapidly lose money. Petranek attributes the 
losses to the overall decline in department store advertising, a long-time supporter of 
Sunday magazines (Petranek, 2010). Department stores in the late 1970s and early ’80s 
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increasingly began to move their money into pre-printed inserts, whose color 
reproduction was superior to Sunday magazines. Moreover, the inserts could be zoned, or 
distributed to select ZIP codes, and advertisers could pay only for the inserts they wanted 
printed rather than the Sunday Post’s full circulation run. In addition, the magazine’s 
overall quality was still viewed negatively by many in and around the Post. According to 
Bradlee, the magazine’s design was for “people who read with their lips” (Meyers, April 
1986), while stories too rarely stirred readers’ emotions. The solution would be a grand 
makeover, “with vastly greater resources in people and money and quality” (Bradlee, 
1986, C7).  
 
A Relaunch That Didn’t Take Flight 
In the mid-1980s, the Post magazine underwent a wholesale redesign that took 18 
months to complete. Printing was switched from rotogravure to a higher quality offset 
process, and the magazine’s page dimensions were trimmed to the same 8 ¼-inch-by-10 
¾-inch format the Los Angeles Times and San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle 
magazines had adopted a year earlier. This was the same size as most consumer 
magazines, and the newspapers had hoped the familiar format would make it easier to 
win the advertising business of upscale retailers, both local and national (Meyers, 
September 1986; Shields, 1986). “To us, the future is national advertising,” said Nick 
Cannistraro, the Post’s vice president of advertising. “But we’re not hanging our hat on it. 
It could be a year or two away before we can plug into that national advertiser media 
schedule” (Meyers, April 1986). The Post newspaper had never made significant money 
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from national advertising. Rather, it earned its fortunes by dominating the local media 
market.  
In promoting the Post’s new magazine, Bradlee told Advertising Age that the new 
look and edgier editorial direction aimed to appeal to higher-end readers and advertisers 
(Meyers, April 1986). If successful, it would be Bradlee’s final grand achievement at the 
paper before he retired: a Sunday magazine even better than The New York Times’ 
(Nelson, 1993). But like the Los Angeles Times, the Post spent a tremendous amount of 
money on things that had almost nothing to do with editorial issues. The page format 
reduction and upgraded paper stock attempted to address advertising concerns alone 
(Shields, 1986).  
The Post spent millions to promote its new Sunday magazine, even though it 
expected to lose $10 million in its first four years before turning a profit (Meyers, 1986; 
Greene, 1986). It was a small investment for the Post Co., which had revenues of $1.07 
billion the previous year and ranked 296th on the “Fortune 500” list of top-performing 
companies (Greene, B1). Ad rates were increased 10% to 20%, with a full-color page 
costing $16,200 (Meyers, April 1986). Yet, the project had its share of critics inside the 
Post’s newsroom due in part to the huge amount of resources funneling into the 
magazine—its news hole doubled and its budget tripled (Bradlee, 1986)—and because 
the magazine’s new editor and half of the writers on staff were New York City 
transplants new to the Post (Nelson, 1993). Jay Lovinger, a senior editor at People and a 
former editor of the Post Co.’s failed Inside Sports magazine, was hired to lead the new 
magazine and bolster its editorial staff; Petranek accepted a demotion and served as his 
managing editor. According to those familiar with the situation, Bradlee and other top 
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editors wanted someone with national consumer magazine experience to lead the Post’s 
new Sunday magazine. Top-flight writers were hired or moved over from other sections, 
including David Remnick (now editor of The New Yorker), Peter Carlson, formerly of 
People, and, later, Walt Harrington, who would go on to win three Sunday Magazine 
Editors Association writing awards. Andy Corty, the former publisher of a regional 
business magazine in Florida, was hired for the newly created position of general 
manager of the Sunday magazine. 
After much fanfare, launch parties and media attention, the premier issue of the 
new-look Post magazine hit the streets on September 7, 1986. The cover story was titled 
“Murder, Drugs and the Rap Star,” a feature about an African-American rapper from 
New York City who was arrested in connection to the murder of a D.C.-area drug dealer. 
Post magazine staff writer John Ed Bradley’s narrative covered more than 11 pages and 
chronicled the life of Joseph “Justice” Williams Jr., a hard-scrambled rapper whose legal 
troubles helped his music career. The story was actually a fill-in, as the intended 
inaugural cover story was supposed to be a feature on President George H.W. Bush. 
However, interviews couldn’t be completed in time, so Lovinger and other top editors at 
the Post agreed to go with the Williams story (Nelson, 1993).  
Also in that issue, Post writer Richard Cohen authored a column titled “Closing 
the Door on Crime” that essentially supported the rights of local jewelry store owners, 
fearful of shoplifting, to prohibit young black men from entering their stores. Young 
black males in large urban cities are often the people who commit crimes, Cohen 
asserted, and storeowners had a right not to do business with them. 
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Taken together, the cover story and column—they were not part of an editorial 
package, as the two were separated by 23 pages—set off a series of events that would 
largely doom the new Post magazine. Led by local radio station owner and talk show host 
Cathy Hughes, protesters decried what they saw as negative stereotyping of blacks in the 
magazine and by the Post newspaper in general. In addition, none of the advertisements 
published in the robust, 112-page inaugural issue included a single African-American 
(Anderson, 1986). Approximately 70% of the population in the District was African-
American in 1986, although the Post pointed out to critics that blacks made up only about 
25% of its broader circulation area (Greene, 1986). Although the newspaper was 
headquartered in Washington, D.C., and it covered the happenings of the federal 
government extensively, the Post’s direct market area included all of northern Virginia 
and southern Maryland.  
There are many reasons for the racial divide within the Post’s circulation mix. 
However, a major turning point was the 1968 street riots following the April 4 
assassination of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. in Memphis. The rioters, almost all 
African-American, shattered store windows and broke into local businesses, looting 
clothes, electronics, liquor and food. Along the 14th Street NW and H Street NE corridor, 
which was filled with African-American-owned businesses, rioters torched whole 
buildings and largely overwhelmed police response. Over three days of rioting, 12 people 
died, more than 1,000 people were injured and nearly as many stores were destroyed; 
6,100 people were arrested. “More than 2,500 jobs had been lost. Washington’s black 
business districts were devastated. Piles of rubble marked buildings 
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destroyed….Insurance rates in the areas soared, if policies would be written at all. The 
two corridors of the riot remained crime-ridden shells for decades” (Tucker, 2004).  
Many residents soon fled the District, while many new ones—mostly 
Caucasians—opted for the suburbs surrounding the city, such as those in Fairfax County 
in Virginia and Montgomery County in Maryland. Between 1960 and 1980, the District 
lost about one-sixth of its population, and between 1980 and 2010 the population shrunk 
still, although not as deeply (The Economist, 2013). Retail commercial activity followed 
these residents into the suburbs. In the Tyson’s Corner area of Fairfax County, two large 
shopping malls accounted for more than $1 billion in annual sales in the late 1980s, with 
department stores such as Macy’s, Neiman Marcus, Hecht’s, Saks Fifth Avenue and 
Bloomingdale’s—long the principal advertisers in many major metropolitan 
newspapers—leading the way (Downey, 1989; Knox, 1991). 
The economic and racial divide between the District and its surrounding suburbs 
would only deepen. In 1990 and 1991, the nation’s capital was the murder capital of the 
United States, based on per capita homicides. Among cities with a population of more 
than 100,000, Washington, D.C. came in ahead of New Orleans, Atlanta and Detroit. 
According to media reports, all forms of crime increased in the District in 1990, with 
murder and assaults rising 10 percent each, and forcible rapes going up 9 percent and 
robberies 11 percent (Ashenfelter, 1991). Those who could afford to live in the 
surrounding suburbs did, and The Washington Post often followed them because these 
were the people who were willing to buy newspapers and who advertisers sought to 
reach. Although the Washington, D.C. area featured many middle-class African-
American neighborhoods, the Post has long focused on the suburbs and Capitol Hill.   
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The business rationale mattered little to the 1986 protesters of the Sunday 
magazine. They sought to use the magazine as a symbol of the Post’s historically poor 
record in covering the positive aspects of D.C.’s African-American communities. 
Dorothy Gilliam, among the first black reporters hired by the Post, in 1961, was often 
tasked with covering the greater Washington, D.C. area’s large black community. “‘But 
they were negative stories about blacks,’ she recalled, ‘describing criminal ways and 
poverty. They never looked at the range of black activities as they looked at white 
activities. Just by exclusion, you ended up with this skewed picture, nothing else except 
welfare and crime’” (Bray, 1980, 164). The Post hired more African-American 
journalists and by the early 1970s, nearly 10% of the nation’s black newsmen and 
women—not counting those who worked for the Black press—worked at the Post (Bray, 
1980). But internal criticisms persisted due to limited promotions and opportunities for 
African-Americans.  
Some 15 years later, readers were voicing many of the same frustrations with the 
company. In the weeks and months that followed the 1986 relaunch of the Sunday 
magazine, the Washington Post Magazine Recall Committee collected and returned 
nearly 250,000 copies of the Sunday magazine to Post headquarters (Roberts, 1989). The 
protests lasted three months and evolved into more general objections concerning the 
belief that the main newspaper too often portrayed blacks in a sensationalistic or negative 
way. Still, the uproar badly damaged the magazine, as many would-be sources refused to 
be interviewed by writers of the magazine (Nelson, 1993), and many of the local 
businesses that initially supported the new publication moved their advertising dollars 
into different sections of the Sunday paper (Meyers, 1986). Whereas the first issue was 
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112 pages, the fourth was down to 56 pages. Advertisers weren’t willing to completely 
boycott the Post, as the newspaper’s local penetration rate was still among the highest in 
the nation. 
Lovinger said he was hired to create 
a publication that would grab readers’ 
attention. It often did, but not always in a 
good way. In one instance, Lovinger ran an 
“exclusive” feature by Post sports writer 
Tony Kornheiser about the impending return 
of the Washington Senators professional 
baseball team, which left the District in 
1971. However, the story was never labeled a 
satirical hoax, work of fiction or parody, 
which is was, even though real-name sports 
and political leaders were quoted. The idea was inspired by a faux feature published by 
Sports Illustrated two years earlier, on April Fools Day, about a pitcher named Sidd 
Finch who could supposedly throw a baseball 168 mph (Howe, 1987). More than 250 
readers called the Post asking for clarification, and four letters to the editor about the 
article were published the following Sunday; each one highly critical of the story. “To 
extend a fictional story as far as Kornheiser did and to use real people and real quotes to 
fabricate an event just to build readership for a dying magazine is sick,” wrote one reader. 
“What will the Post magazine editor Jay Lovinger do next? I’ve got it! How about a nice 
fun and satirical piece on the Vietnam War?” (Davis, 1987, A21). 
Figure	  4:	  Post	  magazine	  editor	  Jay	  Lovinger,	  
formerly	  of	  People	  magazine,	  sought	  to	  
publish	  stories	  that	  would	  grab	  readers’	  
attention.	  In	  this	  case,	  he	  sent	  freelance	  
writer	  Mike	  Sager	  to	  Tahiti	  in	  search	  of	  actor	  
Marlon	  Brando.	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“I was super attracted by the Post job because the thing didn’t have to sell itself; 
the magazine was inserted in the Sunday paper, so you could do anything you wanted 
because the Post covered everything in the newspaper,” Lovinger (2010) would say later. 
“There was nothing obligatory that you had to cover. I had the opportunity to do all the 
kind of things that I really found interesting that most newspapers would never even 
consider doing 
“I think I was often fighting the institution’s perception of itself….In trying to 
create a magazine that was somehow the same as a newspaper just really never worked 
and, in my opinion, couldn’t work….If you bring in somebody from the outside like me, 
who is a magazine person, then in a lot of ways it’s just not a very good fit for the culture. 
You’re always kind of running up hill and they’re always trying to get you to conform” 
(Lovinger, 2010). 
Following the initial race-coverage protests, Lovinger claimed that senior editors 
at the Post were routinely second-guessing his editorial judgment and that the company 
began pushing for more positive stories about blacks in both the magazine and 
throughout the paper (Greene, 1986). Lieb (1988) mostly validated the coverage assertion 
through a content analysis of the magazine from May 4, 1986 to April 5, 1987. He found 
no negative coverage of blacks during the three-month protest while positive stories soon 
became far more regular.  
A few years later, Lovinger and the Post had a parting of ways. He was eased out 
of the door, staying on at the magazine largely in name only and to help the transition to a 
new editor. He was allowed to resign and was given a severance package, to “make right” 
the promises of editorial freedom that he claimed the Post made to him and failed to live 
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up to (Lovinger, 2010). “But the often-asked question remained: does The Washington 
Post Magazine (or that of any other newspaper save the ad-rich New York Times 
Magazine) serve any useful purpose?” (Roberts, 1989, 489). 
Upon his official departure, in 1989, the magazine was largely placed under the 
managerial control of Mary Hadar, an assistant managing editor who oversaw the Style 
section (Nelson, 1993). Bob Thompson, a deputy editor of Style, replaced Lovinger at the 
helm of the magazine, and soon took full control over a much-slimmed down operation. 
With major advertisers still largely reluctant to commit to the magazine, even though it 
was still the only editorial section in the newspaper that published in color—the main 
newspaper didn’t acquire color-printing capabilities until 1999—the Post quickly reduced 
the publication’s budget (Thompson, 2010).  
As editor, Thompson worked to make the magazine more local and less 
controversial. He hired some top-notch narrative writers, including David Finkel, who 
joined the magazine staff in 1990 and would go on to win numerous journalism industry 
awards, including the 2006 Pulitzer for explanatory journalism. Like a number of 
magazine editors before him, Thompson eventually yearned to write—Thompson was the 
rare editor who never before worked as a reporter (Thompson, 2010)—and found 
opportunities in Style and Metro.  
In search of his next professional challenge, Steve Coll, a highly regarded foreign 
correspondent who shared a Pulitzer Prize for explanatory journalism in 1990, took over 
as editor of the Sunday magazine in 1995. Although he spent years as a reporter at the 
Post, Coll brought some magazine experience to his new job. He began his career as a 
contributing editor for the city magazine California as well as for the Boston-based 
	  
	   160	  
business magazine Inc. At the Post, he also wrote for Style and was an occasional 
contributor to the Post magazine during his time as a foreign correspondent. In 1991, Coll 
and David Vise, who together won a Pulitzer for their coverage of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, penned a narrative feature for the magazine on the SEC’s 
investigation into Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken (Coll and Vise, 1991). One year later, 
Coll wrote a cover story on the devastation of Kabul, Afghanistan following the invasion 
of the Soviet Union (Coll, 1992). Interestingly, Coll and Post reporter William Branign 
also wrote a page 1 story for that Sunday’s Post on how thousands of Muslim rebels took 
over the capital of Afghanistan the previous day in a violent coup. These are just some of 
the examples of how the magazine had evolved editorially from its early years of light 
and local news coverage, and how Thompson 
and others at the Post sought to redefine the 
editorial identity of the magazine as something 
similar to—as opposed to distinct from—the rest 
of the newspaper. 
 As editor of the magazine, starting in 
1995, Coll quickly expanded the publication’s 
coverage of national and international issues, 
regularly tapping some of the newspaper’s top 
writers to craft deeply reported and lengthy 
narrative features. A self-described “creature of 
the big machine and a believer of the big machine” (Coll, 2010), Coll coaxed the Post’s 
famed sports writer John Feinstein to write a monthly sports column and routinely 
Figure	  4:	  Magazine	  editor	  Steve	  Coll	  
wanted	  the	  magazine	  to	  reflect	  the	  best	  
of	  the	  Post	  newsroom.	  For	  his	  first	  
edition	  as	  editor,	  he	  convinced	  	  
Bob	  Woodward	  to	  write	  the	  cover	  story.	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convinced many of the paper’s most notable reporters to write lengthy narratives for the 
magazine.  
Yet, perhaps his greatest accomplishment as editor of the magazine was on the 
business side. Wearing the unusual dual hat of editor and publisher—no Post magazine 
editor had ever or since held the double responsibility—Coll reworked the magazine’s 
printing contract in early 1998 and saved nearly a million dollars annually by switching 
to a different stock of paper. “It’s the same paper used by all of the very best newspaper 
Sunday magazines, as well as numerous consumer magazines,” Coll wrote in the 
magazine’s editor’s column (Coll, 1998). The switch was barely noticeable to the eye or 
touch, but it made a significant difference to the magazine’s bottom line (Coll, 2010). It 
was a line that remained red, albeit far less so than earlier years. 
From 1987 to 2003, the Post magazine lost an average of $2.4 million annually 
(internal document), yet the company continued to support it, as it supported the 
standalone, advertising-thin Book World section and, later, the early money-losing years 
of washingtonpost.com (Sherman, 2002). According to Coll, Publisher Donald Graham, 
who at that time was also CEO of the company, simply refused to let the magazine die. 
“He wanted a paper that was driven by quality journalists and though he wasn’t always 
sold on the magazine and didn’t love every decision that I made, or that writers made, 
fundamentally he wanted great journalism in the paper,” Coll said. “He knew that the 
journalists that he cared about valued the opportunity to write in the magazine the way 
we did and he didn’t want to get in the way of that culture” (Coll, 2010). 
Because the magazine was still printed externally and inserted into the Sunday 
newspaper, it long was the only news department managed financially through a profit-
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and-loss sheet. No other section of the Post, including those that carried little to modest 
advertising, such as Sports, Opinion and Metro, were held to the same level of fiscal 
scrutiny at the time.  
In 1998, Coll made the unusual jump from editor of the magazine to managing 
editor of the entire newspaper. Glenn Frankel would replace Coll and hold the position 
until 2002. A longtime Post reporter and editor, Frankel wrote for the Metro section, was 
a foreign correspondent for 10 years (he won the Pulitzer Prize in 1989 for international 
reporting), and served as deputy national editor, but came to his new job with absolutely 
no magazine experience. According to Frankel, he was hired in part because he was such 
a creature of the Post and could navigate the cultural and political dynamics of the 
newsroom (Frankel, 2010). Top editors at the paper wanted someone “who came out of 
the newsroom and who was comfortable with the newsroom because, again, of this 
question of how the magazine relates to the larger newsroom and how you create a 
magazine with a magazine sensibility but at the same time take advantage of the 
enormous journalistic resources in the big room” (Frankel interview, 2010). 
Frankel infused the magazine with his own intellectual interests, from the tobacco 
industry to food safety to famine in Africa. He freely admitted that he had a “journalistic 
agenda,” but also “an institutional agenda of making the magazine more vital” to the Post 
brand (Frankel, 2010). It’s worth noting that the Post magazine and staff writer Peter Perl 
were honored with Sigma Delta Chi’s 2000 “Public Service Award” in the magazine 
category for “Poisoned Package,” a feature on food inspection deficiencies throughout 
America’s food industry (Quill, 2001). Such “journalistic agendas” were, in many ways, 
a reflection of the editorial sensibilities Coll brought to the newspaper as managing 
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editor. In 2003, Coll sought to use the Post Co.’s newfound revenues—it recently sold its 
50% stake in the International Herald Tribune to The New York Times Co.—to increase 
his newspaper’s national and international news coverage so as to better compete with 
Times in the U.S. (Kindred, 2010). Coll was a dedicated supporter of long-form 
journalism; as managing editor, he wrote an approximately 10,000-word feature for the 
Post magazine about political violence in Sierra Leone (Sherman, 2002). However, 
Donald Graham was reluctant to follow too deeply in the Times’ tracks and risk 
alienating the Post’s local audience (Sherman, 2002; Sherman, 2010). Coll left the Post 
in 2005 and joined the New Yorker magazine as a staff writer. 
Frankel stepped down as editor of the Sunday magazine in 2002 to return to 
writing. He was replaced by his managing editor, Tom Shroder, who served as editor of 
Style for two-and-a-half years before joining the magazine’s staff. Shroder came to the 
Post in 1999 after learning that the Miami Herald’s Sunday magazine, of which he was 
editor, was soon to be shuttered due to financial reasons. Shroder had actually replaced 
Gene Weingarten as editor of Tropic, in 1990—Weingarten hired Shroder as his assistant 
editor five years earlier—when Weingarten left Miami to join the Post’s Style section. 
Weingarten would later become a syndicated humor columnist and Pulitzer Prize-
winning feature writer for the Post magazine.  
As editor of the Post magazine, Shroder said one of his first goals was to make 
the publication more reader-oriented through more local stories, photo essays and fiction, 
both professional and reader-submitted. The magazine had been a “vehicle for the 
pleasure and satisfaction of the Post journalists rather than as something that was really 
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aimed at engaging readers….The story subject choice was very often kind of esoteric and 
very removed” (Shroder, 2010).  
In 2006, Shroder decided to honor some of the top stories published by the Post 
magazine over its previous 20 years, starting with the bold relaunch in 1986. The 
commemorative issue contained excerpts of 32 past features, and it was a chance to show 
readers that the Post magazine had long been, at times, a product of great journalistic 
value. “The Magazine’s 20-year survival wasn’t really about luck,” Shroder wrote in the 
issue’s “editor’s note.” “It was about great writers who could make the people, trends and 
institutions of our time come vividly, and in some cases, shockingly, alive” (2006, 2). Of 
course, the magazine wasn’t only about quality journalism. In 2007, Shroder launched the 
first-ever “Peeps Diorama Contest”—it’s now annual—calling on readers to create a 
diorama of whatever scene they like using the Easter treat marshmallow bunnies. 
Photographs of the winning entries were then published in the Sunday magazine. In 2011, 
the contest was a full-blown business operation that featured a week of local activities 
and advertising sponsorships that cost between $10,000 and $50,000 (Washington Post, 
2011). In addition, Shroder introduced the “Post Hunt” to the Washington, D.C. area in 
2008. While working together at the Miami Herald’s Sunday magazine in 1991, Shroder, 
Gene Weingarten and Dave Barry conceived of a scavenger hunt for which clues were 
published in the magazine and readers would scour the Miami area for answers. The 
event would culminate in a big party, where readers would vie for prizes. Shroder 
brought the idea to the Post—approximately 5,000 people, most carrying a copy of the 
Sunday magazine, took part in the inaugural Post Hunt (Strupp, 2008)—and it remains a 
mainstay to this day.  
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By the time Shroder took over the magazine in 2002, it was no longer the 
financial disaster that it was during the 1980s and ’90, when its editorial and printing 
budgets far outpaced advertising revenues. It actually earned a profit of nearly $1 million 
in 2002 and more than doubled it the following year, to $2.1 million (internal document) 
thanks largely to an increase in advertorial inserts, subject-specific special editions that 
advertisers often rallied around, and an increased focus on home furnishing ad sales 
(Shroder, 2006; Steiner, 2010). The good times didn’t continue for long, however, as a 
national recession slowed advertising sales at most newspapers throughout the country. 
Throughout the magazine’s history, business side managers would occasionally suggest 
that the magazine run shorter articles and more feel-good stories, including news-you-
can-use service journalism pieces. Advertisers, the business-side arguments went, didn’t 
want to promote their products next to rambling stories rooted in conflict, grief or 
unsavory characters. More often than not, the magazine’s editors would ignore the advice 
(Steiner, 2010; Karalekis, 2010; Graham, 2010). Because the Post newspaper boasted 
profit margins throughout the ’90s and early 2000s that were “healthy enough to ward off 
calls to turn the magazine into a local version of Men’s Health” (Wemple, 2009).  
Editors’ apathy toward the company’s business values changed somewhat 
following a new top leadership team at the Post. In early 2008, Katharine Weymouth, 
niece of Donald Graham, was installed as the paper’s new publisher. In July of that year, 
she hired Marcus Brauchli, formerly of the Wall Street Journal—a paper with a rich 
history of high quality feature writing and long-form narratives (Sherman, 2010)—to 
serve as executive editor of the Post. It was widely believed that Brauchli got the job, in 
part, because he had “no institutional history at the paper and…no work experience in 
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Washington” (Sherman, 2010). For a publisher interested in transforming the Post’s 
operations for a digital future, she sought a newsroom leader unwedded to the internal 
cultural norms and practices that had long defined her family’s newspaper. In Brauchli, 
she found someone with experience running a converged print-online newsroom at a top-
tier newspaper. Said Weymouth, “He had a great news sense as well as a business sense” 
(Sherman, 2010).7 
In 2009, the Post again redesigned its Sunday magazine, condensing the page 
width, running fewer long features, and including more lifestyle-oriented sections. Debra 
Leithauser, the former editor of the Post’s defunct “Sunday Source” broadsheet section, 
which largely featured product reviews, service articles and entertainment listings—it 
lasted just five years, from 2003 to 2008, due to mediocre fanfare from readers and 
surprisingly little interest from advertisers—oversaw the revamping of the magazine and 
was eventually named its editor, replacing Shroder, who took a company buyout that 
year. 
Critics decried the new-look magazine for its “levity and brevity” and seemingly 
obvious pander to advertisers (Wemple, 2009), while the journalists who initiated the 
changes talked about the product as if it served just one audience: readers. “The impetus 
for the overhaul was that readers had told us what they loved and what they didn’t, and 
we listened,” said Leithauser and Art Director Janet Michaud about the 2009 redesign, in 
an online Q&A with readers (2009). In her “editor’s note” in the inaugural new 
magazine, Leithauser also contended that the magazine was changed to appeal to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Brauchli left his job at the Post in November 2012, outside the period of review for this 
study. Media reports suggested that Brauchli and Weymouth were often at odds, in part 
because she wanted him to make deeper newsroom budget cuts than he was comfortable 
with. Brauchli was replaced by Boston Globe editor Marty Baron (Haughney, 2012).	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increasingly busy readers, people with “a giggling, gurgling baby; a first-grader going on 
middle-schooler; and neighbors who wish they had more time for…well, just about 
everything” (Leithauser, 2009). There was no mention of advertising. 
 
Conclusion 
To understand the history of The Washington Post’s Sunday magazine and the 
editors who have shaped it over the past 50 years, one needs to understand the uniqueness 
of the newspaper through which it’s published and the company and people behind them 
both. Through an array of good business dealings, including the one in 1971 to split the 
company’s public stock offering so that the Graham family could maintain control and 
majority voting rights over the board, the Post has become one of the most financially 
prosperous news organizations in the country. The company’s diversification of business 
interests, as well as the Grahams’ commitment to high-quality journalism, has enabled 
the Post to weather advertising recessions and print circulation declines during years in 
which other major metropolitan dailies cut back significantly in their news operations. In 
some cases, these dailies eliminated whole sections. “At a time when some large 
newspaper corporations have sacrificed journalistic quality for quarterly profits, the Post, 
under Don Graham, has maintained a rock-hard stability and a commitment to—and 
investment in—newsroom excellence” (Sherman, 2002, 42).  
Yet, whereas the Post stands among an elite few journalistically, namely The New 
York Times and Wall Street Journal, its editorial culture over the years has shared many 
defining characteristics with far more dailies. They include the search for stories that 
generate buzz among readers or that win recognition from award committees. They 
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include reporters and editors who produce content with little thought to readers’ desires, 
but rather in the pursuit of praise from colleagues and senior newsroom leaders. They 
include a strong distaste, if not complete ignorance, for the business side of their 
organizations, even though advertising represents the vast majority of their papers’ 
revenues.  
Said Don Graham (2010): “As journalists, if the business side isn’t functioning, 
well, they’re out of luck. In my view, there was too much church-state separation at the 
Post Sunday magazine and every Sunday magazine. It was really stupid. These were 
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Chapter 5 
Institutional Theory, SIT, Change and Status 
 
The impetus for organizational change is often the result of environmental factors, 
whether they are regulatory, technological, social and/or economic (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 
1976; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Ryfe, 2006). Oftentimes, older organizations, whose 
internal norms and practices have been deeply engrained within the culture of the firm, 
struggle to survive when faced with external threats (Carroll and Hannan, 1989). For 
others, however, changes to the environmental and competitive landscape provide a 
welcomed opportunity to pursue new directions and to reconstruct professional 
consensus, thus creating a new institutional order and a return to stability until the “next 
random mutation or shift in niche width sets a change cycle in motion” (Kanter et al, 
1992, 27). 
In the daily newspaper industry, environmental threats often result from new and 
emerging competitors on the media landscape. Historically, these competitors have 
included, among others, radio, television, weekly newspapers, cable television and, more 
recently, Internet-based companies (Rosse, 1980; Dimmick et al, 2004). In each case, 
newspapers expanded and altered their content offerings to mimic certain aspects of the 
upstart medium. As television grew increasingly popular in the 1950s and ’60s, 
newspapers began incorporating more entertainment and lifestyle coverage, so as to keep 
pace with the largely entertainment-based medium of TV. Newspapers weren’t 
necessarily competing for stories, but rather for people’s time and advertisers’ business. 
The advent of cable television, which provides audiences with an array of niche-topic 
channels—from 24-hour news, to sports, to movies and sitcoms—led newspapers to 
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expand lifestyle section coverage and increase the number of sections it published to give 
readers more distinct choices (Bogart, 1985). Studies have shown that the national daily 
USA Today, which premiered in 1982, was essentially an amalgamation of different 
media; it featured the page design of magazines, the visual appeal of television, and the 
breezy and short storytelling of radio (Prichard, 1987). Lastly, the growth of web-based 
digital content in the mid- to late 2000s inspired many newspapers, under the belief that 
readers were starved for time and preferred “quick-hit” content items, to publish even 
shorter news items and more photographs, as well as to create spin-off quick-read tabloid 
editions (Carpenter, 2006).  
Sparrow (1999) contends that risk-averse organizations most closely monitor 
competitors, or peer groups, to more effectively copy practices that are perceived to 
bolster cultural and political legitimacy. However, seemingly rational strategies at one 
organization may not serve other organizations’ interests well due to differences in 
staffing, resources and external relations. “Yet, the very fact that they are normatively 
sanctioned increases the likelihood of their adoption” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 148).  
But what compels the individual actors within an organization to pursue 
initiatives and efforts that are seemingly misaligned with the organization’s strengths and 
survival? And why do some people resist changes to their workplace norms and routines, 
and instead embrace existing actions that yield only mix results at best? Through the 
examination of two behavioral theories, institutional theory and social identity theory, 
this chapter will attempt to provide some answers to those questions. Institutional theory 
can serve as a valuable prism through which to examine Post magazine editors’ attitudes 
and behaviors as they relate to editorial decision-making. The theory generally holds that 
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individuals often seek to conform to established practices and behaviors in their pursuit 
of legitimacy. It wasn’t until after analyzing all of my data, however, that I discovered the 
applicability of social identity theory, which holds that individuals attempt to maintain a 
positive social identity through group categorization and in comparison to others (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1986). Chapter 8 of this study features an extension of social identity theory, 
through the use of institutional theory, to show how the behavior and attitudes of 
newspaper editors can be influenced by both organizational and external factors.  
In additional to discussing institutional theory in this chapter, I will highlight 
different processes for individual and organizational learning as well as how institutional 
theory has been used to examine the news media industry. Following an overview of 
social identity theory, I will then examine its past uses in the study of journalists and the 
news media, as well as the role of status in identity formation.  
 
Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory holds that an institutional environment can influence the 
adoption of certain practices, even when such adoptions fail to improve efficiency. When 
certain norms or innovations reach a certain level of acceptance, or legitimization, the 
failure to copy is seen as almost irrational. However, so too is mimicking standards of 
practice that are unsuited for a particular task. 
Institutional theory is “characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements 
to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and 
legitimacy” (Scott and Meyer, 1983, 149). Legitimacy mainly exists in the realms of 
social and economic support (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse, 1996). In a newspaper setting, 
	  
	   172	  
for example, social support is conferred through positive reader feedback, the willingness 
of news sources to be candid, compliments from colleagues, and external awards. 
Examples of economic support include paid subscribers, newsstand sales, advertising 
revenue and industry partnerships. Failure to conform to widely accepted practices is to 
risk legitimacy. However, this pursuit of legitimizing practices drives isomorphism, or 
the sameness of organizational structures and operations. Even though the practices may 
not be in the best strategic interest of the individual organization, the legitimizing 
practices eventually become codified and difficult to change over time (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
 Developed as an offshoot of rational-choice organizational theory, which 
explains behaviors as purposeful, efficiency-driven reactions to market forces, 
institutional theory is often used to make sense of behaviors in industries with “vague 
criteria for judging value and quality” (Lowrey, 2005, 497). These industries tend to be 
mission-driven, with examples including higher education, health care, charities, 
governmental operations and the news media. Organizations in these industries employ a 
significant number of professionals who measure their organization’s success differently 
than profit-minded business-side managers and executives do (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1988; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Brint and Karabel, 1991; Stensaker and 
Norgard, 2001; Kraatz et al, 2010), making it difficult for organizations to determine 
which practices are best suited to achieve legitimization. For this reason, 
“institutionalism” has become a popular theoretical tool in a number of academic 
disciplines, including political science, economics and sociology (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991).  
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On the organizational level, Hawley (1968) defined the concept of isomorphism 
as a constraining process in which an organization seeks to resemble other organizations 
that exist under a similar set of conditions. In essence, organizations will often imitate 
others’ socially sanctioned, legitimized practices regardless of efficiency or technical 
considerations. Without clearly defined directives and organizational goals, organizations 
will routinely copy external practices that they are simply fond of and that fit within the 
perceived cultural norms of the organization. Isomorphism can also be “self-serving” 
(Kondra and Hinings, 1998, 749) on the individual level, whereby risk-averse managers 
copy and maintain industry norms to protect their internal status and their jobs. However, 
Scott (1987) contends that when an organization faces external threats, these individual 
actors are often too entrenched in established norms and practices to effectively manage 
the situation.  
Conformity in the pursuit of legitimacy is often driven by one of three processes: 
normative, coercive and mimetic (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Normative processes are 
those that are passed along through professional affiliations and structures. In examining 
newspaper-TV partnerships through an institutional theory lens, for example, Lowrey 
(2005) found that normative factors were most predictive of managers’ decision-making, 
as ideas and concepts were routinely passed along through professional networks and 
conferences or promoted through the trade press. Coercive processes are somewhat 
forced upon an organization though external pressure, such as regulatory changes or 
strategic initiatives handed down from a corporate parent. Finally, mimetic processes 
involve adopting the behaviors of model organizations, particularly when faced with 
uncertainty about alternative approaches. Particularly valuable to this study is Greenwood 
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and Hinings’ (1988) contention that certain organizations will pursue mimetic behaviors 
when actors are unclear about the performance measurements their organization uses to 
determine success. Without clearly defined directives and organizational goals, 
individuals will often simply copy external practices that they are fond of and that fit 
within the cultural norms of the organization. As previously stated, this is why much 
research on institutional mimicry has focused on organizations with conflicting 
measurements of success (Brint and Karabel, 1991; Stensaker and Norgard, 2001; Kraatz 
et al, 2010). These organizations possess a social and/or cultural purpose that is reliant on 
but distinct from the organization’s maximization of revenue generation.  
Research utilizing institutional theory tends to focus on micro factors (Townley, 
2002; Zilber, 2002; Powell and Colyvas, 2008), specifically individual actors who 
“perceive the meaning of institutions and infuse their actions with meaning based upon 
these perceptions” (Dacin et al, 2002, 47). Individuals are active, not passive, in 
perpetuating their organization’s institutional logics (Fligstein, 2001). The diffusion of 
norms is also facilitated by employee turnover from one organization to another. In such 
cases, the individual will sometimes introduce to his new organization perceived best 
practices from his former organization, particularly when the former organization carries 
higher industry status (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   
Researchers who use institutional theory often view sources of inertia as the 
consequences of seeking legitimacy, as opposed to the maintenance of vested interests 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Institutionalism puts the theoretical focus on the 
organizational culture and codification of routines that create individual behavior and 
unreflective decision-making (Zucker, 1987; Carruthers, 1995). By applying the lens of 
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institutional theory, individual motives can be examined through “the contexts in which 
they act” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, 16). In addition, the sequencing and timing of 
processes and events are central to understanding outcomes. For this reason, institutional 
studies are typically based on historic analyses (Selznick, 1957; Berger and Luckmann, 
1967) because individuals largely adapt to existing and recurring conditions rather than 
buck organizational norms and routes (Ryfe, 2006).  
In studying the production of news, Cook (1998) and Sparrow (1999) each argue 
for the necessity of examining the historical evolution of institutional practices. Other 
scholars (Thornton, 2002; Townley, 2002) have similarly argued that institutional studies 
require a historic examination of organizations, rather than moment-in-time queries, to 
track the evolutionary nature of values, practices and norms. 
 
Individual and Organizational Learning  
 Studies have found that efforts to improve existing workplace competencies lead 
to less experimentation with new skill sets and procedures necessary for future growth. 
This holds true at both the organizational and individual level (Levitt and March, 1988). 
Such tension between exploitation and exploration, as March (1991) argues, leads to a 
trade-off between attempting to improve current returns—be they cultural or financial—
and seeking alternative approaches to present practices with the hope of bolstering future 
returns.  
 Established and culturally secure organizations are generally inflexible and 
largely resistant to change because operations are often rooted in institutionalized 
structures (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Granovetter, 1985). “If stable and reproducible 
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routines are the foundation of reliable performance, then organizational change increases 
the risk of failure” (Amburgey et al, 1993, 52). Changes also risk the external legitimacy 
of the organization (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), as substantive changes to formal 
practices can lead to perceptions of organizational distress, which can impact everything 
from stock prices to vendor relations to the ability to recruit new hires.  
 On the individual level, the adoption of new practices and routines is equally 
difficult. Pfeffer, for example, firmly argues that while situations change, people rarely 
do. We are “limited in our ability to even recognize the need for change, let alone to 
accomplish it” (1994, 304). Zucker (1977) attributes resistance to change at the individual 
level to cultural persistence within established organizational settings. The more that 
cultural and operational norms are engrained within an organization, the more that the 
internal culture recognizes and rewards the status quo. In such cases, individual behavior 
is constrained by limited operational choices, including the allocation of resources 
necessary to break from current practices.  
 Research that examines how individuals can best effectuate change within 
existing organizational structures varies. Pedler et al (1999) argue for decentralized 
organizational structures in which individuals can confer and communicate. Leonard-
Barton (1999) advocates for a team-based approach to individual learning, which can 
then be spread to the organization as a whole. And Garvin (1993) believes that reward 
systems should be created to encourage the meeting of individual learning goals. But 
since all individuals are merely parts of the whole that constitute an organization, 
diffusion of individual learning throughout an organization is the true challenge, as the 
sharing of individual knowledge is the core requirement for organizational learning.  
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Crossan et al (1999) developed a “4i” framework for the transfer of learning from 
individuals to organizations: intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing. By 
questioning existing practices and routines, developing new approaches and then 
implementing them, learning can move from the individual level to the departmental to 
the organizational. However, as Shipton notes, “transferring learning to effect 
organizational-level change is enormously complicated, depending upon individual, job 
and structural characteristics, as well as the existing learning culture and 
reward/recognition systems” (2006, 240).  
 
Institutional Theory and the News Media 
Although there are few examples of its usage in media and/or communication 
studies, institutional theory can serve as a valuable prism through which newspaper 
companies—and the individual actors that give them life and meaning—are examined to 
make sense of individual decision-making and organizational culture and norms. But 
because newspapers are complex entities that serve a public service function and 
typically require financial profit for survival (Beam, 1996; Lowrey, 2005), any study of 
individual professional and organizational practices requires an understanding of 
motivations, and the challenges in merging missions and markets.  
As noted throughout this study, a number of scholars believe that commercial 
pressures have long undermined news organization’s ability and/or willingness to fully 
serve the public interest (Golding and Murdock, 1991; Schudson, 1995; McChesney, 
1999; Bagdikian, 2004). Beholden to advertising revenues that largely fund the content-
production enterprise, newspapers routinely publish stories that are little more than 
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window dressing for the ads, the argument goes. This interconnection between economic 
and cultural influences has led to a number of challenges within organizations that, like 
newspapers, are largely mission driven.  
In writing about professionalism, Freidson (1986) and Scott (1995) noted that 
professional authority is derived from mission-driven work that holds social legitimacy. 
The individual members that make up organized units of professionals possess expert 
knowledge, typically obtained through a common and specialized education, and define 
their own areas of interest. Because of their common educational backgrounds and 
associations with other industry professionals, operational standards and processes are 
codified, diffused and become normative. However, because professional authority is 
linked to organizational identity, changes in an organization’s mission can limit the 
power of certain professionals. Thornton (2002), for instance, tracked the shift in the U.S. 
higher education book publishing industry, from an editorial logic in the 1960s to a 
market-oriented logic in the 1980s. In the 1960s, many publishing companies were 
privately owned and relatively small, and their missions were rooted in organizational 
prestige and increasing book sales. Publishing was a profession. Things began to change 
some 10 years later, as higher education book publishing became a big business, with 
corporations consuming independent publishers and missions changing to competitive 
position and profit generation. With top-tier publishing houses leading this shift toward 
market gain, conformity in the pursuit of legitimacy followed and the CEO, whose status 
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and authority were derived from the company’s financial success, became the dominant 
authority figure, as opposed to the editorial-side professional publisher.8 
Like most book publishing, the news media serves a civic and cultural function as 
well as an economic one. However, this can lead to conflicting organizational values and 
identity due to the disparate interests of individual actors (DeWerth-Pallmeyer, 1997). 
“The trouble is that what is good for the operative system does not necessarily serve the 
standards or ideals that the institution is supposed to uphold. Therefore institutional 
values are always at risk” (Selznick, 1992, 244). When an organization seeks to change 
due to technological or short-term market threats, it risks diluting and damaging the 
values central to the organization. In such cases, mission-driven employees tend to lose 
some operational autonomy (Kraatz et al, 2010). 
For example, when workers at a Canadian provincial government agency charged 
with historical and cultural heritage battled with their business-side counterparts due to a 
“clash of value spheres between the cultural and the economic” (Townley, 2002, 175). 
With declining public financial resources, museum officials attempted to develop new 
strategic performance measurements to guide decision-making, with an emphasis on 
business planning, visitation numbers and revenue generation. However, this shift led to 
substantial friction among the professional museum employees, who had long measured 
their success based on cultural factors, such as service to and the education of the public. 
Ultimately, employees publicly obeyed the new performance measurement systems, but 
were privately dismissive of them as an assault on their professional autonomy and 
expertise. Consequently, the coercively imposed changes never became embedded within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Also	  see	  Keh,	  H.T.	  (1998).	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Book	  Publishing	  Industry:	  Structural	  
changes	  and	  strategic	  implications.	  Journal	  of	  Management	  History	  4(2):	  104-­‐123.	  
	  
	   180	  
the culture of the organization. Kanter el al (1992) define culture as socially constructed 
structures and systems through which an organization operates. Individuals’ beliefs and 
behaviors feed and solidify an organization’s culture, but those beliefs and behaviors are 
largely the result of an indoctrination of sorts that are perpetuated through norms and 
routines. For a culture to persist, intensity in the adoption of norms and consensus are 
required (O’Reilly, 1989). But to alter an established culture, organizational structures 
often must change. In the case of the Canadian museum, officials simply instituted a new 
strategic effort and performance measurement, but the fundamental structure of the 
organization remained the same, enabling workers to cling to the previously established 
culture and norms.    
Ryfe’s (2009) ethnographic study of a mid-sized U.S. daily newspaper produced 
somewhat similar findings. A new editor hired to run the newsroom instituted new 
policies aimed at forcing his journalists to change how and where they gathered the news. 
The guidelines required reporters to rely far less on news sources at governmental 
agencies, such as courthouses and police departments. According to the editor, the goal 
was to bolster print circulation. But ultimately, a number of reporters quit, while many 
others were resentful of the “encroachments onto their professional turf” (119). In 
examining newspaper-TV partnerships through an institutional theory lens, Lowrey 
(2005) found that normative factors were most predictive of managers’ decision-making, 
as ideas and concepts were routinely passed along through professional networks and 
conferences or promoted through the trade press.  
Sparrow (1999) similarly found that risk-averse organizations most closely 
monitor competitors, or peer groups, to more effectively copy practices that are perceived 
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to bolster cultural and political legitimacy. However, seemingly rational strategies at one 
organization may not serve other organizations’ interests well due to differences in 
staffing, resources and external relations. “Yet, the very fact that they are normatively 
sanctioned increases the likelihood of their adoption” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 148). 
Of course, this isn’t new to the news media industry. Ample studies have show than 
journalists often fear being perceived as professionally out of step with colleagues both 
within their organizations as well as contemporaries throughout the industry (Graber, 
1971; Crouse, 1973; Glasser, 1992; Schudson, 1989). To ignore the editorial choices of 
others is to question shared professional and journalistic values. Therefore, it’s better to 
mimic news values, sources and perspectives, even if it’s not in the individual’s or his or 
her organization’s best interest. More recently, Boczkowski (1999) contended that 
journalists’ increased use of digital technologies has actually facilitated increased 
monitoring of competitors’ work, and has subsequently led to greater mimicry. Moreover, 
the practice has “altered the ecology of practices and values by which journalists make 
meaning out of information” (40), as well as to curtail the overall diversity of content and 
viewpoints published by news organizations.  
But across the spectrum of a specific industry, or even individuals within a 
specific organization, which actors are most likely to mimic and which are more likely to 
experiment? Research from the late 1950s showed that high-status actors are often 
comfortable deviating from conventional behavior (Hollander, 1958); in contrast, middle-
status actors aspire to solidify their social and/or economic standing, so they are often 
reluctant to take risks that might be associated with low-status actors. This is because 
they fear their perceived legitimacy will be called into question, and lose any future 
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opportunity of rising in rank. Interestingly, researchers believe that high-status actors, 
comfortable in their positions (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and low-status actors, who have 
little to lose, are far more likely than middle-status actors to experiment in ways that 
might be associated with those possessing low status (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001). In 
the case of a newspaper company, this might be like allowing local community groups to 
submit and publish unedited press releases directly on the paper’s website, for example.  
However, it’s important to note that each status level also contains a perceived 
hierarchy (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001). But that, I believe, calls into question the 
likelihood that certain high-status actors would be willing to pursue a radically different 
approach to perform a particular task. A high-status actor toward the middle or bottom of 
its level’s hierarchical structure would not likely want to risk damaging its existing 
economic or cultural legitimacy. Unlike low-status actors in general, this high-status 
actor would be taking a risk, including the potential loss of power, prestige and resources.  
Studies have examined the status of newspaper readers and the types of 
publications they prefer—a broadsheet, which tends to cover an array of news, versus a 
tabloid, which covers more sports and crime (Van Rees and Van Eijck, 2003; Chan and 
Goldthrope, 2007)—as well as the status of people who do not read newspapers (Westley 
and Werner, 1964). However, no study has attempted to measure the status of a specific 
group of newspapers or news media outlets. Benson (2006) merely contends that The 
Washington Post, The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal “play a crucial role 
in establishing or modifying the dominant ‘rules’ of journalistic practice” (190), given the 
fact that they are among the few U.S. papers that routinely cover national and 
international news stories and are among the most celebrated newspapers in the United 
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States, based on top journalism prizes won. But while the Post likely helps to set 
professional standards among many high- and middle-status metropolitan newspapers in 
the United States—however they are to be defined—it has also long operated in the 
shadow of The New York Times (Felsenthal, 1993). Other top-tier major dailies, such as 
the Los Angles Times and the Chicago Tribune, similarly view The New York Times as 
the standard bearer of excellence, and they often measure their journalistic efforts against 
those of the Times (Benson, 2001, O’Shea, 2011). Interestingly, studies have shown that 
the Los Angeles Times’ readership is far more similar to that of USA Today’s and other 
regional newspapers (Benson, 2006), highlighting the potential dangers of pursuing 
legitimacy through the imitation of others’ practices and norms.  
So although the Post and Times exist among high-status actors in the U.S. 
newspaper industry, there is a clear hierarchy. Some readers of the Post’s Sunday 
magazine have even wondered why the publication couldn’t be more like the Times’ 
excellent Sunday magazine, with more and lengthier features and higher production 
quality. Post magazine editors and the paper’s top news editors have expressed some 
“ego bruises” as a result of the comparative critiques (Zagoria, 1984, A18). Zagoria, the 
Post’s ombudsman in the early to mid-1980s, himself seemed to welcome a magazine 
more like the Times’, despite the fact that his paper operates in a very different economic 
market, calling on a “top-side commitment” at the Post to more “thoughtful articles and 
quality art, beautifully printed,” thus leading to “an editorial concept that would give 
Washington a Sunday magazine more like the Times” (1984, A18). But such pursuit of 
isomorphic practices could carry a significant downside, as inefficient routines can 
“generate identities, behaviors, roles and values that are seen as appropriate. These norms 
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may crowd out alternative ways of practicing journalism—even if those alternatives 
might respond more efficiently to exogenous pressures” (Ryfe, 2006, 140).  
The study of journalism history and the evolving practices of news organizations 
are well served by institutional theory. The workplace norms and cultures that are 
embedded within an organization aren’t formulated over night, but are adopted from a 
complex system of slightly evolving technical and social routines that are tied to 
isomorphic pressures (Ryfe, 2006). Like any theory, institutional theory cannot fully 
explain the complex relationships and phenomena that give rise to change and 
maintenance in all established organizational settings, or the speed with which one 
organization adopts isomorphic practices as compared to another organization. However, 
applying an institutional theory approach can explain context-specific individual and 
organizational resistance to change, particularly when established practices are seemingly 
less efficient and effective than potential alternatives needed for long-term survival 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1988). 
 
Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory, developed by the French behavior psychologist Henri 
Tajfel in the early 1970s, specifies how individuals’ perceptions of various social 
environments, such as groups or organizations, influence the way they understand 
themselves and others (Tajfel, 1972). Social identity, or SIT, explains a self-evaluative 
process in which an individual compares his perceived social standing to others, then 
classifies himself within a group and compares it to other groups. As Hogg explains in 
citing Turner (1975), “Intergroup relations involve a process of competition for positive 
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identity” (2001, 186), as individuals attempt to establish or confirm distinctiveness in 
their pursuit of self-esteem through group affiliation, and measure their success in 
comparison to the distinctiveness of members in other groups. Every group offers a 
specific identity for members, and members can decide whether or not they want to 
incorporate that identity into their individual identity. Groups can be demographically 
based (race, gender and ethnicity, for example) while organizations can be professional or 
social (clubs and religious groups, for example).   
Individuals generally select identities that positively reinforce their self-image and 
enhance their status. “Thus, in an effort to maintain and enhance a positive work-related 
self-image, when creating their work identity individuals will be more likely to use the 
identities of the work groups that offer them the greatest perceived levels of distinction 
and status enhancement” (Walsh and Gordon, 2007, 50) 
SIT builds on the social psychology work of George Herbert Mead (1967), who 
argued that the self exists only in relation to others and that it is through ongoing social 
processes that individuals’ perceptions, attitudes and behaviors are shaped. SIT greatly 
expands on that concept, specifically how and why individuals perceive themselves in 
comparison to others to formulate a self-identity, and then classify themselves and others 
into social groups (Turner, 1975; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). By grouping oneself into a 
specific social unit, individuals are able to differentiate themselves from perceived out-
group members and exhibit similarities with perceived in-group members (Hogg and 
McGarty, 1990).  
SIT is rooted in three basic assumptions: individuals work to achieve or maintain 
a positive social identity; an individual’s positive social identity is often based on 
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favorable comparisons to in-groups and relevant out-groups; and individuals who are 
unhappy with their social identity will either leave their existing group, attempt to join a 
more positively viewed group, and/or work to make their existing group more positively 
distinct (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Whereas all individuals maintain a personal identity 
rooted in their own characteristics, they also maintain a social identity that is derived 
from membership and status in different groups (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). As Hogg and 
Terry (2000) note, individuals seek to acquire and maintain a positive social identity 
through status, stability and legitimacy within a well-regarded in-group, often in an effort 
to positively reinforce their self-image. The famous Robbers Cave experiment showed 
how affiliation with a group, even absent any other group, could foster obedience and 
loyalty to group rules and practices (Sherif et al, 1961). In the experiment, a group of 
boys from Oklahoma were taken to a summer camp and randomly placed in one of two 
groups. Without knowing the other group’s existence, group members formulated rules of 
behavior, a group name and even a loose hierarchy. When members later learned about 
the other group and had to compete for camp-related resources, they demonstrated in-
group favoritism, in-group bias and a general distaste for the other group. The mere 
awareness of being in one group versus another in a particular situation was enough to 
lead to processes of competition and discrimination. 
Creating and maintaining an identity through social comparison is a “continuous, 
self-defining process” (Walsh and Gordon, 2008, 48), since membership of groups can 
change, as can an organization’s culture and values. For example, the organizational 
culture and values of a daily newspaper would likely change dramatically if the publisher 
chose to eliminate the print edition altogether and make the company a digital news 
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operation. In such a scenario, changes in newsgathering, production and the use of real-
time data analytics to gauge reader interest would likely have a profound effect on 
organizational culture and values, and, subsequently, the perceived in-groups. In addition, 
Dutton et al (1994) have posited that, “members may change their behavior by merely 
thinking differently about their employing organization. If members believe that the 
perceived organizational identity has been altered either in content (e.g., in what 
attributes distinguish this organization) or in its evaluation (making it more or less 
attraction), members are likely to modify their behavior” (256). An organizational 
identity is the relationship between an employee and his organization. The cognitive 
connection an employee has with his organization will determine how strongly the 
employee identifies with the organization. The more that members view their 
organization positively, and the more their self-concept approximates the organization’s 
identity, and the more they will identify with their organization and attempt to serve 
perceived organizational goals. However, the opposite holds true as well. The more that 
members view their organization negatively, the less they will identity with the 
organization and work toward perceived organizational goals (Dutton and Dukerich, 
1991). In such cases, the person’s dominant social identity will likely be based outside of 
the workplace, either through the profession in which he is a member or through external 
organizational affiliations or social groups. 
Individuals can possess multiple social identities, as well as conflicting social 
identities. For example, an individual may perceive her profession in a positive light, yet 
view her day-to-day work in a far more negative light. In such cases—think of an 
attorney who views her profession through a positive lens, but isn’t proud of her day-to-
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day responsibilities defending alleged drug dealers and rapists—members will often 
identity with the perceived positive aspects of their organization’s identity, not the 
negative aspects. “Individuals will use their organization’s distinguishing competency 
and/or their occupation’s positive defining values to determine their organization’s and 
occupation’s identity. The groups whose competencies and positive defining values offer 
members the greatest distinction and status enhancement…will be prominent for these 
individuals and will be used by them to create their individual work identities” (Walsh 
and Gordon, 2008). 
SIT has been used to explore organizational behavior and individual attitudes 
through a variety of organizational affiliations. These studies include an examination of a 
religious college’s alumni (Ashforth and Mael, 1989), 3M salesmen (Dutton et al, 1994), 
New York/New Jersey Port Authority workers (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991), 
veterinarians (Johnson et al, 2006), and librarians (Garcia, 2011). Using SIT, scholars 
have examined the positive relationship between people’s perceptions of a company’s 
commitment to corporate social responsibility and their decision to work there (Ashforth 
and Humphrey, 1993; Turban and Greening, 1997), as well as how the social identity of 
newspaper readers influence the editorial content they consume (Mersey, 2010).  
 That said, SIT has its limitations. Most notably, certain individuals rely more on 
individual identity than group identity to bolster their social standing. These people defy 
social norms and either choose to operate outside of group affiliations or affiliate with 
others who similarly reject social norms. In the case study of The Washington Post’s 
Sunday magazine, Jay Lovinger might fall under this category. He came to the Post from 
New York City, where he served as an editor of People magazine. Lovinger was hired to 
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lead the Post magazine’s 1986 relaunch, but later acknowledged that he struggled to fit 
into the organizational culture of the Post, which he defined as lacking creativity. In 
addition, critics have contended that social identity theory is too limited and struggles to 
explain why people choose to define themselves in connection to a particular group of 
status versus another group of seemingly equal status (Turner, 1999). 
 
SIT and Journalists 
SIT has only rarely been used in communication studies, and only a few 
researchers have applied it to examine the attitudes and behaviors of newspaper 
journalists. Using SIT as a loose framework, Sylvie (1996) examined the stated 
interdepartmental differences within newspaper companies—specifically, editorial, 
advertising and circulation—at Ohio daily newspapers. Ultimately, and not surprisingly, 
he found that interdepartmental differences existed regarding perceived cooperation, or a 
lack thereof, between editorial, advertising and circulation. Newsroom leaders found the 
members of the advertising department the least cooperative, while advertising and 
circulation department leaders found newsroom personnel to be the least cooperative.  
Filak (2004) similarly found that newspaper and broadcast TV journalists 
displayed in-group favoritism and out-group derogation when comparing themselves to 
the other group as well as when considering issues of newsroom convergence between 
the two media. Each group viewed potential organizational changes more positively when 
they believed that members of their own group were driving the changes. This can largely 
be attributed to a general fear of the unknown, but it is a fear based on perceptions of the 
out-groups.  
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In an unpublished 2010 doctoral dissertation that examined daily newspaper 
journalists’ self-perceptions, and how recent technological advances and economic 
declines have influenced their professional practices at newspaper companies, Hinsley 
(2010) found that daily newspaper journalists identify more closely with the profession 
than they do with their respective organizations, in many cases because of unhappiness 
with their organizations for decreasing newsgathering resources due to advertising 
revenue declines. This confirms the findings of Dutton and Dekerich (1991), whose 
research showed that individuals closely monitor the actions their organization takes on 
social issues because those actions can either bolster or damn self-identity. Anything that 
might limit a news media organization’s ability to serve the public’s informational 
needs—including curtailing newsroom resources—can be viewed as a social problem. 
Hinsley’s work also supported Russo’s (1998) findings about journalists at a single daily 
newspaper. There, journalists likewise identified more closely with the profession than 
with their employing newspaper. However, journalists had a difficult time separating the 
work they did from the company that published it, meaning their identification to the 
profession and to their company were interwoven, as opposed to mutually exclusive. 
Moreover, it is hardly surprising that the journalists identified slightly more with the 
profession. As Russo alluded, the vast majority of journalists would not seek work in an 
entirely different profession if that newspaper were to suddenly go out of business. Part 
of the professional nature of journalism means that workers have attained a certain level 
of higher education, undergone task-specific training, and often socialize through 
different industry networks and associations.  
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Lastly, SIT has been used to examine changes in professional identity among 
journalists at a daily newspaper in Sweden. Specifically, the study looked at how print 
journalists’ attitudes changed after they were re-assigned to work on a new web edition. 
The authors found that the re-assigned journalists took a more market-oriented, as 
opposed to content-oriented, approach to their jobs after working in a new group 
environment (Fagerling and Norack, 2005). The new online journalists’ social identities 
transformed in large part because the journalists operated within a new organizational 
unit within the newspaper company, and that the new unit lacked many of the 
institutionalized norms and practices that defined the newspaper company. In addition, 
the online team was so small that journalists, advertising sales representatives and 
information technology personnel had little choice but to work together, fostering a better 
understanding of shared goals and outcomes. Fagerling and Norack found that an 
entrepreneurial spirit permeated the online operation, and that the web-based journalists 
embraced an identity that was rooted in commercial success through editorial innovation 
and a willingness to experiment. This is the very essence of any skunk-works operation, 
whereby a small team of people comes together to develop new ideas and practices 
without feedback from the established organization. By physically segregating the 
operation, new cultural values and norms can be developed. Many newspapers, including 
The Washington Post and USA Today, to name just a few, housed their online news units 
in entirely different buildings (in the case of the Post) or on an entirely different floor (in 
the case of USA Today). In both cases, the new digital operations developed a highly 
entrepreneurial and collaborative culture (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). However, both 
companies later struggled to merge their print and digital operations because the two 
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groups viewed each other as competitors for resources and organizational status. 
Ultimately, the companies had to reorganize both operations to better integrate the two. 
 
The Pursuit of Status 
Inherent in the pursuit of a positive identity through group affiliation, particularly 
in relation to perceived out-groups, is the concept of status, defined as “an individual’s 
standing in the hierarchy of a group based on the prestige, honor and deference accorded 
her by other group members” (Lovaglia, 1997, 161). The accordance of prestige or honor 
upon an individual is based on status characteristics, including age, race, educational 
background, income, physical appearance and a host of others. Certain characteristics 
carry greater weight than others, depending on the cultural setting.   
Gould (2002) explains that there are two frameworks to understand hierarchical 
differentiation of status characteristics. The first perspective views hierarchical status 
structures as natural phenomenon, in which individual characteristics and qualities lead 
certain people or groups to gain greater prominence and influence in group settings. The 
other framework views hierarchical status structures as artificially imposed by interested 
parties, who seek to maintain their privileged positions and access to resources and 
power. The challenge is when people repeatedly reinforce others’ status roles. Those 
roles will often become accepted and inform perceptions that can be difficult to change 
(Ridgeway,	  1997).	  
Studies have shown that status beliefs can also spread beyond those who are 
directly affected by an “influence hierarchy,” to bystanders of similar status 
characteristics who “simply witness the influence hierarchies between people of nominal 
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groups” (Ridgeway and Erickson, 2000, 611). This belief system spreads, helping to 
solidify additional attitudes and perceptions about certain people’s abilities, knowledge 
and worth. 
It’s important to note that status beliefs ultimately must come to be agreed upon to 
form a social reality, meaning that a less regarded group has to accept its inferior status 
for the belief to take hold. This often occurs through the process of “altercasting,” in 
which a lower-status individual comes to accept his social standing through repeated 
experiences with high-status people (Ridgeway, 1997). Justifying existing social 
hierarchies can lead to inferences by both high-status and low-status individuals that the 
lower-status groups possess minimized social value, cementing perceived status 
hierarchies. However, that’s not to say status group membership is forever. “Depending 
on whether they perceive group boundaries as permeable or impermeable and status 
relationships as secure or insecure, low-status group members might adopt a strategy of 
upward individual mobility or social creativity” (Turner, 1999, 9). 
Cohen and Zhou (1991) found that status characteristics played a larger role in the 
interactions of group members when the group was ad hoc, as opposed to established. “In 
the absence of first-hand knowledge about the relative abilities of group members, 
individuals use the information conveyed by status characteristics” (186). External 
characteristics the authors explored were gender, education, leadership, seniority and 
company status. Their findings were rooted in a sociological concept deemed the 
“Matthew effect,” in which “contributions of apparently similar quality are evaluated 
differentially depending on the status of the contributor” (Gould, 2002, 1148). This is the 
basis of much research on status, whereby individual characteristics are subjectively 
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assessed by high-status individuals, who perceive a correlation to task performance 
abilities. For example, in his ethnographical study of manufacturing workers, Vallas 
(2006) discovered that men were often far more committed to long-standing institutional 
norms than were women who worked on the same production line. The company had 
instituted a new team system, requiring that every worker on the line provide 
“cooperation and mutual support across traditional [task] boundaries” (1697), yet men 
oftentimes refused to participate in job rotations or to help women perform a certain task 
due to the men’s attachment to a hierarchical system based on gender. Such an example 
illustrates how an individual can exist in multiple social groups and maintain conflicting 
identities. Certain women in Vallas’ study could exist in a social in-group of high 
performers, in comparison to those who required help to fulfill their tasks, while at the 
same time socially identity with all of the women. In such a case, certain women might 
even perceive the men as the out-group for possessing a workplace mentality that is 
small-minded and insecure. As previously stated in this chapter, an individual can possess 
multiple social identities, and those identities are constantly being reevaluated and 
revised. 	  
Moreover, research shows that organizations often value specific qualities more 
than others. For example, a particular organization might prefer creativity in its workers 
more than efficiency. As a result, individuals with high levels of creativity would tend to 
possess higher status within the organization (Kanter, 1993). The point here is that lower-
status employees can enhance their self-image by identifying qualities they possess that 
are valued by their organization. Pugh and Wahrman (1983) have similarly shown that 
people’s expectations of others can be changed by interactions that defy previous beliefs. 
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In their study, the researchers provided males and females examples of female 
competence in performing a specific task. They ultimately found that demonstrating 
female superiority to men—rather than equal competencies—was the most effective way 
of producing equality of influence in mixed-gender task-oriented groups. “The effects of 
a status characteristic can be said to have been eliminated as a judgmental factor only if a 
demonstration of superiority leads one to be viewed (and to view oneself) as a superior, 
not as an equal” (760). Another example could be found in a low-status, out-group 
section editor at a daily newspaper. If this editor was to attempt to produce award-
winning stories of national significance, it stands to reason that high-status actors’ 
perceptions of that editor would change for the better. This point will be further discussed 
in Chapter 8.  
 
Conclusion 
 The newspaper industry has always faced market threats, whether from radio, 
television, cable TV, community newspapers, the Internet and mobile device. The 
question is never whether newspaper journalists will have to adapt to some new 
technological innovation and slightly alter how they do their jobs, but rather from whom 
will they take their cues. 
 The essence of institutional theory is that the individuals who give an organization 
life routinely seek professional legitimacy for legitimacy’s sake, and often do some 
through the emulation of practices that have gained widespread appeal elsewhere. 
Sometimes, emulation will work out for the best and both the individual and organization 
will be the better for it. In other cases, however, adoption of others behaviors or processes 
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can carry ruinous results, as they could be poorly misaligned with specific goals or 
simply inefficient for the actual task at hand. This is incredibly relevant for today’s 
newspaper industry, as newsworkers face changes and challenges at a far greater pace 
than at any other time in history due to widespread disruptions to the longtime 
advertising-based business model. But it is also relevant to a 50-year case study that 
seeks to understand the evolution of editorial decision-making, namely in the balancing 
of news values and business values. Within the various contexts of history, who did Post 
magazine editors emulate in their pursuit of legitimacy, and what were the motivating 
factors that compelled editors to maintain certain behaviors and processes?   
 Because Sunday magazine editors have historically been held in relatively low 
regard in newspaper newsrooms, for reasons previously mentioned that include some 
daily journalists’ distaste for long-form narrative stories and a resentment that magazine 
writers face little time pressure to publish, this study is also well-served by an 
examination of status and social identity. Newspaper newsrooms are competitive 
environments, both internally and externally. Most newsrooms are divided by editorial 
section, and reporters constantly vie to cover stories that will land their work on a section 
front or, at best, the front page of the newspaper. More people will likely read those 
section-front stories, but the stories will also receive special notice from top editors.  
 Sunday magazine editors rarely operate in that world. They perform their job on 
the periphery, working with long deadlines and lengthy production cycles that inhibit 
most any chance for one of their stories to get moved to A1.  
 As noted earlier in this chapter, social identity theory is based on three 
assumptions: Individuals work to achieve or maintain a positive social identity; social 
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identity is often based on one’s self comparison to others, and then the relevant in-group 
and out-groups the individual is a member of; and individuals who are unhappy with their 
social identity will either leave their existing group, attempt to join a more positively 
viewed group, and/or work to make their existing group more positively distinct (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1986). In an examination of Sunday magazine editors and their attitudes 
toward editorial decision-making and the consideration of business values in producing 
their magazine, social identity theory provides a valuable prism through which to further 
understanding of their pursuit of status and membership within certain organizational in-
groups. By also incorporating institutional theory, research can take a broader view and 
examine both external and internal professional environments that influence the behavior 
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Chapter 6 
Methods 
This study aims to further understanding of editorial decision-making by editors 
of what I call “blended” media products, in this case The Washington Post’s Sunday 
magazine, as well as the editors’ attitudes toward the business side of their publication’s 
operation. In addition, this study is a 50-year case study of the Post magazine, beginning 
with the launch of Potomac in 1961.  
Janesick writes that “qualitative researchers accept the fact that research is 
ideologically driven. There is no value-free or bias-free design….By identifying one’s 
biases, one can see easily where the questions that guide the study are crafted” (2000, 
385). To be sure, personal interest and pragmatism influenced my selection of The 
Washington Post’s Sunday magazine as the focus of this study. Prior to beginning my 
doctoral studies at the University of Maryland in College Park, in 2007, I spent 13 years 
as an editor and reporter for various newspapers, both weekly and daily, as well as for 
three different magazines. Through these experiences, I came to recognize certain 
differences in the organizational culture of newspapers and magazines, specifically in the 
working relationship between journalists and their colleagues in the advertising and 
circulation departments. At the newspapers where I worked, the internal culture was 
rooted in journalistic independence, an often-articulated divide that separated newsroom 
decision-making from business operations and the financial needs of the publication. At 
the magazines where I worked—each a subject-specific niche publication, including one 
that covered the business operations and policy interests of the newspaper industry—the 
newsroom and advertising departments were clearly distinct from one another, but the 
cultural divide was far less doctrinarian than it was at the newspapers. Editors and 
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advertising representatives at the magazines communicated frequently with each other to 
share information about upcoming stories and editorial projects, which advertisers were 
buying space, and what advertisers were saying about the magazine. I’m sure such 
conversations were held at some level at the newspapers where I worked at, but those 
dialogues were not openly discussed in the newsroom.  
 
Study Scope and Purpose 
A Sunday newspaper magazine is an unconventional media product; it 
“challenges classification” (Taft, 1982, 223). It is neither a typical magazine nor a 
newspaper section like any other, as it combines content and production elements unique 
to each medium. Sunday newspaper magazine editors typically produce, package and 
design content in the manner of a magazine, yet they do so in a newspaper newsroom 
environment where traditional news values reign supreme. Among those values, 
particularly at daily newspapers, is editorial independence from commercial pressures, 
both internal (from business-side colleagues) and external (from existing or would-be 
advertisers). Unlike newspapers, magazines have a long history of developing editorial 
content to attract specific categories of advertisers (Steinem, 1990; Mastin, 1996; Zukin 
and Maguire, 2004). In studies of special interest magazines, researchers have found that 
the number of magazines ballooned following World War II because of increases in the 
nation’s economic prosperity and people’s leisure time, as well as the growth of other 
media, namely television, that introduced people to new interests for which they sought 
additional information (Abrahamson, 1996; Sumner, 2010). In addition, as advertising 
began to account for a growing share of magazines’ total revenues, enabling magazines to 
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become inexpensive if not free to readers, editors worked to produce editorial content that 
provided a friendly environment for advertisers. “Between 1900 and 2000, magazines 
generally became a business enterprise instead of a literary enterprise. Magazines became 
defined not as much by their content but by the demographic character of their 
audiences” (Sumner, 2010, 9). Beginning in the 1980s, newspapers sought to expand 
their own reach by developing new “special interest” editorial sections, such as food and 
lifestyle-oriented sections, yet those efforts were largely ancillary to the “hard-news” 
reporting that defined the front section (Bogart, 1995; Eckman and Lindlof, 2003). 
As discussed in great detail in Chapter 3, newspaper magazines were originally 
created in the late 1800s to increase Sunday newspaper circulation, mainly through the 
publication of illustrations, fiction, poems and long-form storytelling. By the early 1900s, 
photography became the principal content element of Sunday newspaper magazines. The 
publications eventually grew incredibly popular among advertisers because the 
rotogravure printing process through which the magazines were created allowed for the 
use of color inks and sharper reproduction of images. The rest of the newspaper was 
printed through a traditional printing system that used only black ink.  
This shift, from a potential driver of Sunday circulation to a distinct vehicle for 
advertising revenue, ultimately became the undoing of locally produced newspaper 
magazines. Beginning in the late 1970s, newspapers discontinued their Sunday 
magazines largely because expenses far exceeded advertising revenues. There are many 
reasons for those declines, including: advertisers’ increased use of free-standing inserts 
that could be distributed through the newspaper in select geographic locations; expanded 
color printing capabilities throughout the newspaper; improved page design technology 
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that brought magazine-like aesthetics and production to the daily newspaper; and the 
addition of new lifestyle-themed sections throughout the newspaper. News accounts and 
academic studies about locally produced Sunday magazines and special sections clearly 
show that newspapers cease to publish them for advertising-related financial reasons, as 
opposed to readership declines (Kenney and Lacy, 1987; Chalaby, 1989; Attaway-Fink, 
2004). Because Sunday magazines are expensive to produce—due largely to the expense 
of glossy paper, third-party printing and binding, and distribution—the sections need to 
generate more advertising revenue than a typical newspaper section does to cover its 
costs. In addition, most major metropolitan newspapers offer advertisers the option of 
geographically zoned preprinted inserts, which maintain many of the same production 
values as a Sunday magazine. It has been estimated that preprint advertising accounts for 
nearly 70 percent of the average metropolitan newspaper’s Sunday advertising revenues 
(Mutter, 2012). As a national newspaper, The New York Times hasn’t experienced these 
challenges because it enjoys a large, national advertising base, and few advertisers opt to 
run preprinted inserts beyond the paper’s New York Metropolitan area. As of September 
2012, The Times had a Sunday circulation of 2.1 million, which includes print and digital, 
making it twice as big as the second-largest Sunday newspaper in the country, the 
Houston Chronicle (Moos, 2012). 
Despite the fact that advertising revenues are the primary determinant in a Sunday 
magazine’s survival, studies consistently show that Sunday magazine editors say they 
make almost all editorial determinations with their perceived readership in mind and 
think very little about the environment they’re creating for current or potential advertisers 
(Haney, 1953; Ranly, 1981; Hynds, 1994; Morton, 1998; McQuilken, 1999). Chapter 2 
	  
	   202	  
presented a review of the relevant literature pertaining to professionalism and journalistic 
news values, as well as the market conditions that influence organizational changes. 
Zelizer has called for more studies that attempt to illuminate ‘‘new modes of 
journalistic practice, new circumstances in which journalism can and does operate, and 
new purposes for which journalism is called into action’’ (2007, 112). Major 
metropolitan newspapers have experienced significant revenue declines over the past 10 
years due to the “disruptive innovation” of online publishing. Christensen (1997), who 
coined the term, defines it as an innovation that creates a new market and value for 
consumers. In the case of newspapers, from a revenue standpoint, consumers are both 
readers and advertisers. The innovation will eventually disrupt the established market—in 
this case, print advertising and print circulation—by forcing existing companies to lower 
prices and adjust product offerings, such as specific sections, including locally produced 
Sunday magazines. 
Understanding how editors, particularly editors of Sunday magazines and other 
advertising-dependent feature and/or lifestyle-oriented sections, can adjust to today’s 
“new circumstance,” as Zelizer calls it, is important as the newspaper industry continues 
to face market challenges that diminish resources and challenge long-established 
professional norms and practices. In many ways, this study is an examination of the 
causes and consequences of power, production and culture in an organizational 
environment where professional norms are highly institutionalized. 
Because the sequencing and timing of processes and events are central to 
understanding outcomes, institutional studies are often based on historic analyses 
(Selznick, 1957; Berger and Luckmann, 1967). This is because individuals largely adapt 
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to existing and recurring conditions rather than buck organizational norms and routes 
(Ryfe, 2006). In studying the production of news, Cook (1998) and Sparrow (1999) each 
argue for the necessity of examining the historical evolution of institutional practices. 
Other scholars (Thornton, 2002; Townley, 2002) have similarly argued that institutional 
studies require a historic examination of organizations, rather than moment-in-time 
queries, to track the evolutionary nature of values, practices and norms. 
 
Study Design  
This study was designed to examine the attitudes and perceptions of past and 
present editors of The Washington Post’s Sunday magazine to better understand the 
principal factors that influence editorial decision-making, particularly as it relates to their 
publication’s commercial success. I conducted 13 in-depth interviews with past and 
present editors of the Post magazine, and used the grounded theory method to analyze 
and conceptualize findings. In addition, I blended case study methodology to triangulate 
findings. By conducting a case study of the Post’s Sunday magazine, bounded within a 
50-year period from 1961 to 2011, I could incorporate a macro-level understanding of 
various factors that influenced the actions and attitudes of editors, including economic 
conditions, industry trends and shifting organizational values. As Stake (1995) explains, 
researchers will often use the case study method in an instrumental way to help 
investigate a broader phenomenon. 
Some case study findings were reported in Chapter 4, which includes a detailed 
history of the Post’s Sunday magazine. Chapter 7 contains the study’s results, which 
suggest that Post magazine editors’ attitudes toward content creation were rooted largely 
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in a desire to earn greater professional respect from colleagues throughout the newsroom, 
by competing both internally and externally for resources and stories. This included the 
pursuit of stories that were designed to win the interest of colleagues as well as 
journalism award committees, despite the fact that readers may not have been interested 
in them. Moreover, editors often attempted to fill the Post magazine with content that 
emulated The New York Times Magazine’s, such as lengthy national and international 
news features. Lastly, Post magazine editors maintained traditional newspaper newsroom 
values, such as low regard for business values in editorial decision-making. Chapter 8 
discusses the bases of these findings.  
Twelve former editors of the Post’s Sunday magazine were each interviewed in-
depth for approximately 60 to 90 minutes, as was the current editor. One past editor of 
the Post’s Sunday magazine, Stephen Isaacs, could not be found, while two other past 
editors, Joe Anderson and Marion Clark, have passed away. Since 1961, the 16 editors of 
the Post’s Sunday magazine were: 
Paul Herron, 1961-1965 
Walter Pincus, 1965-1968 
Joe Anderson, 1968-1970 
Stephen Isaacs, 1970-1971 
Robert Wool, 1971-1972 
Shelby Coffey, 1972-1976 
Marion Clark, 1976-1977 
Laura Longley, 1977-1980 
Stephen Petranek, 1980-1986 
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Jay Lovinger, 1986-1988 
Bob Thompson, 1988-1995 
Steve Coll, 1995-1998 
Glenn Frankel, 1998-2001 
Tom Shroder, 2001-2009 
Debra Leithauser, 2009-2011 
Lynn Medford, 2011-today 
In addition to the editors, three former general managers/publishers of the 
magazine were interviewed in-depth; one of the past editors, Coll, also served as 
publisher of the magazine during part of his time leading the editorial side of the 
publication. Those business-side leaders were Andrew Corty, who was hired by the Post 
to serve as general manager of the magazine and help lead its grand redesign in 1986; 
Anne Karalekas, general manager of the magazine in the mid- to late ’90s; and Leslie 
Morgan Steiner, general manager of the magazine in the late ’90s and early 2000s. 
Washington Post Co. Chairman Donald Graham, former publisher of the newspaper from 
1979 to 2000, was also interviewed in-depth. The current general manager of the 
magazine, Jenny Abramson, and current Post Publisher Katharine Weymouth indicated 
initial interest in taking part in this study; ultimately, however, neither one made herself 
available.  
Because this study examines Post Sunday magazine editors’ content decision-
making processes and their attitudes about the relationship between editorial and 
commercial interests within the magazine, interviews with business-side leaders were not 
directly included in the grounded theory analysis. Like other elements of data, as detailed 
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below, those interviews served to triangulate findings as well as to support the 50-year 
case study of the magazine.  
All interviews were based on a set of predetermined questions, but the interview 
process was free flowing and iterative to allow for follow-up questions and new lines of 
inquiry. As Fortner and Christians write, “open-ended, unstructured interviewing plays a 
prominent role in discovering how people define their realities” (2003, 351). Interviews 
were conducted in person unless the subject was no longer in the Greater Washington, 
D.C. area, where I was based at start of this study; in this case, for Corty and Frankel, the 
interview was conducted by telephone. Three other interviews (Wool, Longley and 
Medford) were conducted by telephone because I moved to the Boston area prior to the 
completion of this study. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed for manual 
analysis. Interview subjects signed a release form that explained the purpose of this 
study, and everyone agreed to speak for attribution. Because this dissertation includes a 
50-year case study of The Washington Post’s Sunday magazine, I believed all subjects 
should be named for the sake of this study’s historic and academic value. All interview 
subjects agreed to the condition of full attribution.  
In addition to interviews with key subjects, I analyzed approximately 85 issues of 
the Post’s Sunday magazine, starting in 1961, as well as various internal documents and 
communications acquired from interview subjects and others. For every two years, three 
issues were randomly selected for examination; additional issues were examined to 
ensure that the researcher had a sample of every editor’s work. In instances when a 
selected issue happened to be an outlier—such as a special topically themed issue—the 
researcher examined the next week’s issue as well. Riffe et al (1996) suggest that the 
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most efficient way for researchers to perform a content analysis of a weekly magazine is 
to use a stratified sample of 12 issues, one randomly selected from each month. Lacy et al 
(1995) came to the same conclusion in their examination of random sampling for content-
analysis studies of weekly newspapers. However, this research project is not a content 
analysis of The Washington Post’s Sunday magazine. Rather, it is a study of Post 
magazine editors’ editorial decision-making and their attitudes about the interplay 
between journalism and commercialism. As a result, I examined past issues of the 
magazine over a 50-year period for contextual purposes only, to add an additional layer 
of detail to the editors’ stories and to identify the evolution of editorial content elements 
and advertising in the magazine for the purpose of the case study.  
Further insights into the history and practices of Sunday newspaper magazines 
were gleaned from trade journals, news reports, academic studies (of which there were 
very few), and informal interviews with people associated with Sunday magazines. These 
include Phyllis Cavaliere, CEO and chairman of the Metro Newspaper Advertising 
Services, formerly the Sunday Magazine Network; Carolyn Flynn, longtime editor of the 
Albuquerque Journal’s women’s magazine SAGE; Leslie Yazel, deputy editor of the Wall 
Street Journal’s Personal Journal section and a former Post Style section editor who 
helped re-conceptualize the paper’s Sunday magazine in 2007; as well as numerous 
friends and former colleagues in the newspaper and magazine industries. The data 
collected through interviews with business-side leaders were not analyzed through the 
grounded theory method. Rather, they were used in conjunction with the other 
aforementioned data sources—documents, physical artifacts, news accounts, etc—to 
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triangulate data in an effort to establishment converging lines of evidence and bolster 
credibility of fact.  
 
Selection of Case Study Subject 
I chose to study The Washington Post’s Sunday magazine largely for pragmatic 
reasons. First, fewer than 10 locally produced weekly Sunday magazines currently exist. 
Second, I sought to focus on a magazine published by a major metropolitan newspaper so 
that findings could potentially be applied to similarly sized dailies, which have been 
undergoing the largest revenue declines of any newspaper segment (Edmonds et al, 2011; 
The Economist, 2009). Third, the magazine needed to be local in editorial and advertising 
scope—as opposed to the Sunday magazine of The New York Times, which is essentially 
a national publication—again to improve the chances of applicability to others in the 
newspaper industry. Lastly, the Post was selected because of its geographic proximity to 
me. The vast majority of former Post magazine editors and general managers who were 
interviewed for this study still lived and worked in the Greater Washington, D.C. area.  
 
Merging Case Study and Grounded Theory Methods 
Researchers who practice qualitative studies tend to believe that reality is too 
complicated to control and can only be “superficially touched” (Holliday, 2007, 6) by 
research that attempts to clarify meaning through interpretation. It’s for that reason that 
qualitative methodologies are often employed to study broad social perspectives and the 
backgrounds and interests of subjects. For this study, I married case study and grounded 
theory methodologies because both are appropriate for a number of reasons, including 1) 
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few studies exist on the specific topic, 2) this study looks at an evolutionary process and 
people’s reactions to it, and 3) this study explores context, consequence and strategies. In 
addition, both the case study and grounded theory methods can be used to study people’s 
actions and engagement in a process (Creswell, 2003). More importantly, the methods 
were combined because of their differences; the case study approach enables exploration 
of context within a bounded system, while grounded theory allows for a more detailed 
analysis of data.  
 
Case Study  
Researchers use the case study method to broadly explore processes and 
individuals that are “bounded by time and activity” (Creswell, 2003, 15). Sources of 
evidence vary in case study research, yet Yin (2012) suggests that researchers collect data 
from any combination of the six most common sources: 1) direct observations; 2) open-
ended interviews; 3) archival records; 4) documents, such as newspaper articles and 
internal records; 5) participant-observation; and 6) physical artifacts, such as employees’ 
work. For this study, I used open-ended interviews, archival records, documents and 
physical artifacts, which included “editor’s notes” that appeared in the magazine or the 
daily newspaper, as well as online Q&A’s with a Post magazine editor.  
One of the defining traits of the case study method is that is based on a 
constructionist approach to research (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). In other words, it is a 
social construction of research participants’ descriptions of their views and actions. It 
“recognizes the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning, but doesn’t 
reject outright some notion of objectivity (Crabtree and Miller, 1999, 10). Yin (2003) 
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explains that the case study approach is well suited to answer “how” and “why” questions 
and to uncover contextual conditions that might be relevant to the phenomenon that is 
being studied. He describes three types of case studies: exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory. In an exploratory case study, data is collected prior to the adoption of a 
theory to frame the study and the formation of research questions, often because there is 
little existing information about the topic of study. The researcher is largely attempting to 
develop a hypothesis. In contrast, descriptive case studies require the use of theory for the 
primary purpose of describing the various characteristics of the phenomenon under study. 
Finally, explanatory case studies aim to explain how things occurred over the course of 




In addition to the case study method, I used a grounded theory methodology to 
analyze data culled through interviews with former editors of the Post Sunday magazine. 
Grounded theory is a good technique for the examination of behavior and attitudes 
because the method requires an examination of processes and trajectory (Turner, 1983; 
Martin and Turner, 1986). 
The grounded theory method requires the “constant comparison of data with 
emerging categories” (Creswell, 2003, 14) and the refinement of those categories until 
the researcher develops a higher level abstraction of the phenomenon under review. 
Pioneered by Glaser and Strauss (1967), the grounded theory approach involves 
systematic coding of data and organizing that data into as many categories as possible. 
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The process requires continually returning to the data to expand categories until they are 
“theoretically saturated” (Conrad, 1978, 102). At that point, the researcher begins 
refining the categories by combining properties, delimiting them as higher-level concepts 
emerge. As Lindlof and Taylor explain, the two main features of grounded theory is that 
theory is grounded in the relationships between data and the categories, and that codes 
and categories continue to evolve throughout the data collection process and until late in 
the study because new information can “alter the scope and terms” of the analytical 
framework (2002, 218). This “continuous interplay between analysis and data collection” 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1994, 273) enables the researcher to explicate a story from the 
interconnection of findings and themes.  
In contrast to open-ended feedback opportunities through questionnaires, open-
ended interviews are generally less structured and take on more of a conversational tone, 
enabling the researcher to pursue different lines of inquiry based on subjects’ responses 
(Crabtree and Miller, 1999; Holliday, 2007). Such interviews can help reveal how 
“participants construct reality and think about situations, not just to provide the answers 
to a researcher’s specific questions and own implicit construction of reality” (Yin, 2012, 
12).  
For this study, interview questions were general, but focused on the interview 
subjects’ career history and path, editorial philosophy as editor of the Sunday magazine, 
their perceptions of The Washington Post’s organizational culture, their perceptions of 
the culture’s impact on the magazine, and linkages over time between editorial decision-
making and advertising/revenue goals. The ability of the researcher to sift out bias and 
factually questionable information is an essential component of this research procedure. 
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Following a process of source evaluation—based on primacy, credibility and the intrinsic 
value of individual sources—researchers attempt to derive reliable facts from the 
evidence so to construct interpretations of past events (Berkhofer Jr., 1995). It’s also why 
open-ended interviews should not suffice as the lone data source of a study.  
Interestingly, every editor interviewed for this study largely defended his or her 
tenure leading the magazine, contending that any revenue problems the publication 
suffered during their time at the helm were a result of the poor performance of Post 
advertising sales reps, a downturn in the nation’s economy, and/or competitive threats 
from emerging media, namely the Internet. Only former Washington Post Publisher 
Donald Graham said he erred in overseeing the publication; he believed he should have 
either killed the publication following the relaunch in the mid-1980s or demanded that 
magazine editors were more business-minded. While editors often provided rosy 
portrayals of their time leading the magazine, most everyone offered critical analyses of 
the problems they inherited upon taking the job, as well as their predecessors’ strengths 
and weaknesses. When combined with internal revenue documents, an examination of 
actual Post Sunday magazines, as well as in-depth interviews with business-side leaders, 
I was able to sift out some bias and achieve far greater accuracy in the data.  
All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed for ease of analysis. As is 
required for grounded theory work, the researcher employed a “constant-comparison 
approach” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 101) to conceptualize the data and identify 
commonalities among cited incidents. “We compare incident with incident as we go 
along so that similar phenomena can be given the same name” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 
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63). Also, by repeatedly examining past interview transcriptions, new lines of inquiry for 
future interviews were identified.  
Through an open-coding, line-by-line analysis, the researcher developed 
approximately 40 conceptual labels. Code notes, or memos, were written throughout the 
coding process to identify unique attributes, potential connections and contextual 
underpinnings. As Strauss and Corbin explain, “The basic analytic procedures by which 
this is accomplished are: the asking of questions about data; and the making of 
comparisons for similarities and differences between each incident, event and other 
instances of phenomena” (1990, 74). Similar incidents and concepts were then grouped to 
reduce the number of units and form categories. Through the axial coding process, further 
connections were made between categories and subcategories to either create new 
categories or to develop broad themes that covered many of the existing ones. “In most 
cases, axial coding brings previously separate categories together under a principle of 
integration” (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002, 221) and conceptualization.  
Initial categories included “awards and external recognition,” “recognition from 
within the Post newsroom,” “the Post as a revered institution,” “the pursuit of editorial 
‘impact,’” “competition with other Post sections,” “competition with The New York 
Times magazine,” “telling stories that Post magazine editors were interested in,” “the role 
of special sections of the Post magazine,” “apathy toward Post business-side 
issues/interests,” “the financial health of the Post newspaper,” and “Donald Graham, 
supporter of the magazine.” In the end, three major themes emerged as central to this 
study: “Politics and Competition Inside the Post Newsroom,” “Evolving Attitudes about 
the Business Side of Magazine Operations,” and “A New York State of Mind,” or more 
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specifically how and why editors of the Post magazine took particular inspiration from 
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Chapter 7 
Findings: Competition, Conflictions and Culture 
Three major themes emerged through the analysis of interviews with editors who 
have led The Washington Post’s magazine over the past 50 years. All three speak to 
challenges editors faced in developing content for the magazine, but the themes also help 
to shine a light on how editors perceived themselves while working at one of the nation’s 
most renowned and respected journalistic institutions. Ultimately, those self-
perceptions—as opposed to a desire to fulfill readers’ content desires, or the pursuit of 
advertising revenues for the magazine—were the main drivers that shaped editorial 
decision-making and the identity editors sought to develop for the Sunday magazine, as 
well as for themselves, while working at the Post. 
 This chapter will examine the three major themes: “Politics and Competition 
Inside the Post Newsroom,” “Evolving Attitudes about Business Values,” and “A New 
York State of Mind,” which details how and why editors of the Post magazine took 
particular inspiration from The New York Times Magazine and, to a lesser degree, The 
New Yorker. “Politics and Competition Inside the Post Newsroom” focuses on the 
internal battles among section editors for potential stories and actual resources, including 
reporters and additional budgetary funding. “Evolving Attitudes” examines how and why 
Post magazine editors perceived the revenue-generating necessities of their publication, 
and their attitudes toward working with business-side colleagues to develop editorial 
content ideas so as to create a more welcoming—and noncontroversial—environment for 
potential advertisers. Lastly, “A New York State of Mind” focuses on how The New York 
Times Magazine has influenced editors of the Post magazine, specifically in their efforts 
to produce editorial content of the same high quality as the Times’ magazine. Even 
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though Post magazine editors acknowledged that the entire Times newspaper has long 
operated as a national publication—in terms of circulation and advertising—and that the 
Post was essentially a local newspaper, they still routinely measured the editorial quality 
of the Post magazine against the Times magazine. In addition, many Post magazine 
editors spoke glowingly of The New Yorker, another general interest weekly news 
magazine, saying they took editorial inspiration from the publication. These editors 
justified their editorial approach to the Post magazine—namely, publishing smart, 
lengthy and occasionally idiosyncratic narrative stories—by citing how The New Yorker 
is a commercially successful magazine that runs similar types of feature articles. Post 
magazine editors throughout the 50-year period of study consistently made this claim. 
Editors again acknowledged that the Post employed a very different business model than 
The New Yorker did, with local versus national circulation. Unlike The New Yorker, the 
Post magazine has also never targeted a highly educated and affluent readership. Over the 
course of 52 weeks per year, for the past 50 years, the Post magazine has essentially 
employed a general-interest editorial approach, and advertising that featured modestly 
priced clothing and home furnishings.  
This chapter will finish with a brief analysis of my interpretation of the data, with 
the next chapter providing a more detailed discussion that centers on an extension of 
social identity theory through the use of institutional theory.  
 
Politics and Competition Inside the Post Newsroom 
The first major theme that emerged through an analysis of interviews with former 
editors of The Washington Post’s Sunday magazine was the editors’ pursuit of 
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professional acceptance by their newsroom colleagues. Newspaper magazines were first 
created in the late 1800s to bolster Sunday circulation, and they did this by providing a 
variety of lifestyle stories—defined broadly throughout this chapter as light-hearted 
articles about everything from food to fashion, romance to recreation, and most things in 
between—poems and illustrations. The modern Sunday newspaper magazine, beginning 
in the mid-1900s, largely employed feature photography, local gossip, food recipes and 
other “soft” news stories. Over time, editors added a bit more journalistic substance to the 
editorial mix, with deeply reported long-form feature stories and award-winning 
photojournalism. Yet, most of the editors interviewed for this study believed that 
journalists working for the daily sections of the newspaper viewed the Post magazine 
negatively for a variety of reasons. These reasons, as the magazine editors imagined 
them, included a distaste for narrative stories that often spanned 8,000 to 12,000 words in 
the magazine, little regard for the magazine’s lifestyle and entertainment articles, a 
dislike of photo essays, jealousy over the long lengths of time reporters were often given 
to report and write stories for the magazine, and a resentment that budgetary and staff 
resources were given to a section that routinely lost money year over year. 
Stephen Petranek joined the Post magazine in 1979 after leading the Sunday 
magazines of the Miami Herald and the Rochester (N.Y.) Democrat for many years. He 
began his career in Rochester as a business reporter and, later, assistant city editor. 
Petranek said such disdain for Sunday magazines was widespread throughout the 
newspaper industry. “It was always seen as a second-class citizen. Sunday supplement! 
Those words defined the lowered expectations,” he said, noting that the Sunday 
Magazine Editors Association was created in 1987 as a professional support group of 
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sorts, allowing Sunday magazine editors to gain editorial inspiration and encouragement 
from like-minded journalists. “The rest of the people in the newspaper rarely took you 
seriously, and even when you deserved to be taken seriously they never gave you the 
credit.” SunMag, as the group was known, ceased operations in the early 2000s due to 
declining membership as newspapers stopped publishing their own weekly magazines. 
The group, supported financially by the Standard Gravure Corp. in Louisville, Ky., which 
printed many newspapers’ Sunday magazines, was unaffiliated with the American 
Association of Sunday and Feature Editors, which was founded in 1947 and is now 
known as the Society for Features Journalism. (The influence of SunMag on the 
professional identity of Sunday magazine editors was discussed in detail in Chapter 2.) 
Syndicated humor columnist David Barry, who got his start in the newspaper 
industry in 1983 with Tropic and whose work appeared in the Post magazine from 1989 
to 2005, has said that most newspaper journalists hold Sunday magazines in low regard 
because they are jealous. Daily section journalists hate their newspapers’ Sunday 
magazines because the publications remind them each week just how dry their own work 
is, Barry said (McQuilken, 1992). Of course, not everyone shares that belief. Critics of 
Sunday magazine have called the publications editorial embarrassments to the 
newspapers that publish them. More often than not, Sunday magazines served as 
repositories for local and light fare, and they were staffed with mediocre journalists who 
no other section editor wanted (Shields, 1986). In addition, newspapers “haven’t done 
enough to make the Sunday magazine a provocative, point-of-view section that stands out 
from the rest of the newspaper,” said James Bellows, a former editor of the New York 
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Herald Tribune, among other publications. “They’re bland and boring” (Machalaba, 
1982, 29).  
Another challenge in magazine editors’ pursuit of acceptance by their newsroom 
colleagues was their inability to produce the type of editorial content that won internal 
plaudits. Post magazine editors defined the paper’s newsroom culture as internally 
competitive for big stories that might earn a spot on A1. They said such stories won the 
attention and excitement of top Post editors—be it Executive Editor Ben Bradlee, his 
successor, Leonard Downie Jr., or any number of managing editors—and that all section 
editors vied to get their staff’s work on the front page. The Post also placed great value 
on the breaking of news, particularly in the areas of politics and policy, given their 
geographic position in Washington, D.C. However, because the magazine was published 
only once a week, and because stories had to be written and produced in advance—the 
entire process could take three weeks to around six months, depending on the story—due 
to production limitations tied to the fact that an outside vendor printed the magazine, the 
magazine very rarely competed on either level. For most of its existence, the magazine 
has printed just two feature stories per issue, with the remainder of the publication filled 
with recurring lifestyle-oriented sections, columns, puzzles and stand-alone photographs.  
Post magazine editors also spoke about their need to be aware and sensitive 
toward other section editors’ “turf”—meaning the story topics those sections typically 
featured—while at the same time not taking the magazine too far afield from the Post’s 
journalistic identity of covering national and political stories. It was a huge challenge 
given that the magazine has always been a general-interest publication. The dual 
challenges would sometimes overlap when a magazine editor wanted to assign out a 
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political feature story. Given that political coverage was the Post’s “bread and butter” 
(Thompson, 2010), it would have been professional suicide to assign a politics feature to 
an outside freelance writer. As Post magazine editor Bob Thompson explained it, the 
paper’s political reporters would feel slighted and journalists throughout the newsroom 
would almost certainly bash the quality of the freelance story. Debra Leithauser (2010), 
who served as editor of the magazine from 2008 to 2010—she was interviewed for this 
study while she held the position—said competition between Post journalists intensified 
throughout much of the 2000s due to the emergence of digital media technologies. As 
print circulation began to decline precipitously in the early 2000s, editors felt greater 
pressure to make their sections stand out from other parts of the Sunday paper in an effort 
to win the increasingly limited attention of readers and to stave off potential budgetary 
cutbacks. “There was a time when Style would not even tell Metro what they were doing, 
or tell the magazine,” said Leithauser (2010), who previously served as editor of the 
Post’s short-lived entertainment, fashion and pop culture section Sunday Source. 
Leithauser also previously worked as an editor of a youth section for the Orlando 
Sentinel, was a deputy editor for the paper’s Sunday magazine, and later went to work for 
the Knight Ridder/Tribune New Service, a syndication company based out of 
Washington, D.C. Internal competition was hardly unique to the Post. In the 1970s, the 
Knight Ridder newspaper company, then the largest newspaper chain in the country by 
circulation, had a saying that “on the back of every reporter are a few footprints; the ones 
with the fewest footprints become the editors” (Pollack, 1978, 28). A perceived 
competitiveness was among the traits editors looked for when making hires.  
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But even prior to the Post’s circulation declines, newsroom turf battles routinely 
erupted. For example, a potential magazine story about a crime spree in the District might 
rankle the editor of the Metro section, interview subjects said. A story about a national 
political figure could upset the newspaper editor who oversaw politics coverage. And a 
story about area culture or a major personality might stir the ire of those in the Style 
section, which was conceived of in the early 1960s as a daily magazine of sorts that 
chronicled the private lives of public figures and offered a variety of lifestyle-oriented 
coverage. In many ways, the weekly magazine and the daily Style section had 
overlapping editorial missions for most of the past 50 years, and those missions were 
further diluted with the addition of new weekly sections geared toward home life, food, 
lifestyle and the arts.  
This wasn’t the case in the early years of Potomac, the name of the Post’s original 
Sunday magazine whose founding editorial mission in 1961 was “local” and “light,” 
according to editors and in-paper promotions (Washington Post, 1961; Herron, 2009). 
The magazine was created as a rotogravure publication that published mostly 
photographs; newspaper advertisements during the time proudly claimed that 75% of 
Potomac content was illustrations, the term used in the early ’60s for photography 
(Washington Post, 1961, A11). Articles tended to focus on the social happening of local 
organizations, like the Boy Scouts or a horseback riding club, as well as area events such 
as fishing derbies and parades. Paul Herron, the founding editor of Potomac, said the 
magazine was created to bolster Sunday circulation through local, feel-good, 
“cheesecake” coverage and to increase advertising revenues. At the time, and for many 
years thereafter, the magazine was the only section—with the exception of the weekly 
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TV Week rotogravure publication—that could publish in four-color. The Post newspaper 
was actually among the last U.S. metropolitan dailies to use color printing on its section 
fronts; it began in 1999. According to then executive editor Len Downie Jr., there was 
significant concern among Post journalists and even some readers that adding color to the 
newspaper would lead to less serious and less substantive journalism (O’Brien, 1997; 
New York Times, 1999). Studies have shown that journalists, starting in the early 1980s, 
believed that readers would perceive newspapers that used spot color and contemporary 
page design as less professional and less accurate. However, these studies proved these 
fears to be unwarranted (Pasternack and Utt, 1986; Smith, 1991). Nonetheless, such a 
concern speaks to a certain mentality that existed within and around the Post: stylistic 
changes aimed at bolstering the economic fortunes of the newspaper were viewed as a 
potential threat to the paper’s identity as a serious journalistic institution. 
In many ways, the magazine began to adopt that seriousness beginning in the late 
1960s and early ’70s. The magazine began to adopt the editorial identity of the 
newspaper as a whole, which, under Bradlee, sought to compete for stories, prestige and 
power with The New York Times and other nationally recognized newspapers, such as the 
Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune. Magazine feature stories became more 
serious and focused on issues and personalities that existed outside of the Washington, 
D.C. beltway, so long as they had some local connection to the region. Editors explained 
this was of their own doing, not by order of anyone at the newspaper; over the years, the 
Sunday magazine editor most often reported to one of the newspaper’s managing editors. 
The magazine’s evolving editorial content reflected their own interests, editors said, as 
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well as a desire to produce content that reflected their perceptions of the great and mighty 
Post.  
Beginning in the early 1970s, the magazine also became a vehicle for long-form 
narrative storytelling; articles often explored what former Post magazine editor Shelby 
Coffey (2010) called the “human condition.” Coffey, who graduated from the University 
of Virginia with a degree in English literature and was named editor of the magazine in 
1972, at the age of 25, said such stories sought to examine the motives and inspirations 
for how people chose to live their lives. In developing stories for the magazine, he said he 
often thought about Plutarch, an early Greek essayist who was more interested in his 
subjects’ personality and character than he was of their roles in history. “Bradlee was also 
a classics guy, as he used to remind us,” Coffey added (2010), noting the “old axiom in 
newsrooms that a reporter writers for three friends and an editor.” Although Coffey 
believed in the editorial value of deeply reported profiles, stories that examined the 
personal lives, emotions and motivations of people who have accomplished great things 
in life—it’s worth noting this was largely also the editorial mission of the new daily Style 
section, created in 1969, causing a blurring of the distinction between the two sections—
he was also a young editor at the time who very much wanted to please the newspaper’s 
top editor.  
By the late 1980s and into the ’90s, internal competition intensified as the daily 
newspaper followed the path of others in the industry that sought to compete with cable 
television by producing more lifestyle-oriented content and feature writing styles, even in 
the main news section, according to former Post magazine editor Steve Coll (2010), who 
later became managing editor of the entire newspaper. The growing similarities between 
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the magazine and other parts of the newspaper only intensified internal competition, 
editors said. To make the magazine more distinctive, editors fully embraced literary 
journalism—narrative nonfiction stories that had a beginning, middle and end, and that 
sometimes included the author as a central character—as well as stories that chronicled a 
subject’s effort to overcome a major life obstacle.   
However, according to Leithauser (2010), internal competition began to wane in 
the late 2000s—because of business factors more than anything else. She cited the 
naming of a new publisher (Katharine Weymouth) and the hiring of a new executive 
editor (Marcus Brauchli), both in 2008, as a main reason. Both people routinely 
trumpeted the values of departmental collaboration; the combining of the Post’s online 
and print operations, in 2009; and a much smaller newsroom staff due to multiple rounds 
of voluntary buyouts that were largely aimed at containing operating costs. Weymouth, in 
particular, has been a vocal advocate for greater collaboration between the editorial and 
advertising departments. However, she received a great amount of criticism in 2009 from 
the Post newsroom as well as external media circles for developing what she called 
advertiser-sponsored “dinner salons.” The salons were to feature high-profile guests from 
politics, business or entertainment, as well as Post journalists, and people would pay 
between $25,000 and $250,000 to have “off-the-record” conversations with them. Critics 
assailed the plan, saying the Post was attempting to charge lobbyists and business leaders 
for access to the paper’s editorial staff. In addition, it would be a conflict of interest for 
the newspaper to pay the various high-profile guests to attend, since the newspaper 
routinely covers those people and their work (Allen and Calderone, 2009). Weymouth 
killed the project before it ever launched, and has been apologizing for the idea ever 
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since. However, the episode does speak to Weymouth’s willingness to challenge some of 
the Post’s organizational values in managing the newspaper’s finances. 
Brauchli was entirely new to the Post, having come from The Wall Street Journal.  
Brauchli quickly hired Raju Narisetti, a former colleague at the Journal, as a managing 
editor and charged him with merging the Post’s print and digital operations newsrooms. 
Media accounts of Brauchli’s hire suggested that Weymouth purposely hired someone 
from outside of the Post—Downie was a longtime reporter and editor at the newspaper 
when he succeeded Bradlee—because she believed the newspaper required a fresh 
perspective. Like most metropolitan dailies, the Post was suffering large advertising 
revenue shortfalls and circulation declines, which prompted budget cuts and newsroom 
staff reductions (Perez-Pena, 2008). However, in late 2012, Brauchli left the job for 
unspecified reasons and was replaced by Boston Globe executive editor Marty Baron 
(Farhi, 2012). Conjecture regarding Baron’s future at the Post, and the challenges and 
opportunities that lie ahead for him, will be provided in the next chapter.  
With fewer newsroom resources in general, Leithauser explained, section editors 
were forced to collaborate more often with colleagues in other sections or editorial 
departments to achieve their journalistic goals.  
   
Hiring from Within 
Within the framework of internal newsroom culture and competition, it is 
noteworthy that almost all Post magazine editors were hired from within the newspaper. 
Of the 15 top magazine editors who have held the position over the past 50 years, only 
three—Walter Pincus, Robert Wool and Jay Lovinger—came directly from other 
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publications, and only Lovinger came from a magazine, People. All other Sunday 
magazine editors were already employees at the Post newspaper, as an editor or reporter 
in the Style section, the Metro section, a weekly lifestyle section, the foreign desk or as 
an assistant editor of the magazine. Petranek became the top editor of the magazine 
without ever previously working in a different editorial department at the Post, but he 
spent two years as a deputy editor of the magazine under Laura Longley before winning 
the promotion after she went on maternity leave and then left the paper altogether to 
become communications director of the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in 
Washington, D.C. Petranek was later demoted when the Post hired Lovinger to lead the 
revamped magazine. Because the Post was spending tens of millions of dollars on a 
redesign and relaunch that attempted to bolster the editorial prestige and aesthetics of the 
magazine—in large part to win the business of high-end national advertisers—the 
company wanted an editor with national consumer magazine experience. 
To better understand how the newsroom culture of the Post informed and 
influenced the Sunday magazine, it’s useful to examine the tenures of the three outsiders.  
In 1966, then-managing editor Ben Bradlee was just one year into his job and 
sought to move the paper into a more journalistically serious and distinctive direction. 
One of his first efforts was to change the editorial direction of Potomac by bringing in 
someone with a hard-news background. Pincus was a political reporter for The 
Washington Star and a longtime friend of Bradlee’s. The morning Post and afternoon 
Star were ferocious competitors, but they had an informal agreement not to poach each 
other’s news reporters. As an end-around to that agreement, Bradlee hired Pincus to join 
the Post as an editor, rather than a reporter, to lead Potomac. Herron, a former Post real 
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estate editor who helped launch and run Potomac over the previous four-plus years, was 
immediately removed his job and made an assistant financial editor for the daily paper. 
But although Pincus came to the Post with some previous magazine experience, 
his tenure as head of the Sunday magazine was short lived in large part because he 
repeatedly butted heads with other section editors—most notably Metro editor Ben 
Gilbert—over competition for potential stories. Pincus came to the job not knowing many 
Post editors or reporters, and said for this research that he was unconcerned about 
potential turf battles when it came to stories. It simply wasn’t something he thought 
about, Pincus said (2010).  
Under Herron, Potomac was a feel-good Sunday magazine. The rotogravure 
publication was “local and low key. No controversy. Keep the thing short. Use the color,” 
said Herron, recalling his marching orders from Post executive editor James Russell 
Wiggins. But although Pincus had no problem running ample lifestyle content—he added 
restaurant reviews, written by the Post’s Nick Van Hoffman, and a section on local 
fashion—he also refused to shy away from stories he deemed “journalistically 
substantive.” Under Pincus, Potomac published a story about a local teen’s experience 
having an abortion, and local Vietnam veterans who were injured in the war. Pincus ran 
profiles of largely anonymous local government officials who held substantial power 
behind the scenes, and a feature about the popularity of Junior ROTC programs among 
local African-American high school students (at a time when race riots were a major 
issue throughout the country, including in the nation’s capital). Pincus said Bradlee 
largely left him alone to put out the magazine each week—both men were fond of Clay 
Felker’s New York magazine, a consumer title that routinely published hard-hitting news 
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features wrapped within ample pages of style and society news—but editors of other Post 
sections often bristled over the fact that Pincus was covering stories that previously only 
ran in their sections, he said.  
In less than two years, fed up with the internal politics and competition for stories, 
particularly among editors in Metro and Style, Pincus told Bradlee to move him into a 
reporting position in the main paper. According to Pincus, the final straw came while he 
was pursuing a big feature story on Walter Washington, a lawyer and local official who 
many thought could become D.C.’s first black mayor. Pincus had learned that 
Washington, unbeknownst to many, was working as an attorney in New York City in 
addition to his paid local governmental responsibilities in the District. Gilbert, the Metro 
editor, found out about the potential story and went on a mini-rampage because he was a 
fan of Washington’s and also because he felt the story belonged in Metro, Pincus said. At 
Bradlee’s request, Pincus reluctantly agreed to let Metro pursue the story.  
In the years immediately following Pincus’s tenure with the magazine, 
Potomac—first under Joe Anderson and then Stephen Isaacs—moved back toward 
“softer” feature stories, including ample sports pieces. In 1969, the magazine even 
published its own football trading cards featuring Washington Redskins players. 
Anderson and Isaacs had worked as reporters and section editors prior to their move to 
the magazine, and in both cases it appears as if they were merely filling in until a more 
permanent solution could be found. After short stints as editor, both men returned to work 
in hard news sections.  
 In 1971, Bradlee hired a freelance magazine writer to wholly revamp Potomac 
and turn it into something that could compete journalistically with the likes of The New 
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York Times Magazine, Esquire and The Atlantic Weekly. A New York City writer who 
freelanced for such top magazines, Robert Wool was hired by Bradlee to create a new 
publication for the Post with a national editorial identity.  
Wool: Ben said he liked that I had a magazine background rather than a 
newspaper background. There’s a difference….A magazine is much more about 
the writing, whereas newspapers are focused largely on simply conveying the 
facts of an event. It’s entirely different. It’s like comparing apples and pears 
(2012). 
The thinking, Wool explained, was that the sheer excellence of the magazine’s 
journalism would earn the Post the advertising business of national companies and also 
add to the overall prestige of the newspaper. Wool noted that he had no idea if Potomac 
was ever profitable, and he didn’t much care. Plans called for the magazine to receive a 
new name (The Washington Post Magazine), higher-grade paper, and additional editorial 
resources and advertising sales representatives. Wool spent nearly a year conceptualizing, 
budgeting and talking to various internal constituencies, such as advertising 
representatives and other Post section editors. Wool brought in a consultant who 
projected that the effort would cost about $3 million over three years. But the concept 
was killed before it ever came to life. According to Wool, Publisher Katharine Graham 
ultimately declined to spend the money necessary for the revamp/relaunch. In 1971, the 
Post was consumed by controversy and its publication of the Pentagon Papers, a 
classified report first leaked to The New York Times and then to the Post that chronicled 
the history of deception by the U.S. government in justifying to the nation its role in the 
Vietnam War. The Nixon administration filed a court injunction to force the papers not to 
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publish the report, yet the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately sided with the public’s right to 
know. However, the legal battles took a heavy financial toll on the Post. According to 
Wool, Graham wasn’t in the mood to risk millions of dollars on a new magazine. 
Although Wool made some editorial changes to Potomac in the year that he led 
the publication, including running the occasional book excerpt—something he said was a 
first for the Sunday magazine, although it actually devoted an entire issue in 1968 to a 
chapter from the book Ten Blocks From the White House, which chronicled the race riots 
in D.C. that year—he said he didn’t want to be editor of a magazine that lacked top-notch 
editorial resources. With the promise of a new and potentially prestigious magazine gone, 
Wool opted to leave the Post and return to New York City, where he became political 
editor for The New York Times Magazine.  
Lovinger was the last Post Sunday magazine editor hired to the position from 
outside of the company. In 1985, under Bradlee and Publisher Donald Graham, he was 
tasked with overseeing the multimillion redesign and relaunch of the publication, whose 
title was changed to The Washington Post Magazine in 1977. Formerly an editor at 
People magazine, which premiered in 1974 with a focus on “people, not issues” (Time, 
1974) and quickly became an editorial template for countless other consumer magazines, 
Lovinger (2010) said the Post hired him to bring a “magazine sensibility” to its Sunday 
title.  
Lovinger: I think they finally concluded after all this time that you couldn’t make 
a successful magazine with newspaper people or people with newspaper 
consciousness, which is what they’d always tried to do before that. And so they 
were looking to go outside for somebody who had a magazine consciousness…. 
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A newspaper is about information, whereas a magazine, to me, is really 
about the same things that a good movie is about: a good story, something that 
has a dramatic arc to it, good characters. The truths are not able to be summed 
up in, like, three sentences….They might have information in it, but it’s something 
that creates a life, a world, like a good novel or a good movie.” 
But Lovinger’s time at the Post came to a somewhat abrupt end. His challenges 
began as early as the first issue, on Sept. 7, 1986, which prompted months of protests 
over perceptions of racial insensitivity in Post news coverage. As discussed in great detail 
in Chapter 5, which examined the history of The Washington Post and its Sunday 
magazine, the inaugural issue of the new magazine featured a cover story about a black 
New York City rapper accused of murder. In addition, a columnist for the magazine 
wrote a piece that largely defended the rights of D.C.-area store owners to discourage 
young black men from visiting their stores because young black men were 
disproportionately responsible for crime. Taken together, the two pieces—Post columnist 
William Raspberry called it “a disconcerting combination of bad luck, bad judgment and 
racial insensitivity” (1986, A15)—set off a firestorm of reader anger over the negative 
depiction of African-Americans in the pages of the city’s top daily newspaper. It brought 
embarrassment to journalists throughout the Post newsroom and unwanted negative 
attention to the many businesses that had advertised in the paper’s new Sunday magazine, 
often for the first time. The protests ended after three long months, but the damage to the 
magazine’s advertising potential was long-lasting, said Post magazine editors and 
publishers. One of the primary purposes behind the multi-million dollar redesign and 
relaunch was to win the advertising business of high-end, luxury brands that hadn’t 
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previously done business with the newspaper. And yet, the magazine immediately 
became a tainted brand that many businesses didn’t want to be associated with.  
Lovinger’s greatest failing as editor of the magazine, however, was that he lacked 
diplomatic skill, said subsequent Sunday magazine editors who worked at the Post during 
his tenure, as well as at least one magazine staff writer who worked for Lovinger 
(Nelson, 1993). He failed to build meaningful relationships with other section editors and 
even among his own staff. Carving out an editorial niche unique from the Style section 
was particularly difficult, he and others said, given that the magazine and Style largely 
had overlapping missions. The only real differences were the magazine’s ability to print 
color photography and its willingness to publish much longer features. Moreover, 
Lovinger was considered something of a journalistic provocateur, meaning he sought 
stories that would shock readers—and sometimes his newsroom colleagues—to keep 
them wondering what the magazine might publish next. There seemed to be no definable 
editorial identity to the publication, which ran a 13,000-word narrative about a reporter’s 
search for Marlon Brando (Sager, 1987) one week, to a serial fiction story (yet 
unidentified as fiction) about the return of the Washington Senators baseball team the 
next (Kornheiser, 1987). The Post newspaper had to write a story after the fact that 
explained the Senators feature was satirical (Howe, 1987). In fairness to Lovinger, the 
feature was clearly a gag. A starting outfielder was named “John Doe,” the shortstop was 
a former singer in the band Menudo, and a tagline appeared at the end of the 10-page 
feature that noted that news of the Senators would not be reported in the Post’s sports 
section because “the team is likely to be inept, and subscribers do not need to be 
reminded of yet another failing Washington administration, not to mention the trauma 
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such coverage could cause the players themselves” (Kornheiser, 1987, 30). Lovinger 
continued running the series about the Senators’ faux season. 
Lovinger said the element of surprise was the editorial identity of his magazine. 
Unfortunately, he explained, the Post newsroom was filled with people who only valued 
political or serious national news. Many at the Post appreciated good storytelling, but 
only through the traditional journalistic values of objectivity, fairness and social 
responsibility, he said.  
Lovinger: [The magazine] was basically an outsider publication. Part of the 
problem is it just didn’t really fit….By the process of natural selection, you’re 
going to hire people that fit into what the culture is predominantly about and what 
you’re trying to consciously achieve. [As the magazine editor], you’re always 
kind of running uphill and they’re always trying to get you to conform. 
As Ben (Bradlee) once said to me, if you want to fight the institution it’s 
going to keep leaning on you and leaning on you and leaning on you, and 
eventually it’s going to crush you into dust….The Post had a self identity that 
everybody [there] bought into. It was understood that you were the kings of the 
world and you were driving this very great publication, which also at the same 
time happened to make a lot of money.  
Following the “Lovinger experiment,” as Post magazine editor Glenn Frankel 
called it (2010), the company has only hired internal candidates for the magazine editor 
position. It’s not clear whether this became a conscious decision following Lovinger’s 
departure in 1988, or whether the Post simply opted to look inward to its talented 
newsroom staff. Either way, every Sunday magazine editor who came after Lovinger 
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spoke of the value and necessity of building relationships throughout the newsroom, 
often to maximize editorial resources—such as borrowing a reporter from a daily section 
to write a magazine story—but also to win internal support given that newspapers 
throughout the country were shuttering their own locally produced Sunday magazines 
due to financial reasons. If the Post magazine couldn’t turn a profit, as it rarely has over 
the past 25 years, it needed to be viewed as journalistically relevant by many of the high-
profile daily section reporters and editors throughout the newsroom, the magazine editors 
claimed.  
A number of magazine editors said they were successful in building such support, 
largely through the improved quality of journalism the magazine published. Magazine 
articles were increasingly winning regional and national journalism awards, and many of 
the newspaper’s high-profile reporters from the national desk and foreign bureaus were 
writing lengthy narratives. In addition, internal support for the magazine occurred when 
magazine editors were promoted to higher-profile jobs in the newsroom. Coffey, who 
was editor of the magazine in the early 1970s, went on to a succession of bigger 
positions, including editor of Style, features and national. Longley and Petranek both 
acknowledged Coffey’s support for their work and his willingness to coax other section 
editors to share reporting resources with the magazine. Frankel and Tom Shroder 
similarly enjoyed significant support from Coll, a former Post magazine editor who left 
that position to become managing editor of the entire newspaper.  
Coll (2010) said he worked to build support for the magazine during his tenure as 
its editor by making assignments something of a prized opportunity for daily section 
writers. Coll could hold out the assignment as an escape from the day-to-day grind of 
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news reporting, for reporters to take months to produce a deeply reported, beautifully 
written 10,000- to 15,000-word narrative that would be painstakingly edited and finely 
packaged in a unique section. He said he sought to create a publication that his newspaper 
colleagues would be proud of. To Coll, the magazine should be a showcase of the many 
great journalists employed by The Washington Post. It should be a product of the 
newsroom, not distinct from it. To that end, Bob Woodward was tapped to write the cover 
story for Coll’s first issue, on Sept. 24, 1995, a 10,000-word feature about why Colin 
Powell was a reluctant contender for the U.S. presidency (Woodward, 1995).  
Coll: I, as a creature of the big machine (the Post newsroom) and a believer of 
the big machine, wanted the magazine to proudly express the best of The 
Washington Post in magazine form.  
Thompson, who immediately preceded Coll as editor of the magazine, Frankel 
and Shroder similarly said that they worked to make the Sunday magazine more 
reflective of The Washington Post newspaper and the type of journalism that they 
believed it represented: deeply reported and well-written stories of social, cultural and 
political value. All four men talked about the importance of having good relationships 
with section editors and reporters throughout the newsroom to mitigate internal 
competition over stories, to borrow staff writers for magazine assignments, and to build 
support for a section that wasn’t always viewed favorably among rank-and-file writers 
and editors. According to Thompson (2010), who was hired as an assistant editor for the 
Post’s Style section in 1985 after previously serving as editor of the San Jose Mercury 
News’ Sunday magazine, such efforts were largely a reaction to Lovinger’s time as editor 
because he rarely used writers from the daily newspaper, even though many were topical 
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experts on a subject the magazine was covering, and he often assigned stories that were 
more entertaining than informative.  
Thompson: Editorially, Jay set it up as something that would be better and 
different [than the newspaper], and he pissed off a lot of people by doing that. 
The Washington Post is The Washington Post; it’s a serious organization and 
there’s a lot of talented people there. 
An analysis of interviews with Post magazine editors showed that editorial 
decision-making was often rooted in a desire to win the general approval of newsroom 
colleagues. Although most spoke about the need for the magazine to offer something 
distinct from the Sunday newspaper, with long-form narrative journalism often serving as 
that something, many also spoke of their desire to impress reporters and editors who 
worked in other sections of the paper. This finding is consistent with the extensive 
literature on professionalism in the newspaper industry, as detailed in Chapter 3, whereby 
journalists often produce content to win the approval and respect of colleagues, as well as 
to maintain the newsroom’s perceived norms and practices. Although all interview 
subjects said that the Sunday magazine was a unique print product, editorially distinct 
from the vast majority of the rest of the newspaper, most editors consistently noted a 
desire to publish stories that reflected the interests and editorial sensibilities of newsroom 
colleagues, as well as personal interests such as international issues, food safety and 
district area politics, for example. This desire was generally rooted in wanting the 
magazine to be viewed positively by various top-level editors, respected reporters, and 
former colleagues in other sections/editorial departments. 
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Herron: We put in the magazine what appealed to us, what appealed to the 
editor, what appealed to the managing editor, who reviewed it. He liked this kind 
of story…that’s what we’ll do now. 
 
Coffey: There was no doubt that in the back of your mind, or in the back of my 
mind, at least, I would think, ‘Is this going to be something that Katharine 
Graham, Ben Bradlee, [managing editor] Howard Simons, peers within the 
newsroom, people I care about outside, people I hear from will think is a strong 
piece or that this intrigued [them]?’  
 
Thompson: My job was to make a product that people in the paper were proud 
of. In addition to that, something the readers liked…. 
I would say I had two problems when I took over the magazine. One, it 
was losing a ton of money. And two, the newsroom hated it….I had to change 
that. 
 
Coll: On the journalistic side, I wanted to do work that was memorable, that I 
and my colleagues would recognize as powerful.  
  
Frankel: I was prepared, and did several times, [to do] stories that had 
journalistic impact that I felt had strong journalistic value and social value that 
wasn’t going to get a ton of eyeballs. No question. I was quite willing to do that. I 
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had the luxury of doing that…we’re talking The Washington Post Magazine and 
everything that term connotes! 
This supports Tuchman’s (1978) findings, that news production is often socially 
constructed by journalists, who operate through work routines and a web of relationships 
that include human sources, other reporters, editors and even friends and family 
members. Internal standards and professional practices most often guide journalists in 
determining news criteria, and success in doing so is measured internally, within the 
newsroom, rather than externally, among readers (Gieber, 1964; Broder, 1987). As 
former New York Times reporter Robert Darnton wrote, “We knew that no one would 
jump on our stories as quickly as our colleagues; for reporters make the most voracious 
readers, and they have to win their status anew each day as they expose themselves 
before their peers in print” (1975, 176).  
Speaking generally about the Post magazine through the years, Pincus said it has 
largely served as a “hobby horse” for whoever was in charge of it. He blamed the culture 
of the Post newsroom, particularly during the ’80s, ’90s and early 2000s, when section 
editors had tremendous autonomy over their own content and reporters were routinely 
allowed to write longer and longer stories. Journalistic purpose was seemingly measured 
internally by column inches, Pincus said (2010). And with little direct local competition 
from other publications, the journalistic purpose of much of the Post during this period 
was increasingly geared toward national and international news coverage. Former 
Publisher Donald Graham (2010) shared Pincus’s assessment.  
Graham: I would argue that The Washington Post newspaper as a whole became 
successful very suddenly. And as it did, we lost some of our sense that our 
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paramount was to write for readers. That was in the water when I joined the 
place…. Inevitably, at almost every big paper in the country, as competition 
diminished we started writing more [about] what writers wanted and less what 
readers wanted. The magazine, to me, almost perfectly exemplified that history. 
 
Evolving Attitudes about Business Values 
The second major theme that emerged through an analysis of interviews was 
editors’ general discomfort with even the idea of needing to consider business-side 
interests when formulating editorial concepts and features for the Sunday magazine. Most 
editors spoke fondly of the “good old days” of the newspaper industry, when top editors 
encouraged reporters and section editors to ignore internal and external commercial 
interests so as to protect the paper’s editorial integrity. In fact, journalists have been 
trained for the better part of a century to largely ignore the business side of publishing. 
Generating revenue, they’ve been told in college classrooms and professional 
newsrooms, is the job of advertising sales representatives. To assign a story based on an 
advertiser’s request for that story would violate professional journalistic standards of 
practice, Post magazine editors explained. But even if an advertiser doesn’t explicitly 
request a particular story, there is a danger in the mere possibility that some readers might 
believe certain editorial content exists to win advertising, editors explained. In such 
cases, the newspaper would lose its credibility as an independent news provider and truth 
teller, multiple editors said.  
Of those who oversaw the magazine over the past 50 years, recent editors were 
more likely to say they viewed the Sunday magazine as a commercial venture and liked 
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that their jobs required them to work closely with Post advertising representatives and 
other business-side executives. Frankel (2010), in particular, noted that he took the 
magazine editor position because he wanted to learn more about the business of 
publishing, although he was quick to say that meetings with the magazine’s publisher and 
advertising sales reps were often uncomfortable because both sides saw their interests as 
more important than the other’s. Leslie Steiner (2010), who served as publisher of the 
magazine during Frankel’s time there, agreed about a disconnect of purpose between the 
editorial and business sides. She recalled one instance when a company wanted to pay a 
lot of money to run a gatefold advertisement on the cover; the ad is attached to the cover 
and folds inward, into the magazine. But Frankel refused, saying it would ruin the artistic 
value of the cover he had been planning. Steiner said it was the low point of her time as 
publisher because the argument brought her to tears. Steiner felt that Frankel had 
previously agreed to the concept, and she was furious that he was willing to turn down 
much needed adverting revenue for what she perceived to be artistic reasons. The 
magazine was distributed through the Sunday newspaper, not on a newsstand where it has 
to compete against numerous other magazines to win the attention of potential readers.  
Starting in the mid-1980s, the Post’s top magazine editor typically spent a 
considerable amount of time communicating and working with advertising and business-
side executives at the company. Unlike every other section of the newspaper, the 
magazine had its own general manager or publisher—who was required to maintain a 
profit-and-loss statement, and routinely shared results with the magazine’s top editor—in 
large part because the magazine was printed by an outside vendor, on either a rotogravure 
or offset press, rather than through the Post’s newspaper presses. Since the late 1970s, the 
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magazine has been printed on paper of a higher grade than newsprint, enabling better 
color reproduction, and bound with a staple. All editors decried the fact that the 
magazine’s finances received extra scrutiny from top Post executives, saying the P&L 
system was deeply flawed. For example, the magazine didn’t receive any credit for 
Sunday circulation gains, while expenses never included the salaries of daily reporters 
from other sections who contributed feature articles to the magazine.   
Coll: It was really just a way to punish the magazine by clarifying how much, on 
paper, the department was losing. At certain points I started going around to 
other departments and drawing up mock profit and losses. Do you realize that the 
sports department loses $25 million a year? You think the tire ads pay for all that 
road game travel? (He laughs) Nobody ever paid any attention to me. 
Graham acknowledged that the system wasn’t perfect—it is still used today—but 
said the P&L statements did provide a “yardstick” to determine the magazine’s overall 
financial health. “It should have been what told us, if we didn’t have such a stubborn 
publisher at the time…that this wasn’t working,” he said of his time as publisher. In a 15-
year period, from 1987 to 2001, the Post magazine lost more than $44.3 million, or 
nearly $3 million per year (Post internal document, 2005). Why the Post maintained its 
Sunday magazine despite so many years of financial losses will be explained later in this 
chapter. 
When speaking about the magazine’s finances, editors routinely focused on its 
readership value, as opposed to advertising revenue, essentially contending that the 
publication was a valuable component of the Post’s Sunday circulation strategy. This was 
likely because the magazine didn’t often earn much advertising revenue, particularly over 
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the past 25 to 30 years, and editors preferred to view the publication primarily as a 
journalistic product, rather than a commercial one. The fundamental purpose of the 
magazine, many editors explained, was to give readers another reason to buy the Sunday 
newspaper and to engage readers through quality editorial content. 
Various Post magazine editors contended that internal readership studies showed 
the magazine was popular among readers, although the company was never been able to 
quantify the actual monetary value of that popularity in terms of circulation value, they 
and business-side executives explained. Nonetheless, the circulation-enhancing rationale 
was tacitly endorsed at the highest levels of the newspaper, as the magazine was allowed 
to lose millions of dollars a year. The Post was able to do this because it made so much 
money through other parts of the newspaper, namely local classifieds and local retail 
advertising. In 2004, the Post earned 32.9% of all locally placed advertising in its direct 
market area (Internal document, 2005).  
Like all major metropolitan newspapers, the Post’s Sunday circulation greatly 
exceeded daily circulation and the company has long charged higher advertising rates for 
that day. Within months of its merger with the Times-Herald, in 1954, the combined Post 
newspaper had circulations of 381,417 daily and 393,680 Sunday, ranking it as the ninth-
largest morning newspaper in the country. Circulation growth continued through the 
years, but it increased substantially when the Washington Star went out of business in 
1981, to about 730,000 daily and 952,000 Sunday. By 1995, circulation had reached 
834,641 daily and 1.14 million Sunday. However, the Post’s circulation has been in 
something of a freefall since the advent of the Internet in the late ’90s and early 2000s. 
Between March 2011 and March 2012 alone, the paper lost 15%, or about 133,000 
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copies, of its highly lucrative Sunday circulation. Sunday circulation in March 2012 was 
719,301 (Funding Universe, 1996). 
Early editors of the magazine said they knew little about the overall finances of 
the magazine, and they liked it that way. Later editors, particularly following the ’86 
relaunch, were at least mindful of their publication’s bottom line. This awareness led 
some editors to take a more proactive role in coming up with advertising revenue-
generating strategies for the magazine. However, all editors made a point to explain that 
they measured any potential revenue ideas against the potential journalistic value to 
readers. Journalism had to trump advertising revenue, they said, even during years when 
the magazine was losing millions of dollars.  
In one instance, Frankel and Coll, then managing editor of the newspaper, 
orchestrated moving an education review from the weekly Book World section to the 
magazine. Editors of Book World, which didn’t operate with a profit-and-loss statement 
like the magazine did because it was printed internally, disliked having to produce the 
reviews. Calling it a great “pander,” Frankel said he wanted to take over the reviews 
primarily because he knew they were popular with advertisers and would add to his 
section’s bottom line. But he said he also saw the journalistic value in education stories 
and that the subject was under-covered in other sections of the Post. “I felt that education 
was truly a crossroads subject that our readers really cared about. It involved money, 
politics, all kinds of issues that I cared about,” Frankel said, noting that the first education 
review he published in the magazine was about 60 pages, nearly twice the size of the 
normal magazine, and loaded with advertising.  
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Subsequent editors of the magazine—Shroder, Leithauser and Medford—were 
similarly mindful of and active in their publication’s financial wellbeing, although it 
should be noted that Shroder accepted an early-retirement package in 2008 in large part 
because he felt the Post wanted to over-commercialize the magazine. “I knew that they 
were going to make change, that they were going in a direction [with the magazine] that I 
didn’t agree with, and I felt that I no longer believed that the future was going to be 
brighter than the past,” he said. “Originally, they were saying they didn’t want any more 
‘downer stories,’ which really meant any more real serious journalism in the 
magazine….I think that they wanted it to be more sort of a city magazine…and that just 
bored me.”  
Top editors and executives at the Post were, in fact, planning to revamp the 
magazine. In 2007, managing editor Phil Bennett tapped a Style section editor to secretly 
analyze the locally produced Sunday magazine space and to make recommendations for 
how the Post could best revamp its publication. Although it’s unclear whether the report 
played a role in any future editorial and business strategy shifts with the magazine—
Bennett left the Post in early 2009—it did suggest that the magazine focus primarily on 
women, editorially and through the advertising it carried, because the newspaper overall 
had been seeing declines in readership among females ages 24-40. It also called for 
bolstering lifestyle, service and consumer-oriented content. “Most newspapers’ biggest 
mistake with regard to topics such as fashion, home décor, shopping, beauty, etc., is to 
present them as if apologizing for focusing on them. Newspapers send this message by 
not reporting out the issues thoroughly, with writing that wastes time explaining why you 
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might care about such a ‘trivial’ area and by not adding truly useful (yet fun to read), 
detailed service and product evaluations” (Post internal document, 2007).  
 To be sure, journalists throughout the country in recent years have been made 
acutely aware of the financial challenges plaguing the newspaper industry. Like all daily 
newspapers, the Post has lost significant print advertising revenue over the past 10 years 
due largely to external competition from the Internet, mostly in the areas of recruitment 
and automotive classified advertising as well as retail advertising. And like many 
newspapers, the Post has sought to change its organizational culture, albeit slowly. In 
recent years, industry insiders have argued that newspapers can no longer afford to allow 
their journalists to ignore the business side of publishing; reporters and editors needed to 
become more flexible in their attitudes about editorial independence (Rainey, 2009; 
Niles, 2011). One such example of this came from Medford (2011), who has served as 
the Post magazine’s editor since 2011. She said she had wanted to eliminate the 
publication’s front-of-the-book “Trend Report” department because she felt it provided 
little editorial value. The section is a one- or two-page photographic showcase of various 
products grouped around a specific theme, such as going to the beach or gearing up for 
outdoor adventure. However, Medford said the business side of the magazine operation 
“vetoed” her editorial desire because “Trend Report” helped create a commercial 
atmosphere in the magazine that advertisers valued. In another instance, Medford’s 
editorial team was planning to run a 25th anniversary issue in late 2011; to some at the 
Post, the magazine was born with the relaunch in 1986. Medford and her deputies wanted 
to use a guest editor, someone famous, to lead the content creation for that issue as a 
promotional gimmick of sorts. But again, the advertising department successfully pushed 
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back, saying it would be too difficult to sell advertising connected to an unknown 
editorial commodity. Instead, the magazine ran an anniversary issue that highlighted 
some major stories in Washington history from the previous 25 years, as well as some 
noteworthy stories from Post magazines past. Medford said she pushed for her editorial 
vision in both instances, but ultimately conceded each point because the new internal 
culture at the Post is more supportive of business-side concerns than editorial ones when 
it comes to feature sections and non-sensitive topics.  
Medford: The whole newsroom is very cost conscious now. When [Publisher] 
Katharine Weymouth has a senior editors meeting or an extended staff meeting, 
she has basically said you have to be. Historically, newsrooms have never paid 
the least bit of attention to the business side and that was a value, actually. 
Katharine has said you need to be business savvy, you need to pay attention to the 
business because it’s a battle of survival. 
 The line that actually separates editorial content from advertising in the Post’s 
Sunday magazine has long been thin, if not opaque. Herron, the founding editor, said he 
chose to keep his distance from the business side of the newspaper because he worried 
that readers might perceive a blurring of the editorial-advertising line; he greatly valued 
editorial independence and the maintenance of professional journalistic standards. And 
yet, Herron would assign stories about how to host a successful dinner party, for 
example, knowing full well that area stores were advertising flatware, linen and furniture 
in the magazine. He justified this by explaining that readers aren’t as doctrinal as 
journalists are in the need for separation between editorial content and advertising, 
seemingly contradicting his own rationale for maintaining such boundaries.  
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Herron: I don’t think [the typical reader] is that observant….It would not occur 
to a normal reader if we ran a story about how to set your table for a dinner and 
there’s an ad for linens or something….He sees that it is there, but he does not 
believe that there is a connection. He doesn’t say, “Oh boy, these guys run a little 
ad and they give him a little story.” He’s not as suspicious, he’s not as 
investigative as you would be or as I would be. 
 Other editors explained that the magazine’s general manager, publisher or 
advertising sales rep routinely requested stories about certain general topics—golf or 
NASCAR, for example—because they believed that they could sell topic-specific 
advertisements around the story. However, these editors said they typically rejected such 
requests for one of two reasons: such stories lacked journalistic basis, or the advertising 
representatives had a history of not following through on their end of the deal. In one 
instance, Frankel said the magazine’s general manager suggested a cover story about 
NASCAR. Frankel thought the sport’s growing popularity made it journalistically 
worthwhile, particularly since the magazine had never written about it. The editorial team 
came up with a specific story, assigned the article, and set it to run on a specific date. 
However, the advertising staff failed to sell a single new ad. In telling this story, and with 
the assistance of hindsight, Frankel acknowledged that the article was probably a poor fit 
for a Post readership that was largely urban, professional and—among those in the 
suburbs—affluent. In addition, readership surveys showed that the magazine had a heavy 
female readership. It was an example of a national story that wasn’t the right fit for a 
local audience, including advertisers.  
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Medford, the current editor, told a similar anecdote about a 2011 request by a Post 
advertising representative for a golf story because the U.S. Open was being held at the 
Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, Md., in June of that year. Medford found and 
assigned a golf story that she deemed journalistically worthwhile, but the Post’s 
advertising department didn’t sell a single new ad in that issue. Shroder said newspaper 
ad reps made it difficult for editors to work with them because reps routinely 
overpromised and under-delivered. This was his experience as editor of the Miami 
Herald’s Sunday magazine, Tropic, and the Post magazine. Shroder said Tropic was 
“extremely popular” with readers, but the Herald’s advertising department often 
struggled to sell space in it.  
Shroder: Advertisers wanted eyeballs. The magazine was attracting plenty of 
eyeballs, and so we were always sort of wondering, “What’s wrong with this 
picture?” And also it made me skeptical. “Well, if you did fashion content, we’d 
sell fashion ads,” they would say. We DID try to do fashion, but they never 
delivered. There was a long history of them not being able to deliver, and so it 
just sort of made you not want to go out of your way to do anything [editorially 
for commercial reasons] because it wasn’t going to sell anyway. 
 
Special Sections 
Throughout the history of the Post’s Sunday magazine, the greatest tension 
between editors and their business-side counterparts revolved around the creation and 
production of special themed editions of the magazine. Starting with Potomac in ’61, 
special editions were used to build excitement among specific categories of local 
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businesses that sought to better target potential customers. Even though newspapers have 
long touted their ability to help local businesses target readers on a geographic basis, they 
have created a variety of topic-specific sections over the years in part to appeal to specific 
demographic groups that advertisers want to reach. For the Post magazine, such special 
issues have included Bridal, Dining, Education, Fashion, Home and Design, and Travel.  
 All editors interviewed for this study acknowledged that the primary purpose of 
these sections were to bolster advertising sales, and that the sections actually generated 
the lion’s share of the magazine’s annual ad revenues. But the editors also deeply disliked 
most special sections because they felt they were being forced to produce content they 
wouldn’t otherwise have produced. All editors said they had total discretion over story 
selection, although some editors noted that business-side colleagues and/or top Post 
editors have explained that special section feature stories shouldn’t detract from the 
positive commercial marketplace that the sections aimed to create. Longley learned this 
lesson early in her time as editor of the magazine, after she ran a cover story about 
Nicaraguan rebels in an issue that also contained a special section devoted to area art and 
culture; the section was bound within a typical issue of the magazine. Advertisers who 
bought into the section were furious, calling sales reps, top editors and even Publisher 
Donald Graham to complain that the story created a negative environment in an issue that 
was promoted to them as something of a celebration of the arts, she said (2012). Longley 
said she quickly learned that special sections should contain mostly positive editorial 
content, and cover art needed to reflect that content. A negative restaurant review in a 
dining guide special section was OK, she noted, because reviews are opinions and 
editorial opinions cannot be purchased. However, an editor probably should not run a 
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feature story about health violations at area restaurants in a guide that aims to win the 
advertising business of local eateries, she explained. Such a story has a place in Metro or 
other sections, maybe even the magazine during a typical week, Longley explained, but 
not in a special section that exists primarily to win food-related advertising. To avoid 
such problems in the future, thematic special sections were no longer bound within the 
general-interest magazine. Instead, they became the entire issue of the magazine for that 
week.  
By now, more than 20 issues per year of the Post’s magazine have been special 
sections, with topics ranging from Home & Design, to Travel, to Health, to Dining. An 
analysis of interviews with Post magazine editors shows a clear and gradual shift in 
attitudes about the role and value of special sections, with recent editors viewing them 
more favorably. According to the editors, the total number of special sections has 
increased through the years:  
Herron: There was only one person in the Post advertising department who dealt 
with us and the ads in the magazine….and we wouldn’t have listened to him if he 
had [asked for more special sections]. If he’d had said [they] want more 
automotive issues, we’d say, “Go to hell. We don’t want to do more automotive 
issues, or furniture issues or…” 
 
Coffey: Newspapers are business, but journalism isn’t. 
 
Petranek: The guys in the business side of the Sunday newspaper magazine 
always want a thing to sell; they want 52 special issues to sell a year. What you 
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do is you give them eight. You give them two dining guides a year, four fashion 
and two something else’s. But to me, they were aberrations from what the 
magazine did. 
Interviewer: Why keep it at eight? What was the rational for that? 
 
Petranek: It was the smallest number I could get. If I could have done it at four, 
or one, I would have. 
 
Lovinger: I guess they sold them when they could. You know, whatever made 
sense when the advertiser would want them. This was stuff that was still a bit of a 
leftover from rotogravure magazines, but it was lucrative so….I really had 
nothing to do with [Post] business people. 
 
Thompson: I don’t think I really wanted to know what the advertisers wanted out 
of the magazine….I did not spend a lot of time worrying about what the 
advertisers wanted. I'm grateful for that. 
If you think you’re offering the readers of The Washington Post a certain 
kind of journalism, the more special issues you have the less of that you can do. 
Over the years, it is my impression—I only know from the years that I was there—
it is my impression that people in the advertising department believed that 
everything should be a special issue. 
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Coll: The way the 6th floor (the advertising department) worked with this 
magazine was that you could get the sales floor excited about the special issues. 
Everybody felt like this was going to be a special thing and that their clients were 
going to be glad that they were in it. And then the momentum would reinforce 
itself.  
 
Frankel: We were designing special issues that would sell. We were killing 
special issues that we didn’t think were sellable. We were creating. We were 
doing our journalism, which oftentimes, you know, the business side was not 
terribly enamored with. But we were also doing many kinds of journalism that fit 
comfortably into their needs. 
 
Shroder: As the years went by, the business stresses sort of increased….There 
was always this sense of security at the Post with this understanding of the wall 
between the editorial and business side. And on the other hand, I was trying to 
reject this sort of major rejection of all concerns of the business side that 
newsrooms had been able to enjoy, this luxury of the past. 
If they (the biz side) felt that there was a potential for advertising sales in 
a certain thing, we would then attempt to think of something that we felt was 
legitimate from an editorial perspective that would address that. We turned down 
all sorts of things that they thought they could sell advertising to because there 
were no editorial purpose….Also, I didn’t want to have too many special issues 
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because it reduced the number of regular issues that we had, which I felt was 
really what drove readership.  
 
Leithauser: After this meeting I had yesterday with the ad reps, all of them sent 
me a note saying just how pleased they were that they actually were 
heard….Great story ideas can come from anyone. If I don’t understand their 
push-backs, how can I expect them to understand mine? I think that they were 
genuinely encouraged that somebody from editorial actually understands that 
they have opinions on magazines that actually matter….No one will argue that the 
magazine should lose money. 
In confirmation of Petranek’s point, former publisher Donald Graham said his 
ideal would have been 52 special sections of the Post’s Sunday magazine because those 
were typically the only issues that earned a profit. On occasion, he noted, the magazine 
published an extraordinary piece of journalism during one of its non-special sectioned 
issues. But more often than not, Graham said, stories were simply long and uninspiring. 
Interestingly, most magazine editors credited Graham as the reason the Post continued to 
publish its often money-losing publication, saying he valued the same kind of long-form, 
substantive journalism that most Post journalists valued. This point will be expanded 
upon later in the chapter. 
 Many of the editors interviewed for this study, particularly those who led the 
magazine over the past 25 years, spoke highly of The New York Times’s current model 
toward the publishing of special sections, whereby the paper publishes most special 
sections independent of its general-interest weekly magazine. Since 2004, the Times has 
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published various men’s and women’s fashion and design magazines, titled T, that appear 
separate from the magazine. T, which comes out 14 times a year, operates under an 
entirely distinct editorial team than the general-interest Times magazine. Hugo Lindgren, 
who became editor of the Times magazine in October 2010, explained that T was created 
to provide a more pleasant editorial environment for luxury advertisers than the Times 
magazine could provide on a regular basis: “They do some interesting stuff [at T], but 
they’re not going to do a story about famine in Africa next to the Chanel ads, so it’s an 
environment that the luxury advertisers feel more comfortable in and it’s difficult for us 
to make the counter to that” (Rosenbaum, 2012).   
The Times magazine does produce its own share of thematic special editions, 
including “Innovations” in medicine, technology and science, “Food & Drink,” 
“Education,” and “Voyages,” among about five others (New York Times, 2012). 
Although none of the Post editors mentioned these special editions, The New York Times 
and its Sunday magazine were consistent topics of interest among most of the editors 
interviewed for this study.   
 
A New York State of Mind 
The third major theme that emerged through an analysis of interviews was a 
general aspiration among Post magazine editors to compete editorially with The New 
York Times Magazine. Although the Post’s circulation strategy and advertising base have 
long been different from the Times’, Post magazine editors routinely spoke about their 
desire to create a product that at least matched the editorial excellence of the Times 
magazine.  
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Interestingly, “ambitious” was a word that a number of Post magazine editors 
used to describe their editorial approach to the Sunday magazine. Following the earliest 
years of Potomac, when it was largely a rotogravure picture magazine, editors worked to 
produce a weekly publication that told serious stories about social issues and 
consequence. They pursued stories that shined a light not only on how people lived but 
also on the personal choices and experiences that helped to explain why people lived the 
way they did. In recent years, even some of the Post magazine’s more light-hearted 
sections, such as Date Lab, have been described as editorially meaningful. Date Lab, 
which was created in 2006 and matches up local single people—followed by a post-first 
date editorial recap—“took the reporting DNA and the values of The Washington Post 
and put them into this area of life that I think a lot of people would say is frivolous, but 
it’s really not. It’s really talking about that search for partnership and meaning that pretty 
much everyone is on,” said former Post magazine assistant editor Sandy Fernandez, who 
led the Date Lab section through its early years (Antoniades, 2011). That said, the Post 
magazine editorial team once turned over its DateLab matchmaking duties to a capuchin 
monkey named Armani, just to see how he would fare (Fernandez and Chang, 2008). On 
a less frequent basis, the magazine in recent years has also dedicated an entire issue to the 
Post Hunt—a citywide scavenger-hunt contest organized and hosted by Dave Barry, 
Gene Weingarten and Tom Shroder, who brought the idea to the Post from their days 
together at the Miami Herald—and an Peeps marshmallow diorama design contest. Both 
annual editions, since the mid-2000s, involve external events that carry ample 
sponsorship opportunities for area businesses. 
	  
	   256	  
Despite editors’ stated goals around editorial ambition, the Post Sunday magazine 
has long been viewed throughout the Post newsroom as a mediocre, if not lousy, 
publication. Editors interviewed for this study, particularly those who oversaw the 
magazine for its first 30 or so years, consistently spoke about how the Post magazine was 
editorially boring, visually unappealing, and too often failed to match the overall 
journalistic excellence of the Post newspaper. Each editor said he or she was charged 
with improving the magazine in some substantive way because top Post editors and 
business executives were generally unhappy with the product. In addition, the Post 
repeatedly tried to redesign and revamp its Sunday magazine in large part to better 
compete with the Times magazine on an editorial and advertising basis, editors said.  
The New York Times has long maintained a national print circulation strategy, 
with hundreds of thousands of copies distributed to paid subscribers and newsstands 
throughout the country. As a result, the Times magazine—as well as other sections of the 
paper—has benefited from a great diversity of advertising, from small New York-area 
antique stories to large national luxury goods companies such as Chanel (Rosenbaum, 
2012). Starting in the early 1990s, the paper expanded efforts to extend its print 
circulation beyond the New York City area. In 1993, 63%, of the Times’ Sunday 
circulation was in the New York City market area. By 2003, that number was down to 
49%. In 2010, it was just 38% (PoliticalCalculations, 2011).   
Although the Post has routinely published national news stories, largely because it 
is headquartered in the nation’s capital and covers the workings of the federal 
government, the company’s business strategy has always been rooted in the Washington 
metro area. Starting with the 1954 purchase of the Washington Times-Herald, which 
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essentially gave the Post a daily morning newspaper monopoly in the Washington, D.C. 
area, the company has dominated its local advertising market. It helps that the Post’s 
market penetration, meaning the percentage of people in the Post’s local market area who 
read the paper on a consistent basis, has long been among the highest in the country 
among major metropolitan dailies (Sherman, 2010; Edmonds, 2011). But unlike the 
Times, The Wall Street Journal and USA Today, three national newspapers that receive a 
substantial amount of their advertising revenue through national advertising, the Post has 
received relatively little because its audience is almost entirely local.   
 The Post first tried to make its magazine more competitive with the Times 
magazine in editorial quality and appeal to national advertisers in the early 1970s when 
Bradlee hired Wool to lead the revamp of Potomac. Wool said Potomac’s name was to 
change to become The Washington Post Magazine, mimicking the Times’s Sunday 
magazine, and Post ad representatives were to target big-name national advertisers. (He 
noted that the ad reps were incredibly resistant to the idea, often complaining about the 
challenges of selling space to national advertisers in a largely local publication.) 
Ultimately, after almost a year of planning, Post Publisher Katharine Graham declined to 
invest in the new product, believing it wasn’t worth the financial gamble, Wool said.  
It wasn’t until five years later, in 1977, that the Post changed the name of its 
Sunday magazine—executives determined that the company would be better served if its 
Sunday magazine capitalized on the strong brand of the daily newspaper, according to 
editors interviewed for this study—and sought to publish more national feature stories. 
In-paper advertisements that announced the new publication also touted its “bold new 
graphic design and much more color. And the writing will be just as colorful as the 
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exciting pictures” (Washington Post, 1977, B7). In addition, the magazine went from a 
simple fold, like every other page in the newspaper, to staple-stitched binding. According 
to editors and business-side leaders, inspiration for each change came from New York. 
Coffey: We sort of wanted that bigger name, like The New York Times Magazine. 
The Washington Post Magazine! 
 
Graham: Everybody was terminally dissatisfied with Potomac, which was the 
good roto book, but was obviously pallid compared to…. I’ve often thought the 
best thing for the Post would be to ban The New York Times from the building 
because we aren’t The New York Times! We shouldn’t be influenced by it. 
The new magazine was thrown into disarray, however, following the sudden and 
tragic death of magazine editor Marion Clark, who was killed when walking into an 
airplane propeller on a Michigan runway just weeks before the official relaunch. A 
longtime Post magazine reporter and assistant editor, Clark often wrote about the D.C. 
social scene and various lifestyle issues. Along with magazine columnist Rudi Maxa, 
Clark also helped break the story that Rep. Wayne Hays gave his mistress a no-show 
administrative job on his congressional staff (Maxa and Clark, 1976). Coffey, who 
worked closely with Clark for many years, said a lot of people at the Post were absolutely 
devastated by the news of her death. But with planning for the relaunch well underway, 
the Post had to quickly find someone to replace her.  
Longley was a former reporter and editor at Playboy and The Washingtonian 
magazines, respectively, and joined the Post in the mid-’70s to lead the paper’s new 
Washington Post Writer’s Group. The Post sought to capitalize on some of its best-
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known political reporters and columnists, including David Broder and George Will, and 
launched the news service to sell versions of their work to other newspaper companies. 
Longley was charged with identifying which stories and columns merited syndication and 
to then work with the writer to re-edit the piece for a more general audience. Longley was 
also tapped to lead various book projects at the Post, again largely utilizing material 
previously published in the newspaper and repackaging it for a niche national audience. 
She said she believes those experiences made her a desirable candidate for the magazine 
editor position—Longley said she didn’t apply for the position but, rather, was asked to 
take the job following Clark’s death—because top Post editors wanted someone who 
could reshape the publication to appeal to a niche national audience and national 
advertisers, ala The New York Times Magazine.   
Longely: When it became The Washington Post Magazine, and it was to be much 
more major stories, written by big names, I think the newsroom said, ‘We get the 
idea. But [the new magazine] still isn’t The New York Times Magazine.’ There 
wasn’t the leadership from upon high to make it happen [on a weekly basis].  
When people were tapped to write for the magazine by a top editor, we 
were able to get stuff from people who really knew national and 
international….But you were also competing against editors of these other 
sections…it was a tough situation. They didn’t want to give up writers, and they 
didn’t want to give up stories that would have gone in their sections to run in 
another section. It’s very territorial. 
The new magazine, which premiered on September 11, 1977, was bound for the 
first time by a staple and was printed through offset to improve reproduction. But 
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although the redesigned and renamed magazine was to “maintain its local character and 
flavor,” according to Bradlee (quoted in Jones and Anderson, 1977, F13), it actually took 
on a much more national editorial tone, featuring articles that delved into social and 
cultural topics. The premiere issue was devoted to the 1977-78 “Cultural Season,” with 
articles on music, television, dance, drama and film. Future editions included features on 
Hustler magazine editor Larry Flynt and how he came to be a born again Christian 
(Maxa, 1978), juvenile prostitution in the Greater Washington, D.C. area (Chaplin, 1978), 
and how President Jimmy Carter’s sister, Ruth Carter Stapleton, was traveling the world 
as a Baptist minister (Maxa, 1978b).  
Despite its editorial aspirations, the magazine still operated with a small editorial 
staff—approximately 5 people, including a page designer—and a relatively modest 
freelance budget, Longley said. In addition, the new magazine never developed a clear 
editorial identity because it never fully shed it largely local past. Stories ranged from 
local to regional to national to international on a week-to-week basis, not including the 
various special editions that were designed to win over area advertisers. It simply wasn’t 
clear what the magazine sought to be, and the lack of identity made advertising sales 
difficult, Post business leaders said. 
To complicate matters, the Post refused to discontinue carrying Parade magazine, 
whose advertising base was almost entirely national, because the supplement was 
incredibly popular with readers. Significant numbers of people throughout the Greater 
D.C. area purchased the Sunday Post only for Parade and coupons, Graham said. 
Although those people likely read very little of the Sunday paper, they counted as much 
as anyone else who purchased the Post. They helped bolster the paper’s paid circulation 
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total, which helped set annual advertising rates. That said, it’s worth noting that The New 
York Times has never carried Parade or a comics section because executives believed 
such sections were editorially misaligned with the paper’s journalistic identity as a 
serious and substantive news publication (Tifft and Jones, 1999).  
 By the early to mid-1980s, Bradlee and other top Post executives sought to again 
revamp the Sunday magazine, again largely to win the business of big-name, high-end 
retail advertisers. But while the Post aspired to win the same kinds of national advertising 
that filled The New York Times Magazine, the Post took most inspiration from the Los 
Angeles Times. In 1985, the Los Angeles Times relaunched its weekly Sunday magazine 
Home into a general-interest weekly magazine that centered on personality profiles and 
celebrity interviews (Los Angeles Times, 1985). Moreover, the Times decreased the page 
size of the magazine to match the size of consumer magazines. That way, prospective 
advertisers would not need to change any of their print advertising specifications to do 
business with the LA Times’ newspaper magazine. Graham said the idea made a lot of 
sense to him, as the Post Co.’s Newsweek operation was a natural feeder system for any 
Post magazine revamp. “Newsweek bought so much of that coded paper that we could get 
quite a deal on it and that we could spend a lot less money on paper. But it was high-
quality paper, so it would give us the opportunity to attract the class of advertisers you 
never had in the [Post] book before.” 
 According to editors of the Post magazine, however, that wasn’t the only 
reason—if even the primary reason—for the grand redesign and relaunch of the 
magazine. 
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Petranek: [The Post refused to give up on its Sunday magazine] because The 
New York Times had a Sunday magazine. That’s very simple; it’s all about ego. 
The Post considered itself to be a better paper than the Times in the years that I 
was there.  
The Times had more column inches than we did in that time period, but 
you could have made a really good case that the Post was the best paper in the 
U.S. in the time that I was there, the 13 years that I was there. You can’t make 
that case today, there’s no if’s ands or buts that the Times is better than the Post, 
which is really sad.  
 
Lovinger: They realized [in the mid-’80s] they had been doing the rotogravure 
version for, like, 25 years and they were never really happy about it. And I’m not 
sure exactly why—whether it was content or this advertising question or the fact 
that compared to The New York Times [magazine], it was weak.   
 
Thompson: You know, they looked at the Times, and the Times is a different 
animal for different reasons, but nonetheless the Post and the Times were very 
competitive and the Post people didn’t want to be embarrassed by their Sunday 
magazine. So, they were willing to commit more resources than other papers for 
that reason because they had higher standards. 
 
Frankel: Our competitors, only in our minds, was The New York Times 
Magazine, to an extent. But there, too, The New York Times magazine has a much 
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different ad base, a much larger one being up in New York and having a national 
audience that we didn’t have. And so they were working on a whole different 
playing field.   
But, nonetheless, I wanted to make sure that our journalism was just as 
good, if not better, than theirs. Any died-in-the-wool Washington Post person 
from that era always looked at The New York Times as a big, bad guy’s Hertz to 
our Avis almost, you know? And [we] didn’t mind kicking their ass when it was 
possible.  
 Although Post magazine editors seemingly understood the differences between 
their paper’s circulation strategy and the Times’s, they largely sought to match the 
editorial ambition of the Times because that’s what most Post journalists throughout the 
newsroom tried to do on a daily basis. However, even before the relaunch, there was 
often a distinct mismatch between editorial content and advertising in the magazine. 
Longley, for example, described the editorial and advertising mix of the magazine prior 
to and during her years as editor as “schizophrenic.” Woodward & Lothrop and the 
Hecht’s Co., two major area department stores, were prominent advertisers in the 
magazine through much of the ’70s. However, ads that featured bras, party dresses and 
women’s shoes often surrounded and interrupted the page flow of feature stories, which 
were often about male national political figures.  
 Interestingly, Post magazine editors also cited a different New York-based 
magazine they often took inspiration from. Coffey, Longley, Coll and Medford all 
referenced The New Yorker as what a good weekly, general-interest magazine could 
accomplish editorially.  
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In The New Yorker’s prospectus, in 1925, founder Harold Ross famously wrote 
that his new publication would not be edited “for the little old Lady in Dubuque.” Rather, 
The New Yorker was produced for a sophisticated, highly educated readership that 
spanned the nation, even though it has long contained multiple pages of New York City-
based entertainment listings. Only two editors led the magazine over a 61-year period: 
Ross, from the magazine’s founding in 1925 until his death in 1951, and William Shawn, 
from 1952 until 1986 (Terry, 2005). In explaining the history of The New Yorker, Grimes 
described the magazine as “a brilliant, unpredictable product of the Jazz Age, irreverent, 
brisk, gossipy and sharp….Under the quieter and more reflective Mr. Shawn, the 
magazine, already profitable, grew into a rich and prestigious powerhouse, with a 
reputation for comprehensive, acute profiles and multi-part reporting articles on 
important issues” (1992, C20). It was a writer’s magazine, created for a smart and often 
affluent audience that advertisers paid large amounts of money to reach (Douglas, 1991).  
Post magazine editors who said they took editorial inspiration from The New 
Yorker were quick to note that the current editor of The New Yorker, David Remnick, was 
a staff writer for the Post magazine during the mid-’80s. Remnick was named editor of 
The New Yorker in 1996. This relationship was seemingly pointed out to draw a 
connection between the editorial talent both magazines employed. In addition to 
Remnick, Coll would go on to become a contributing writer for The New Yorker, as did 
former Post magazine staff writer Nicholas Lemann, who has served as dean of the 
Columbia Journalism School since 2003. He announced his retired in 2012.  
The problem with Post magazine editors taking editorial inspiration from 
publications such as The New York Times Magazine and The New Yorker is that the two 
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New York-based magazines have long been produced for national niche audiences—
namely, affluent and educated readers—and that the publications largely contain 
advertising from luxury-goods businesses. In contrast, the Sunday Post’s circulation is 
almost entirely local, the magazine’s advertisers have historically been based in the 
Greater Washington, D.C. area, and nearly every Post magazine editor interviewed 
identified his or her audience extremely broadly.  
For example, some of the editors noted that the Post magazine had a slightly 
higher female readership, but said they didn’t necessarily select stories based on that fact. 
As recent as 2009, the editor of the magazine explained in an online Q&A that the 
publication’s target audience is “any and all readers….We don’t have a specific target 
audience in mind, per se.” Even though the length of feature stories in the Post magazine 
were shortened following the 2009 redesign, Leithauser further described her target 
audience simply as someone “who likes to read” (Leithauser and Michaud, 2009). These 
were unusual comments, given that magazines have increasingly targeted specific 
audiences since the late 1970s. Moreover, research has shown that general-interest 
magazines, specifically Look, Life and The Saturday Evening Post, went out of business 
in large part because advertisers moved their money to television, where audiences were 
far more segmented (Van Zuilen, 1977; Bogart, 2000; Dimmick, 2003). In 2010, the 
Washington Post Co. sold Newsweek because the weekly news magazine was losing tens 
of millions of dollars a year (Aherns, 2010). In less than two years, new owner 
InterActiveCorp announced that, although Newsweek would continue to be available 
online, it would cease publication of the print product by the end of 2012 (Carr and 
Haughney, 2012). 
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In addition, it’s not entirely clear the degree to which readers of the Post 
magazine are even interested in the long-form narrative storytelling that has long defined 
the publication. For example, Shroder said the magazine lost nearly 15% of its readership 
following the retirement of humor columnist David Barry in 2005; he added that a lot of 
people also picked up the magazine only for the crossword puzzle. Weingarten, who 
wrote his own humor column in the magazine starting in 2000, replaced Barry as the 
back-of-the-book columnist (Weingarten, 2005), a job he still holds to this day. And 
although the Post has conducted proprietary readership surveys of all sections for at least 
the last 30 years, it doesn’t survey readers about the magazine’s features. Surveys mostly 
ask readers their opinions about recurring sections in the front and back of the magazine, 
said editors and business-side leaders of the magazine. According to Graham, the average 
reader of the Post’s Sunday newspaper fell within a less desirable demographic than the 
typical reader of the daily paper from an advertiser appeal standpoint. Sunday readers 
tended to have lower household income and less education than the average daily reader, 
he said, noting that Sunday coupons and the editorially lowbrow Parade magazine were 
large draws for many readers. But instead of creating a Sunday magazine for the Post’s 
actual audience, magazine editors often produced 12- to 14-page esoteric narratives that 
they themselves would enjoy, he said.  
Graham: If you asked the readers, ‘What magazine do you like most?’ the 
readers of The Washington Post would’ve said People or, optimistically, 
Newsweek. The writers and editors [of the Post magazine] would have said The 
New Yorker….But The New Yorker is a 1 percent publication. It is read by the 
demographic cream of the U.S. And they like long, discursive articles and 
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beautiful writing. [Starting with the 1986 relaunch, the Post Sunday magazine] 
has been a colossal mismatch with its audience.  
 Despite Graham’s frustrations with the magazine, editors consistently pointed to 
him as the primary reason the newspaper continued to publish its own Sunday magazine 
while so many other papers discontinued their own in the face of similar financial losses. 
Graham became publisher of the newspaper in 1979, taking leadership of the family 
business from his mother, Katharine. He believed in the value of good journalism. He had 
worked as a reporter and editor at the Post and the Post Co.-owned Newsweek magazine 
starting in 1971. Editors of the Post magazine said Graham was different than most 
publishers at other newspapers in that he didn’t make decisions based on short-term 
financial interests, even though the Post Co. was and remains publicly owned. (As 
previously explained, the Post Co.’s operates under a dual-class stock ownership system, 
with members and close associates of the Graham family controlling ultimate decision-
making.) Because the newspaper was earning so much money from the 1970s through the 
first half of the 2000s, the company could afford to lose millions of dollars on a Sunday 
magazine that some reporters and editors in the Post newsroom appreciated for its 
journalistic value. Interview subjects said that the magazine has long been the home of 
great, long-form storytelling, and that Graham’s legacy as publisher of the Post is that he 
routinely put journalistic interests ahead of commercial ones. Moreover, he believed that 
the Post was every bit as good as The New York Times, and if the Times was publishing 
its own Sunday magazine then the Post should, too, editors said. 
Coll: He wanted a paper that was driven by quality journalists, and though he 
wasn’t always sold on the magazine and didn’t love every decision that I made or 
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that writers made, fundamentally he wanted great journalism in the paper. He 
knew that the journalists that he cared about valued the opportunity to write in 
the magazine the way we did, and he didn’t want to get in the way of that culture. 
 For his part, and with the value of hindsight, Graham said he probably should 
have killed the magazine following Lovinger’s departure in 1988. From a business 
standpoint, the magazine struggled to recover from the three months of street protests that 
greeted its ’86 relaunch. And from an editorial standpoint, the magazine was always 
poorly aligned with readers and advertisers, he said, even after its various relaunchs. But 
that, too, was part of the Post’s newsroom culture: section editors were given a 
tremendous amount of editorial freedom, which included freedom from most internal and 
external financial interests.  
 Interestingly, none of the editors said they viewed the monthly city magazine The 
Washingtonian as real competition to the Post magazine. The Washingtonian has been 
published since 1965, and its editorial focus is feature journalism, service articles, and 
news and information about various lifestyle-oriented topics, including dining home 
improvement, health and wellness, and travel. Collectively, it’s not all that dissimilar 
from the Post magazine over the years. Thompson and Leithauser at least acknowledged 
that The Washingtonian was a competitor for D.C. area readers’ time, but both were 
generally dismissive of the city magazine. In Leithauser’s case, it was because The 
Washingtonian is a monthly niche publication—it caters to a largely affluent 
readership—whereas the Post magazine publishes on a weekly basis and aspires to appeal 
to more of a general audience. For Thompson, however, the differences were more 
personal. “I'm not a big Washingtonian fan, so they didn't do a lot of stuff that I wished I 
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was doing….They had a different idea of what they were doing than we did… From my 
point of view, [service journalism] doesn't interest me that much; that’s something that is 
done all over the newspaper” (Thompson, 2010). 
Only Pincus, who said he took editorial inspiration from Clay Felker’s New York 
magazine, believed that the Post magazine should have more closely followed the city 
magazine model. Lamenting Bradlee’s constant desire for the Post newspaper and its 
Sunday magazine to compete against The New York Times, Pincus said the Post magazine 
would have been well served to remain steadfastly local editorially. “I’ve argued over the 
ensuing 40 years…that [the Post magazine] should have been a city magazine. It could 
have been The Washingtonian....It could have been big and fat if they had just…ugh” 
(Pincus, 2010).  
In 1978, Costen studied the editorial influence that city magazines had on locally 
produced Sunday magazines in their market area. In the case of the Post’s magazine, 
Potomac, she found that local coverage increased from 68% of all coverage in early 
1965, the year The Washingtonian began publishing, to 74% during the same time period 
one year later. However, this relatively small increase could just as easily be attributed to 
Post magazine editors’ personal editorial interests than it could to concern over greater 
local competition; Herron was editor of Potomac in early 1965, and replaced by Pincus 
mid-year. Moreover, Costen found without explanation that the percentage of local 
editorial content in Potomac plummeted to 34% in late 1965. Both Herron and Pincus 
said in interviews that their editorial focus was largely local.   
 Other print publications existing in the Greater Washington, D.C. area throughout 
the period of this study, most notably the alternative weekly Washington City Paper, 
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which was founded in 1981 and still exists, and various community weeklies and 
political-oriented titles, such as Congressional Quarterly and The Hill. However, Post 
magazine editors generally dismissed all of these alleged or would-be competitors 
because those publications weren’t producing the same type of editorial content that they 
wanted the magazine to. By and large, only The New York Times Magazine was 
publishing a weekly print publication that mixed long-form features and shorter pieces 
that were general interest in topic. Editors aspired to produce a magazine that they 
wanted to read, and that their newsroom colleagues might be proud of. As Thompson 
pointed out, the fact that the magazine routinely lost money was an issue of secondary 
importance. “The advertising competition wasn’t my problem” (Thompson, 2010).  
In general, the self-defined editorial missions of Post magazine editors have 
varied little over the past 50 years. Everyone believed that the magazine should showcase 
photography; for many years it was among the only sections that could publish in four-
color. And nearly everyone believed that the magazine should have a mix of long-form 
features and short section pieces. Two of the biggest variances were the types of stories to 
tell—local only versus a mix that included national and international—and who should 
tell them. Mostly starting with Thompson in the late ’80s, the Post magazine became a 
section that aimed to highlight the best storytellers the Post newspaper had to offer. For 
Coll and Frankel, the two editors who immediately followed Thompson in the job, the 
magazine was not simply another section of the Post Sunday newspaper. Rather, the 
magazine was of the newsroom, a section that showcased the great journalism that had 
long defined The Washington Post. Whether or not that journalism was of appeal to those 
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who read the magazine, or if that journalism was at all relevant to the advertising that 
financially supported the magazine, was of little concern to most editors.  
Graham: I think going back to ’86, I’d have sat down with Ben [Bradlee] and 
said, “Look, this is part of your newspaper, but it’s also a business proposition 
and I think we ought to hire a publisher together and we ought to hire him with a 
joint sense of what the magazine should look like. We ought to have a sense of the 
magazine and we ought to hire someone to edit ‘that’ magazine. We can’t just 
turn someone loose and let them turn it into the magazine of their choice.” 
 
Conclusion 
The conceptualization of these three issues, through the constant comparison 
method of inquiry that serves as the basis of grounded theory work, led me to a theory 
rooted in behavioral psychology called social identity theory, or SIT. First developed by 
the French social psychologist Henri Tajfel in 1972, SIT aims to explain how individuals’ 
perceptions of their social environments, such as groups or organizations, influence how 
they understand themselves and others. In examining Washington Post Sunday magazine 
editors’ attitudes and perceptions about the relationship between editorial decision-
making and commercial imperatives of publishing a magazine, I have come to think that 
self-identity played a central role in how they approached their jobs. However, in the next 
chapter that discusses my findings, I will extend SIT by incorporating institutional theory 
to explain how Washington Post Sunday magazine editors were influenced both 
internally and externally. Not only did most Post magazine editors work to be part of the 
perceived “in-group” of the newsroom—namely, national reporters and editors whose 
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work routinely appeared on the front page of the newspaper—but they were also 
influenced by an oftentimes irrational desire to mimic the editorial content and style of 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion: Re-conceptualizing Roles and Identities 
My close analyses of the interviews suggest that social identity was a central 
factor in the editorial decision-making processes of Washington Post Sunday magazine 
editors. Specifically, editors’ perceptions of the Post organization and of journalists who, 
they believed, best represented the organization greatly influenced their attitudes about 
editorial values as well as the role of business values in editorial decision-making. I 
believe the vast majority of Post magazine editors chose to maintain normative values in 
content creation—specifically, independence from commercial pressures of any kind and 
journalism as an educational force in the public good—because they wanted to improve 
how the magazine was perceived, and by association themselves, by respected editors and 
writers throughout the newsroom. Moreover, because editorial competition with The New 
York Times has long been part of The Washington Post’s newsroom culture, Post 
magazine editors sought to bolster their organizational legitimacy by pursuing editorial 
strategies that attempted to emulate the Times magazine. 
Throughout the 50-year period of this case study, the Washington Post has been 
widely regarded in the news media industry as one of the nation’s editorially elite 
newspapers. Under publishers Phil Graham, his wife, Katharine Graham, and their son 
Don Graham, the company has dedicated significant financial resources to investigative 
reporting as well as to local, national and international news coverage (Felsenthal, 1993; 
Shaw, 2006). As of 2011, The Washington Post had won 57 Pulitzer Prize awards, the 
newspaper industry’s highest honor. That’s second only to The New York Times’ 106 
Pulitzers through 2011 (New York Times Co., 2012).  
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As former Post ombudsman Bill Green wrote, Pulitzer “winners become the 
nobility of American journalism” (1981, A15). In fact, studies and media reports have 
shown that reporters and editors are perceived to carry greater professional prestige after 
winning a journalism award (Kosicki et al, 1985), and that a newspaper’s prestige is 
elevated throughout the industry when one of its journalists is honored for his or her 
work, particularly investigative journalism and enterprise stories (Coulson, 1989). In 
addition, according to those interviewed for this study, ample professional admiration is 
often bestowed upon the reporters whose work routinely appears on the front page of the 
Post. Because the newspaper covered the federal government extensively, as well as the 
various policies and social implications of those policies, page 1 stories often focused on 
politics and national issues. Reporters and editors looking to advance to higher-profile 
positions within the newsroom learned that a seriousness of editorial purpose was 
required. To even consider business values in conceiving or producing a story was 
antithetical to the organizational culture of the newsroom. Erik Wemple, a former media 
writer for The Washingtonian magazine and today a media reporter for the Post, once 
explained: “The default setting of the Post’s publishing model has long hewed toward the 
puritanical. Journalists do what they do best—put out a paper—and the advertising 
people do what they do best—sell it” (Wemple, 2009). Although Post magazine stories 
were almost never elevated to the front page, due largely to production limitations—
magazine features are planned out months in advance and have a lengthy production and 
distribution cycle—magazine editors did sit in on newspaper-wide story rundown 
meetings and saw firsthand the type of stories that earned the attention, interest and praise 
of the paper’s top editors. These experiences certainly played a role in shaping many 
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magazine editors’ sense of professional identity and their social standing within the 
organization.  
In shining a light on the attitudes and decision-making processes of Washington 
Post magazine editors through the years, I contend that editors were motivated by their 
pursuit of professional self-esteem within the organization, and sought to improve or 
maintain their status and legitimacy with highly regarded organizational in-groups by 
attempting to mimic content production by The New York Times Magazine. In this 
chapter, I will discuss the value and limitations of social identity theory and institutional 
theory, as well as how an extension of social identity theory through the lens of 
institutional theory can further understanding of a distinct category of newspaper editors, 
namely Sunday magazine editors. Lastly, I will discuss the ultimate value of this research 
study, its contributions to the profession and literature, as well as its limitations and some 
potential avenues of future scholarly study.   
 
Social Identity and the Pursuit of Status 
Social identity theory specifies how individuals’ perceptions of various social 
environments, such as groups or organizations, influence the way they understand 
themselves and others (Tajfel, 1972). People evaluate themselves in comparison to 
others, and seek to bolster their social standing and self-conceptions by associating with 
perceived in-groups. Status is self-reinforced through perceptions of and comparisons 
with relevant out-group members. A full examination of social identity theory, or SIT, 
can be found in Chapter 5. 
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SIT has not been widely used by researchers to study journalists or the news 
media industry. However, one case holds particular relevance to this study. In the mid-
2000s, SIT was employed to examine changes in professional identity among journalists 
at a daily newspaper in Sweden. Specifically, the study looked at how print journalists’ 
professional attitudes changed after they were re-assigned to work on a new online 
edition. The authors found that the re-assigned journalists took a more market-oriented, 
as opposed to content-oriented, approach to their jobs after working in a new group 
environment (Fagerling and Norack, 2005). The new online journalists’ social identities 
transformed in large part because the journalists were operating in a brand-new unit that 
lacked many of the institutionalized norms and practices that defined the newspaper 
operation, including the values of editorial independence from business-side colleagues. 
In addition, the online team was so small that journalists, advertising sales representatives 
and information technology personnel had little choice but to work together, fostering a 
better understanding of shared goals and outcomes. The authors found that an 
entrepreneurial spirit permeated the online operation, and that the web-based journalists 
embraced an identity that was rooted in commercial success through editorial innovation 
and a willingness to experiment.  
Interestingly, the social identities of Washington Post magazine journalists did not 
seem to change when they joined the magazine staff from another editorial department at 
the newspaper. This is likely because editors viewed the magazine as more similar than 
dissimilar to the rest of the newspaper; it was a print publication that was part of the 
Sunday newspaper package. In addition, Post magazine editors worked in close contact 
with reporters and editors from the daily newspaper, often in an effort to get daily staffers 
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to write feature stories for the magazine. In interviews, many Post magazine editors said 
journalists throughout the newsroom held the Sunday magazine in low regard editorially. 
In each case, the editors said they worked hard to improve the editorial quality of the 
magazine and, consequently, how it was perceived in the newsroom. Aware that the 
magazine often lost money on an annual basis, editors said their worked to secure the 
publication’s future by convincing top editors and many national reporters—through 
word and deed—that the magazine could represent the best of Washington Post 
journalism: well-research, finely-crafted and thoughtful long-form storytelling 
(Thompson, 2010; Coll, 2010; Frankel, 2010, Shroder, 2010).  
In examining the differences between producers of “hard” news and “soft” news 
at an Argentinean news site, Boczkowski (2009b) found that each group carried negative 
perceptions of the other. However, hard news producers viewed their counterparts more 
negatively, perceiving them as a bit lazy and less than serious about their work. To be 
sure, journalists who work on the Post Sunday magazine, with its weekly publishing 
cycle—and virtually nonexistent online presence, which is explained in greater detail 
below—operate at a far more relaxed pace than journalists who work for daily sections. 
Magazine editors simply do not have nearly the same temporal pressures that daily 
section editors do. Stories are rarely tied to the news value of timeliness, and it is not 
uncommon that once a story is ready for publication it is actually held for a later date so 
as to diversify the weekly mix of magazine stories. In contrast, daily journalists routinely 
publish information as soon as it is sufficiently verified as accurate, an expediency 
greater enabled by online publishing.  
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To win the social approval and feature-writing services of daily staffers, magazine 
editors had to maintain the professional values that defined the entire Post newsroom, 
where commercial necessity was of little consideration and journalistic purpose trumped 
all. In addition, a number of Sunday magazine editors noted that they often pursued 
stories that they believed might earn the publication positive attention and praise from top 
Post editors and respected journalists. It is not entirely clear which members of the Post 
newsroom magazine editors perceived as being in the out-group, but they most certainly 
perceived advertising sales staff in that light. To work closely with business-side 
colleagues and share many of their organizational goals would damage magazine editors’ 
sense of professional identity and perceived social standing within the newsroom. Said 
Paul Herron, the founding editor of Potomac: “There was only one person in the Post 
advertising department who dealt with us and the ads in the magazine. There was not a 
whole group of people, just this one person. And we wouldn’t have listened to him if he 
had [suggested a special section]. If he had said we want more automotive issues, we’d 
say, ‘Go to hell! “We don’t want to do more automotive issues, or furniture issues or…” 
(Herron, 2010). Editors oversaw content; advertising reps sold ads, Herron explained.  
In addition, Post magazine editors maintained a clear separation between their 
editorial staff and those who worked in advertising; none of the editors allowed their 
staffs to communicate with those on the business side. Editors routinely cited their 
concern that staff members might feel undue pressure to change editorial content for non-
journalistic reasons, such as to win the business of potential advertisers. That said, editors 
acknowledged that they often pursued certain feature stories—so long as the story had 
editorial merit, meaning it was rooted in actual news values—because Post advertising 
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sales managers thought they could sell ads around that general theme. However, editors 
said they didn’t often share the original motivation for the story with their staffs or, if 
they did, were clear to point out that the story was only running, first and foremost, 
because it was a story worth telling. Many editors so deferential to the church-state divide 
at the Post that they wouldn’t even meet their publisher/general manager on the Post’s 6th 
floor, where the business operation was located. Instead, the publisher/general manager 
would have to travel to the newsroom, located on the 5th floor, or they would meet on 
“neutral territory” in the company’s cafeteria, according to former Sunday magazine 
publisher Leslie Morgan Steiner (2011). In their efforts to explain this practice, editors 
routinely pointed to the organizational identity of the Post and the maintenance of such 
normative values as editorial independence.  
However, no editor could cite a specific example of when a staff member was 
pressured to change or alter content due to the incursion of business considerations into 
the editorial equation. Rather, a number of editors suggested that it was the maintenance 
of such boundaries that prevented problems from occurring in the first place.  
In short, magazine editors largely approached their section as if it was like any 
other news section in the paper. This is noteworthy given that newspapers throughout the 
country began shuttering their Sunday magazines in the late 1970s and early ’80s for the 
stated reason that the publications did not earn enough advertising revenues to cover 
costs. Facing significant revenue declines due to Internet competition, newspapers have 
consolidated other sections of the daily paper, most notably Business. While the move 
was always attributed to cost savings, it was also a recognition that most people were 
getting their stock listings online (Ovide, 2009).   
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That said, “church-state” boundaries were not absolute over the 50-year period of 
study. Post magazine editors helped to devise an increasing number of special thematic 
editions of the magazine to win advertising revenues, and the two most recent editors—
Debra Leithauser and the current editor, Lynn Medford—spoke more extensively than 
any of their predecessors about the importance of generating advertising revenues. This 
can likely be attributed to a variety of factors, including a cultural shift within the entire 
company toward a shared awareness concerning revenues and expenses, and the jarring 
realities of staff layoffs, section and property closures, and overall newsroom cutbacks 
that were reflections of economic—as opposed to journalistic—events. As Medford 
(2011) explained: “The whole newspaper is very conscious of the bottom line right now. 
You’re conscious that you want to at least break even, and we’re not right 
now….Historically, newsrooms have never paid the least bit of attention to the business 
side, and that was a value actually. Katharine [Weymouth, the publisher,] has said you 
need to be business savvy, you need to pay attention to the business, because it’s a battle 
of survival.”  
 Even Tom Shroder, who served as editor prior to Leithauser and left the Post in 
2008 through a buyout because he felt senior leaders at the paper were going to weaken 
the editorial quality of the magazine in the pursuit of advertising revenue, said he 
eventually became more open to working with business-side colleagues. “I was trying to 
learn creative ways to survive, and I thought that if I could serve my journalistic goals 
and allow the magazine to survive, that the survival of the magazine is important enough 
to try to be creative and to try to understand [the ad sales reps’] perspective and their 
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concerns in order to maybe do something really smart that would both produce good 
journalism and enable them to help support the magazine” (Shroder, 2010). 
Although there were some slight variations in the editorial approaches and content 
preferences of all Washington Post Sunday magazine editors interviewed for this study, 
every editor maintained that he or she was in the business of storytelling and journalism. 
Figuring out the revenue side of the equation was someone else’s job, many said. As 
professional journalists who worked at a widely respected institution such as The 
Washington Post, they said they were paid to produce a weekly print product rooted in 
editorial excellence. The editors defined excellence as “impact,” “buzz,” “serious,” 
“narrative,” “compelling” and “award-winning.” In the case of “buzz,” editors explained 
that a good story is sometimes one that gets people talking in the barbershops and beauty 
salons, and that gets picked up by radio or local television. Berkowitz (1992) came to call 
these “What-a-Story!” stories; these are stories that are so unusual or that catch 
journalists off guard. Berkowitz uses the example of the unexpected announcement by 
President Lyndon Johnson in 1968 that he would not seek reelection. Romano (1986) 
slightly tweaked the label, calling them “Holy-shit!” stories and citing as an example a 
wire story headlined “Guests Drowned at Party for 100 Lifeguards.” However, in both 
cases the researchers were not analyzing the stories through an information gatekeeping 
prism or through professional or social identity. Rather, studies were operational analyses 
that examined the processes used by journalists and news media organizations to cover 
non-routine news work that altered established content production practices.   
According to the findings of this study, Post magazine editors’ accomplishments 
were largely self-measured based on awards won and stories that earned the praise and 
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admiration of top newsroom editors and respected journalists who primarily worked on 
the front section of the newspaper. “When [individuals] identify strongly with the 
organization, the attributes they use to define the organization also define them” (Dutton 
et al, 1994, 239). 
Interestingly, the editor who arguably struggled the most while leading the 
magazine, Jay Lovinger, sought to remake the publication into something editorially 
distinct from the daily newspaper. Lovinger was seemingly uninterested or even aware of 
specific in-groups throughout the newsroom, and quickly found himself lost and lonely 
within an organizational setting he did not understand or even like. He proudly shared the 
story of how he wore sweatpants and a tattered sweater to his first meeting with executive 
editor Ben Bradlee to talk about the job. “If someone was going to hire me, I wanted 
them to know what they were getting and to not hire me thinking that I was somebody 
that I wasn’t. And then I’d wind up at the place and we’d both have been confused about 
why I was even there in the first place….I think I was often fighting the institution’s 
perception of itself. But as I would always say, what does the perception have to do 
with…this magazine? In trying to create a magazine that was somehow the same as a 
newspaper just really never worked and in my opinion couldn’t work” (Lovinger, 2010). 
 
Institutional Theory and Keeping up With the Times 
Institutional theory is “characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements 
to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and 
legitimacy” (Scott and Meyer, 1983, 149). Developed as an offshoot of rational-choice 
organizational theory, which explains behaviors as purposeful, efficiency-driven 
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reactions to market forces, institutional theory attempts to explain the bases for mimetic 
behaviors that are seemingly irrational. For this reason, institutional theory is often used 
to make sense of behaviors in industries with “vague criteria for judging value and 
quality” (Lowrey, 2005, 497), since individuals in these industries have different 
motivations based on their position within the organization. Chapter 5 provided a full 
examination of institutional theory and its relevance to the news media industry.  
Sparrow (1999) found that risk-averse organizations most closely monitor 
competitors, or peer groups, to more effectively copy practices that are perceived to 
bolster cultural and political legitimacy. However, seemingly rational strategies at one 
organization may not serve other organizations’ interests well due to differences in 
staffing, resources and external relations. “Yet, the very fact that they are normatively 
sanctioned increases the likelihood of their adoption” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 148).  
In the case of Washington Post magazine editors, findings suggest they often 
sought to emulate the editorial ambition of The New York Times’ Sunday magazine in 
large part because they saw themselves as journalistic equals to their contemporaries at 
the Times. This was standard belief among journalists throughout the Post newsroom, in 
large part because the two newspapers often chased the same national, political and 
international news stories. When the Times began publishing stories in June 1971 based 
on what had become known as the Pentagon Papers, a history of U.S. decision-making 
processes relating to the Vietnam War, the Post had to scramble to catch up. According 
to Bradlee, “The Post did not have a copy [of the Pentagon Papers], and we found 
ourselves in the humiliating position of having to rewrite the competition. Every other 
paragraph of the Post story had to include some form of the words “according to the 
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Times,” blood—visible only to us—on every word” (1995, 311). Bradlee routinely 
referred to the Times as competition, and that mentality certainly influenced the stories 
Post journalists pursued. In his biography, Bradlee acknowledged that when he became 
editor of the Post his top goal was to have “people in the know, people in power,” speak 
of the two newspapers “in the same breath, instead of just the New York Times” (1995, 
370). 
Post magazine editors routinely cited The New York Times as having the “gold 
standard” of Sunday newspaper magazines, with lengthy feature and investigative stories, 
engaging and thoughtful columns, and beautiful photography. Others reported that they 
took additional editorial inspiration from such consumer magazines as The New Yorker, 
New York and Esquire. Like The New York Times Magazine, these publications have a 
national circulation. And like the Times magazine, all are highly regarded in the 
journalism industry for their long-form narrative articles. Yet, the Post magazine never 
could seem to compete with the Times magazine, often to the great chagrin of journalists 
throughout the Post newsroom, who suffered plenty of “ego bruises” from the 
comparative critiques (Zagoria, 1984, A18). Sam Zagoria, the Post’s public editor in the 
early to mid-1980s, publicly welcomed a magazine more like the Times’—despite the 
fact that his paper operated in a very different economic market—calling on a “top-side 
commitment” at the Post to more “thoughtful articles and quality art, beautifully printed,” 
thus leading to “an editorial concept that would give Washington a Sunday magazine 
more like the Times” (1984, A18). Editors interviewed for this study said there were 
many reasons why the Post magazine was routinely editorially inferior to the Times 
magazine. These include a lack of financial investment in the magazine’s paper quality, 
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design, editorial budgeting and staff size. Post management was largely reluctant to 
invest in upgrades because the magazine was relatively expensive to produce, even in its 
often-criticized state, and it often failed to win sufficient advertising support to cover 
costs. Moreover, the Post had a far different readership and advertising base than the 
Times. The Post is largely local whereas the Times is national; the Times has long 
enjoyed nearly 40% higher circulation than the Post (Ives, 2009). But because editorial 
competition with The New York Times was so deeply engrained within the culture of the 
Post newsroom over the period of this study, Post magazine editors sought to bolster 
their organizational social standing through a variety of mimetic behaviors in the form of 
editorial decision-making.  
In the mid-1980s, Bradlee finally convincing Publisher Don Graham to invest in a 
wholesale redesign of the Sunday magazine, to win the business of national advertisers 
and to bolster the journalistic value of the publication. It was Bradlee’s final chance 
before retirement to create a Sunday magazine even better than The New York Times 
Magazine (Nelson, 1993). For a variety of reasons explained in Chapter 4, which 
examined the history of The Washington Post and its Sunday magazine, the effort failed 
miserably due to a combination of poor leadership, bad luck and an irrational desire to 
one-up the Times. 
 As previously stated, isomorphism is often driven by uncertainty of goals. 
Without clearly defined directives and organizational goals, individuals will often copy 
external practices that they are simply fond of. With the exception of Paul Herron, the 
founding editor of the Post’s Sunday magazine in 1961, no editor interviewed for this 
study said they were given an editorial mission to fulfill; Herron said then-Executive 
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Editor J. Russell Wiggins told him to keep the magazine “local and low key. No 
controversy. Keep the thing short” (Herron, 2009). This lack of direction and editorial 
mission ultimately led to what Post magazine editor Walter Pincus (2010) called a 
“hobbyhorse effect”; editors used the publication to simply further their personal editorial 
interests. I contend that these interests were largely informed by magazine editors’ desire 
to produce the same type of lengthy narrative articles about national and international 
issues and events that largely defined The New York Times Magazine, because doing so 
bolstered their internal status and their efforts to join perceived in-groups of highly 
respected Post journalists.  
Editors sought to strengthen their social identities within the Post newsroom 
through the maintenance of journalistic values and professional norms, but those values 
and norms were influenced just as much by external factors. Magazine editors routinely 
attempted to emulate in their work the editorial identity of The New York Times 
Magazine, despite the apparent irrationality of doing so, since the locally oriented Post 
served very different audiences, in terms of readers and advertisers, than the nationally 
oriented Times. Moreover, even though the Post magazine only rarely made money, and 
in fact lost up to $3 million some years, editors were generally unwilling to risk their 
social legitimacy, both internally and externally, by redeveloping editorial content to 
better appeal to new readers and potential advertisers.   
Of course, workplace norms and cultures that are embedded within an 
organization are not formulated over night. Instead, they are adopted from a complex 
system of slightly evolving technical and social routines that are tied to isomorphic 
pressures. Moreover, not all copying is necessarily bad. Under the right competitive 
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circumstances, adoption of industry best practices can bolster efficiency and legitimacy. 
The key is in consideration of the circumstance. Like any theory, institutional theory 
cannot fully explain the complex relationships and phenomena that give rise to change 
and maintenance in all established organizational settings. However, through this 
extension of social identity theory, institutional theory can help explain context-specific 
individual and organizational attitudes and actions.  
The findings of this study have shown that Post magazine editors’ social identities 
were intrinsically tied to a desire to bolster their professional status both within their 
organization and in comparison to their contemporaries at The New York Times 
Magazine. The fact that the Post magazine had long lost millions of dollars annually and 
that newspapers throughout the country were shuttering their own locally produced 
magazines due to financial shortfalls was seemingly of little importance to most editors. 
Ultimately, they were less concerned with keeping up with the times, and more interested 
in keeping up with newsroom colleagues…and the Times. 
 
Study Limitations  
 John Harris left The Washington Post in 2006 after 21 years as a political reporter 
for the newspaper. Along with colleague Jim VanderHei, Harris wanted the Post to create 
a subsidiary publication that focused entirely on politics and policy. But Post executives 
never warmed to the idea, fearing that the new publication—even in a digital-only 
form—would siphon away precious advertising revenues from the print newspaper. So, 
Harris and VanderHei left the company, found financial backing from Albritton 
Communications, former owners of the Washington Evening Star in the mid- to late 
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1970s, and launched Politico.com and an accompanying free weekly print publication. 
Said Harris, whose website celebrated its sixth birthday in January 2013: 
“[O]rganizations like the Post or The New York Times have been insulated from the spirit 
of the [entrepreneurial] age—precisely because they were secure and prestigious places 
to work” (Rosen, 2006). In short, the companies’ past successes have contributed to their 
recent struggles. This point was later echoed by Melanie Sill, a former executive editor of 
the Sacramento Bee and The News & Observer in Charlotte, N.C., who left the 
newspaper industry for academia: “Organizations, especially those with long histories, 
are driven mostly by culture, and some of the newspaper industry’s greatest challenges 
are cultural, not strategic” (Bechtel, 2011). 
What makes these prestigious papers so distinct, in terms of the editorial 
resources they allocate to newsgathering and reporting, and the national and international 
scope of editorial coverage, is precisely what makes this study somewhat limited in 
scope. However, The Washington Post is a major metropolitan newspaper with a local 
circulation and advertising base. In that regard, the business underpinnings of the 
company are not all that different from most any other daily metropolitan paper in the 
United States. And because the business operation is not mutually exclusive from the 
editorial operation, the Post faces the same economic and technological challenges as 
most every other daily newspaper.  
As a case study, the research focuses on the history and evolution of The 
Washington Post Sunday magazine, with particular attention to the editorial decision-
making processes and attitudes of those in leadership positions at the publication. Those 
processes and attitudes were certainly shaped by a variety of internal conditions 
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somewhat unique to the Post: The newspaper is owned by a diversified company that 
includes education and cable television; the company is publicly traded, but the Graham 
family and close associates own the majority of voting shares; and the newspaper 
produces far more original editorial content about national and political issues in no small 
part due its geographic location in the nation’s capital. Because the Post Co. has been 
wildly successful financially thanks to the diversification of revenue streams—the 
newspaper contributed just 15% of the company’s total revenues in the first quarter of 
2012, yet lost $23 million in all (Chittum, 2012)—the Post magazine has enjoyed 
significant financial resources through the years, even though the publication has only 
rarely generated an annual profit. Newspapers whose Sunday magazines lost far less 
money have shuttered the publications. Lastly, the newspaper boasts a large internal 
talent pool from which to choose new editors of its magazine—if it wants to hire from 
within, which has been the norm over the past 50 years—and editors of the magazine 
have access to many talented potential writers in the Post newsroom.  
For all of these reasons, extending or generalizing the results of this study for 
application to other daily newspapers is difficult. However, I contend that the findings 
pertaining to social identity and its extension through institutional theory to better 
understand editorial decision-making and attitudes about changing professional values 
can be applied to daily newspaper journalists in most any market. Pfeffer (1994) has 
argued that people are limited in their “ability to even recognize the need for change, let 
alone to accomplish it” (304). When recognition does occur, resistance to change at the 
individual level can be attributed to cultural persistence within certain organizational 
settings (Zucker, 1977). The more institutionalized norms and practices are within an 
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organization, the more that the organization’s internal culture recognizes and rewards the 
status quo. Institutionalization often constrains individual behavior by limiting 
operational choices, preventing certain actions, and restraining resources allocation in the 
pursuit of innovation.  
 
Final Thoughts 
As I believe this study has shown, it is incredibly difficult for individuals to break 
free from the norms and practices that have long defined the professional positions they 
inhabit. Those who attempt to invariable meet resistance from people within the 
organization who seek to protect their own resources, internal status and power. For this 
reason, facilitating substantive changes that challenge the status quo must start at the 
organizational level, namely the top leadership of the organization.  
It is noteworthy that almost every editor and business-side executive interviewed 
for this study staunchly defended his or her role in improving the Post magazine. It didn’t 
matter if the magazine lost millions of dollars during their tenure, or made millions. It 
didn’t matter if Sunday circulation fell during their time with the publication, or if it rose. 
Only Donald Graham freely owned his perceived failures as a leader when it came to the 
Sunday magazine. He should have insisted on greater collaboration between the 
newsroom and advertising departments, Graham said. He should have been at least 
somewhat involved in hiring decisions, to ensure that people with the right professional 
experiences in the magazine and publishing were brought on, Graham added. He should 
have killed the magazine altogether following the 1986 relaunch debacle, Graham 
admitted.  
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But the reality is that Graham didn’t do any of these things during his 22 years as 
publisher of the Post newspaper. In terms of the magazine, he left decision-making 
largely in the hands of editorial-side people with little vested interest in fundamentally 
reevaluating the value and purpose of the section. Why would he do this? Why keep the 
magazine going during years of multimillion losses? According to most editors 
interviewed for this study, it was because Graham fully embraced the same high-
achieving journalistic identity of the Post that most every magazine editor embraced. If 
editors were happy with the magazine, then Graham was largely tolerant of some 
financial losses because he ultimately wanted his newspaper to be guided by a 
journalistic compass.   
Can a newspaper produce great journalism without a Sunday magazine? Of 
course it can. Does a newspaper need a Sunday magazine to maintain or grow its Sunday 
circulation? Of course not. But I would contend that a Sunday magazine, at least if its 
editors are publicly empowered by organizational leaders to experiment and innovate 
editorially and in collaboration with an equally empowered advertising department, could 
be an invaluable tool to win back print readers and advertisers. This would likely require 
the hiring of a magazine editor who would embrace such empowerment, and possibly 
even locating the magazine department away from the main newsroom so as to allow the 
department to develop its own norms, values and culture. As previously noted, evidence 
supports the idea that removing newspaper journalists from a traditional newsroom 
environment and placing them in a new group environment that includes business-side 
personnel will foster an increased market orientation toward their work (Fagerling and 
Norack, 2005). 
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Then again, perhaps recent changes in the publishing market will, incidentally, 
enable editors to stay the course. The case of The Washington Post Sunday magazine 
suggests a longtime misalignment between editorial and business values, with editorial 
values largely trumping the pursuit of revenue that are necessary to maintain the 
company’s operations. But today’s newspaper companies are increasingly reliant on 
circulation revenue—through raising newsstand and home-delivery prices, as well as 
charging readers to access online editions—to make up for losses on the print advertising 
front. Washingtonpost.com has announced plans to construct a “pay wall” around much 
of its content starting in the summer of 2013 (Berkovici, 2012). But print edition readers 
will rightfully come to expect more for their money, and a Sunday magazine is arguably 
the most distinct vehicle through which a newspaper could deliver an editorial experience 
unlike any other. Some advertisers might continue to forsake Sunday magazines, opting 
instead to hawk their wares and messages through lower cost media alternatives or media 
whose content better reflects an advertiser’s brand identity. But with the revenue model 
shifting toward circulation, such lost opportunities would be less consequential. 
Newspapers are working to supplement advertising revenues through the 
development of standalone niche magazines that cater to relatively affluent readers and 
advertisers. The profits earned by these magazines generally help subsidize newspaper 
operations. Some examples of newspapers that publish offshoot magazines include the 
Houston Chronicle (Gloss), the Dallas Morning News (FD Luxe), the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch (FEAST) and the Miami Herald (Indulge). The idea that a standalone magazine, 
an inserted magazine section or even a newspaper section that is conceptualized and 
designed in a magazine format to help subsidize “hard news” operations isn’t 
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revolutionary. Rather, editors rarely speak of it in those terms; that is likely because most 
editors want to be identified first and foremost as journalists, not businesspeople. 
However, when you are the editor of the nation’s most journalistically respected 
newspaper, there is little risk in speaking the truth. Bill Keller, then New York Times 
executive editor, said during a news staff meeting in 2006: “We don’t put out a daily 
newspaper; we put out a daily newspaper plus about 15 weekly magazines. Some of them 
are actual magazines. But a lot of them, although they’re printed on newsprint, are still—
in format, in conception, in design—magazines” (Calame, 2006). Keller freely 
acknowledged that the newspaper invests in “soft news” sections because they generate 
advertising revenues that “help subsidize the stuff that drew most of us into the business.” 
The “stuff” Keller was referring to was the core news reports that are the work of the 
national, foreign, metro, business, sports and culture news desks. “That’s the inner wall 
of the castle,” he said (Calame, 2006).  
Standing in defense of that wall, however, are not generic general-interest 
magazines. The sections do not yield profits simply because of their paper stock or page 
designs.9 Rather, almost all of them cater to a specific niche audience that businesses 
want to reach through advertising. Byron Calame, the Times’ public editor, had deep 
concerns about the strategy, worrying that the publication of “frivolous” content was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The	  Boston	  Phoenix	  is	  a	  good	  example.	  The	  alternative	  weekly	  newspaper	  changed	  
formats	  in	  late	  2012	  and	  became	  a	  glossy	  magazine.	  The	  weekly	  was	  merged	  with	  a	  
standalone	  entertainment	  publication,	  and	  the	  new	  Phoenix	  featured	  four-­‐color	  
printing	  throughout	  and	  more	  photography.	  However,	  the	  Phoenix	  went	  out	  of	  
business	  six	  months	  later.	  Although	  the	  leadership	  team	  had	  hoped	  the	  new	  format	  
would	  win	  the	  business	  of	  high-­‐end	  national	  advertisers,	  those	  advertisers	  largely	  
remained	  away.	  The	  readership	  of	  the	  Phoenix	  was	  still	  young	  and	  educated,	  but	  the	  
publication	  remained	  largely	  local	  in	  content	  (Kahn,	  2013).	  Format	  alone	  could	  not	  
repair	  the	  necessary	  interwoven	  connections	  between	  editorial	  content,	  readers	  and	  
advertisers.	  	  
	  
	   294	  
“risky venture” (2006) that could damage the Times’ reputation as a serious news 
organization. But I would argue that Calame’s fears are not born from a rational concern 
for the Times brand and economic well-being. Rather, they are rooted in Calame’s self 
perceptions and social identity, namely as someone who used to produce what he called 
“serious news.” As this study has shown, it is not always easy to embrace changes that 
can potentially challenge one’s identity.  
Most newspapers have been changing, though, often out fear of their own 
mortality. Some newspapers are cutting back on print editions, publishing just three days 
a week; Sunday is always one of those days. Other papers, namely The U-T—formerly 
known as the San Diego Union-Tribune—are experimenting with publishing their own 
Sunday magazines solely through tablet-based e-editions. These magazines often include 
photo slideshows, videos that complement text-based stories, and interactive graphics. If 
the largest reason for shuttering locally produced Sunday magazines is the high costs of 
production, then eliminating printing, binding, inserting and distribution is an obviously 
compelling idea. These also provide great opportunities for further study through the 
prisms of social identity and institutional theory. As news products evolve, the technical 
requirements of professional practices change, and the revenue balance slowly shifts 
away from advertisers and toward readers, scholars and practitioners would be well 
served by a better understanding of the various internal and external factors that influence 
editorial decision-making.  
The once sacrosanct church-state divide between editorial and advertising 
departments has diminished at many newspapers over the years, due in large part to 
increased revenue competition from local TV stations, city magazines and, most of all, 
	  
	   295	  
the Internet. However, additional implications from the findings of this study are that 
newspaper leaders must do a better job explaining to journalists the value of closer 
cooperation between the newsroom and business-oriented departments, namely 
advertising and circulation. It is not enough for a publisher or executive editor to simply 
call for closer cooperation when financial times become tough. The Washington Post’s 
decentralized newsroom structure provided section editors tremendous freedom to 
operate with little oversight, but it also fostered a disconnect between different section 
editors, and between section editors and advertising department personnel. Current 
publisher Katharine Weymouth has chided the various departments throughout the 
newspaper for acting as if they exist alone, and has implored them to work together. In 
telling this story, Medford (2011) explained that editors have become more amenable to 
communicating with business-side colleagues, but that journalists still make revenue-
based changes to the editorial product only when they are “comfortable” with the idea. 
As an example, Medford cited the running of strip ads on the bottom of the front pages of 
the Style and Sports sections. However, Medford has resisted allowing an ad to appear on 
the cover of the magazine—a publication that is distributed within a plastic bag that 
includes the comics section and free-standing inserts, and is then tucked within the 
Sunday newspaper—because she does not want to lose any editorial cover space. Clearly, 
change cannot occur from imploring alone.  
The Post’s Sunday magazine has similarly been allowed to lag on the digital 
front, despite the fact that the newspaper is actively seeking revenue growth online. None 
of the editors interviewed for this study embraced digital opportunities for the 
publication. Although the Post was among the first newspapers in the United States to 
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have a presence online, starting in 1996, none of the magazine editors since that time has 
put much effort in developing multimedia content to expand their publication’s 
readership and advertising revenue opportunities. Tom Shroder, Leithauser and Medford, 
the three editors who oversaw the magazine during this period, all said the topic would 
come up in meetings from time to time, but that the company never placed a priority on 
it. Evidence of that is clear from the magazine’s presence online. In late 2012, the 
magazine section was listed next to last, or ninth out of 10 categories, under the 
“Lifestyle” tab at the top of the website. Lifestyle is listed ninth out of 12 tabs. For those 
who are able to find the magazine section online, stories are largely cut and pasted from 
the print edition; only rarely do they contain photo slideshows of additional images or 
complementary video packages. All three of the magazine editors said they had never 
created unique content specific for the web, pointing to limited staff resources and a 
personal lack of interest in doing so. 
Another challenge for the Post moving forward is the ability of editors to 
regularly rework and refine the Sunday magazine. As the company’s newsroom resources 
have shrunk—the Post still has one of the largest newsroom workforces of any daily 
newspaper in the country, with approximately 600 people as of 2012 (Mufson, 2012)—
and the demands of the Internet have required journalists to work in both print and pixels, 
less time is available to experiment and innovate. In addition to currently running the 
Post’s Sunday magazine, Medford is editor of the Sunday Arts section and the Sunday 
Style section. Sunday Style is a tabloid version of the daily Style section. However, 
unlike the daily Style section, which largely features general interest content, Sunday 
Style focuses on entertainment and pop culture. Medford said she was tasked with the 
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additional responsibilities due to personnel cutbacks. Moreover, she said finding the time 
to reflect on her work, assess challenges and plan for the future is extremely difficult. 
Medford is the only editor of the Sunday magazine whose editorial responsibilities 
extended beyond the magazine.  
Steve Coll wore multiple hats for a time as editor of the magazine in the early 
’90s, but he was charged with overseeing both the editorial and business operations of the 
publication. Donald Graham (2010) said he asked Coll to do both jobs in an effort to 
bridge the divide that had long separated editorial and advertising. However, when Coll 
left the magazine about a year later to become managing editor of the entire newspaper, 
the dual editor-publisher position was abolished. Graham said Glenn Frankel, Coll’s 
successor as editor of the magazine, lacked Coll’s understanding of business and that 
newsroom leaders prioritized filling the position with the best journalist they could find. 
For newspaper publishers moving forward, there may be great value in providing 
section editors with various business-side responsibilities. It would surely require the 
hiring of people with more diverse skill sets, but it would also accomplish the 
increasingly important goal of helping newsroom personnel become true partners with 
business-side colleagues. It would also fundamentally change organizational operations 
that have enabled the maintenance of the status quo. In interviews for this study, most 
Post magazine editors said they did not particularly enjoy working with business-side 
leaders because those leaders cared about revenue generation far more than they cared 
about the journalistic product. But by giving editors some responsibility over the business 
operations of the print sections or digital products they oversee, it is highly likely that 
greater cross-departmental understanding between editorial and business would ensue. If 
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Sunday magazine editors want their sections to survive, it is in their interest to re-
conceptualize their own identities, both within the newsroom and throughout the industry 
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